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actions 
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 This thesis consists of three essays that examine the role of managerial traits (specifically 
managerial conservatism, interest alignment with shareholders and debtholders, beliefs about 
firm value and hubris) on their firms’ acquisition and CSR choices and their valuation effects. 
All the essays use hand-collected pension plan data. 
 The first essay finds support for a managerial conservatism explanation for acquirer 
acquisition choices and M&A price effects. More conservatively managed acquirers are more 
likely to use cash as the method of payment and to target less risky firms (e.g. being public or 
having lower leverage or managerial conservatism). We find that acquirers experience poorer 
price effects for stock versus cash payment even after controlling for the equity price effect and 
that these price effects monotonically deteriorate with increasing managerial conservatism, 
consistent with the agency problems associated with managerial conservatism. These results 
remain robust using propensity score matching, a four- or five-factor model, the BHAR 
methodology, top five executives instead of CEO when measuring managerial conservatism, and 
the inclusion of various controls (e.g., multiple or single acquirers, policy uncertainty, business 
cycle, managerial hubris, firm mispricing and Republican orientation). 
 The second essay finds that managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) 
of acquirers is positively related to the likelihood of using stock (cash) as the M&A payment 
method, positively (negatively) related with M&A acquirer equity price effects, and negatively 
(positively) related with M&A acquirer bond price effects. While managerial conservatism is 
positively related with an acquirer’s CSR ranking it is negatively related with an acquirer’s 
M&A price effects. Information about an acquirer’s misvaluation contained in pre-
announcement short selling by investors and the abnormal trading of its executives also affects 
the acquirer’s choice of payment method and M&A price effects. 
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 In the third essay, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the dynamic relations 
among CSR composite rankings, firm undervaluation, executive compensation and corporate 
governance. Our measure of firm undervaluation based on insider trading captures information 
not captured by commonly used mispricing measures. We use system-GMM and 3SLS for a 
system of four simultaneous equations to control for endogeneity and simultaneity. Our evidence 
indicates that a firm’s future CSR ranking is positively related to firm undervaluation and 
negatively related to managerial conservatism. We find that the trading of managers reveals 
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 This thesis consists of three essays that examine the role of managerial traits (specifically 
managerial conservatism, interest alignment with shareholders and debtholders, beliefs about 
firm value and hubris) on their firms’ acquisition and CSR choices and their valuation effects. 
All the essays use hand-collected pension plan data.  
 The first essay (Chapter 2) focuses more on managerial conservatism, which is proxied 
primarily by two managerial pension-related metrics. The primary objective of the essay is to 
examine whether managerial conservatism, is (1) an important determinant of acquisition choices 
such as target risk level and method of payment; and (2) can account for differences in the 
announcement and post-announcement price effects of M&As on acquirers. Thus, this paper also 
addresses a topic identified for further research in Sundaram and Yermack (2007); namely, the 
effect of executive pension plans as a form of managerial compensation on managerial 
conservatism and firm behavior.  
 The first essay differs from previous studies in a number of other ways. First, we examine a 
time period which captures the mandated changes in the disclosure of executive and director 
compensation in the aftermath of the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
(including the mandated requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform). Second, we 
not only examine announcement returns but we also examine post-announcements returns using 
benchmark models that are more robust and commonly used in current research. Third, with a 
less dated sample we capture the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, and thus, are better able 
to make a more timely contribution to the ongoing debate on the driving forces behind returns on 
and after M&A announcements and to the more general literature of corporate governance, 
director and executive compensation and firm performance. Fourth, we appear to be the first to 
use PBHAR (Pure Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns) as an alternative measure to account for 
issue price effects when examining the (post-) announcement price effects for acquirers using the 
stock method of payment. 
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 The first essay finds support for a managerial conservatism explanation for acquirer 
acquisition choices and M&A price effects. More conservatively managed acquirers are more 
likely to use cash as the method of payment and to target less risky firms (e.g. being public or 
having lower leverage or managerial conservatism). Our results from both time-series and cross-
sectional panel logistic regressions support the conclusion that firms with higher inside debt and 
compensation leverage are more likely to use cash versus stock as the method of payment over 
the next two years. We observe a monotonic increasing (decreasing) relation between the quartile 
assignments of pension-related metrics and the managerial acquisitiveness with cash (stock) as 
the method of payment. The results are not weakened by the inclusion of a number of other 
control variables with statistical power such as the relative differences of the two pension plan 
metrics and debt-to-assets between the acquirer and the target, CEO age, hubris, political 
orientation, expected CEO tenure, announcement returns, stock price, market capitalization, and 
cash flow risk.  
 We find that acquirers experience poorer price effects for stock versus cash payment even 
after controlling for the equity price effect and that these price effects monotonically deteriorate 
with increasing managerial conservatism, consistent with the agency problems associated with 
managerial conservatism. Without first adjusting for any equity issue effect, our CAR 
(Cumulative Abnormal Return) results for the announcement window [-1, 1] days based on the 
five-factor (Fama and French, 2015) and four-factor (Carhart, 1997) models confirm previous 
findings that acquirers using stock (cash) as the method of payment significantly underperform 
(outperform) their pricing benchmarks. With such an adjustment (Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos, 2016), we find that the Pure CAR (PCAR) for [-1, 1] for acquirers using stock are still 
negative but now are insignificant. For the three post-announcement windows, the (P)Alpha are 
insignificantly positive (significantly negative) for acquirers using cash (stock) as the method of 
payment. When we differentiate by method of payment and pension-related metric we observe 
that the PCAR and PAlpha monotonically worsen with increasing inside debt (i.e., greater 
managerial conservatism).  The announcement price effects using the factor models are robust 
when we add various control variables that have been identified as being significant determinants 
of such effects. The announcement and post-announcement price effects using the five (or four) 
factor models also are robust when we measure price effects using the BHARs or PBHARs.  
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 The first essay makes a number of contributions to the executive behavior, executive 
compensation and M&A literatures. First, we show that managerial conservatism is a plausible 
alternative explanation for explaining various acquisition choices and associated price effects. 
Second, we contribute to the ongoing and lively debate dealing with perceptions of a disconnect 
between executive compensation and firm performance. We contribute by examining the effects 
of the components of CEO and board compensations and the duration of such compensations 
(i.e., immediate or deferred). Third, we contribute to the literature that reports that older CEOs 
are associated with less risky firm investment policies (Serfling, 2014), that CEOs with shorter 
horizons are associated with more agency costs, lower firm valuation and higher levels of 
information risk (Antia, Pantzalis and Park, 2010), and that managerial political orientations (as 
proxied by Republican-supporting managers) are associated with conservative corporate policies 
(e.g., Hutton, Jiang and Kumar, 2014) and firm tax avoidance (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie and 
Graffin, 2015). Fourth, we contribute to the literature on managerial hubris (overconfidence) 
where M&As are used to fulfil desires for large firm size (Jensen, 1986) or to build empires 
(Baumol, 1959; Mueller, 1969). 
 The second essay (Chapter 3) finds that managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(debtholders) of acquirers, which is the focus of this essay, is positively related to the likelihood 
of using stock (cash) as the M&A payment method and is positively (negatively) related with 
M&A acquirer price effects. The essay has four major objectives. The first objective is to 
examine the effects of managerial interest alignment with its shareholders (MIAwEQ) and with 
its debtholders (MIAwDBT) that we introduce to the literature, informativeness of executive 
insider trading about their firm’s value as captured by their abnormal net purchase ratio 
(CANIPR) that compliments the measure of (Akbulut, 2013), managerial conservatism measured 
by pension-related metrics (e.g., InsDbt) and corporate social responsibility ranking (CSRcom) 
on M&A method-of-payment choices and (post-) announcement price effects. The second 
objective is to assess the determinants of the announcement price effects when the price effects 
are after the removal of the equity issue effect associated with the stock method of payment for 
not only shareholders but also bondholders (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2016). The third 
objective is to use the two-stage regression model of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) with 
additional determinants of the price effects to examine the portion of the mean price effect 
attributable to arbitrage short selling and to use two covariance decomposition methodologies to 
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examine the proportional explanatory power of each determinant in the second-stage estimation. 
The fourth and final objective is to extend the literature by being the first to identify the 
determinants of managerial interest alignment with its shareholders and with its debtholders, 
informativeness of executive insider trading about their firm’s value as captured by their 
abnormal net purchase ratio, managerial conservatism measured by one of the two pension-
related metrics and corporate social responsibility ranking in a simultaneous five-equation model 
estimated using three stage least squares (3SLS).  
 Using Probit regressions, we observe that the likelihood that stock is chosen as the method 
of payment increases with greater managerial interest alignments with shareholders and 
decreases with greater managerial interest alignments with debtholders. The likelihood of cash 
(stock) being used as the method of target payment is higher with lower (higher) acquirer 
misvaluation (consistent with Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone, 2015), and is higher (lower) 
with higher managerial conservatism, proportion of institutional ownership, acquirer leverage, 
managerial relative incentive ratio, and volatility of returns. Only the choice of cash payment is 
related (positively) to a firm’s CSR ranking.  
 When we single sort the pure stock price effects for acquirers by method of payment that is 
adjusted for the equity issue effect, we obtain a result similar to that of Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2016) that the mean price effect decreases substantially in magnitue for the acquirers 
using stock as the method of payment. To examine equity issue effects for bondholders, we first 
single sort the pure bond price effects for acquirers by method of payment that is adjusted for the 
equity issue effect. We find that the mean positive price effect decreases substantially in 
magnitue and becomes insignificant for the acquirers using stock as the method of payment, and 
that the pure price effects are significantly superior for the stock versus cash payment method for 
the announcement window and the three post-announcement windows. For all double sorts, we 
observe that both the announcement and post-announcement price effects for acquirers improve 
as the pre-announcement managerial interest alignment with its debtholders (shareholders) 
increases (decreases). 
 We continue by examining whether various factors identified in the literature can explain the 
pure price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements. As expected, pure price effects for 
acquirers are monotonically more positive (negative) for greater firm managerial interest 
alignments with shareholders (debtholders). We apply the two-stage regression model of 
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Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) to gauge the impact of arbitrage short-selling on the pure 
stock price effects during the M&A announcement window. We find strong evidence for the 
importance of short selling in explaining the pure stock price effects for acquirers for M&A 
announcements, and for the explanatory power importance of managerial interest alignment with 
its shareholders and bondholders, and for acquirer misvaluation as perceived pre-announcement 
by the general market based on their short-selling behavior or the executives of the acquirer 
based on their trading behavior. 
 Among our many findings based on the simultaneous five-equation model, we find that: (i) 
pre- to post-M&A changes in managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) are 
negatively (positively) related with changes in managerial conservatism, and both are related 
with changes in CSR ranking; (ii) pre- to post-M&A changes in the cumulative abnormal net 
insider purchase ratio is positively associated with changes in CSR, managerial incentive, and 
managerial interest alignment with debtholders (only when the method of M&A payment is 
stock); (iii) the pre- to post-M&A changes in the CSR composite rankings are positively related 
to changes in the cumulative abnormal net insider purchase ratio, managerial conservatism 
measured by the pension-related metrics, managerial incentive, institutional ownership, 
managerial interest alignment with both its shareholders and bondholders, and residual analyst 
coverage; and (iv) the pre- to post-M&A changes in managerial conservatism are positively 
related to changes in compensation leverage, CSR ranking, managerial incentive, institutional 
ownership, and managerial interest alignment with debtholders. This essay makes a number of 
contributions to the literature on managerial interest alignment and managerial conservatism,  
informed investor trading, and  corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
 The third essay (Chapter 4) reports the estimates for a four-equation system using system-
GMM and 3SLS that addresses a more comprehensive set of possible endogeneity issues among 
four dependent variables (CSR, firm undervaluation, executive compensation, and firm 
governance). Our evidence indicates that a firm’s future CSR ranking is positively related to firm 
undervaluation and negatively related to managerial conservatism. We find that the trading of 
managers reveals informed information about the “error-in-expectations” embedded in firm 
valuations.  
 To provide tests of the “errors-in-expectations” hypothesis for the undervaluation of firm CSR 
performance, we develop and use an undervaluation metric that is based on the findings of 
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various studies that insiders tend to be better informed about the true values of their firms, and 
such insider trades by managers are profitable. We provide evidence that the four dependent 
variables are dynamic and endogenous as are some of the control variables. As a result, we 
employ a dynamic system-GMM estimator to our panel data to quantify the dynamic and 
simultaneous relationships between these four variables. The inferences from the dynamic 
system-GMM estimations are then compared with those from 3SLS estimations of the four-
equation system. We examine previously untested proxies for two of our dependent variables; 
namely, inside debt and compensation leverage as proxies for executive conservatism, and 
insider trade behavior for firm undervaluation.  
 The third essay contributes to the literature in six distinct ways. First, we test dynamic and 
simultaneous relations among CSR, firm undervaluation, executive compensation and corporate 
governance. Second, our evidence that firm undervaluation is positively associated with a firm’s 
future CSR ranking provides new avenues of enquiry for both insider trading and firm 
misvaluation research. Third, we show that two metrics based on executive pension plans (i.e., 
inside debt and compensation leverage) have corporate effects that differ from those from firm 
leverage. Fourth, this study contributes to the corporate mispricing literature in that our insider 
trading based undervaluation metric identifies a unique mispricing component that is not 
captured by the commonly used mispricing measures in the literature. It also has significant 
explanatory power for explaining a firm’s future CSR ranking, executive compensation and 
corporate governance. Fifth, this essay contributes to the literature by further emphasizing the 
need to examine the relations among independent and dependent variables and their relations 
with CSR rankings and to the need to use more sophisticated econometric techniques (such as 
system-GMM and 3SLS) to estimate simultaneous systems of equations to control for 
endogeneity and simultaneity. Sixth, this essay contributes to the literature on the asymmetric 










 The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature contains many papers addressing acquisition 
choices.1 The search for growth opportunities (e.g. Servaes, 1991; Rousseau, 2009) as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q or some other measure is given as a motive for acquisitions.2 Acquirer misvaluation is 
one of the explanations for an acquirer’s choice of stock versus cash as the method of payment.3 
While various studies find that the price effects for acquirers are poorer for the stock versus cash 
method of payment, 4 Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) find that the difference between the 
two is no longer significant when the estimates of the M&A price effects reflect the price effects 
associated with equity offerings when the M&A method of payment is stock.  
 Since acquisition choices and their price effects may be associated with different risks (e.g., 
Kim, 2014) and managerial risk tolerance, managerial conservatism is expected to play an 
important role in the choice of targets and payment methods, and the immediate and longer-term 
price effects associated with M&A announcements (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; May, 1995; 
Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2014). Indirect debt (present value of executive pension benefits 
divided by total firm assets) is one measure that is associated with conservative firm policies 
(e.g., Wei and Yermack, 2011) and with agency issues that destroy firm value (Eisdorfer, 
Giaccotto, and White, 2015). Whether indirect debt and another pension-related measure called 
compensation leverage (i.e., present value of executive pension benefits divided by total 
executive compensation) play a significant role in explaining acquisition choices and their price 
effects for acquirers remains untested. 
                                                          
1 We use the term M&As since the terms mergers and acquisitions are often used interchangeably in the literature 
(e.g. Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2004; Boehmer and Zhang, 2008; Liu and Wu, 2014). 
2 Dybvig and Warachka (2015) criticize the use of Tobin's Q as a measure of firm performance, and suggest two 
new measures of operating efficiency. 
3 Examples include Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswananthan (2004), Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh (2006). 
4 Examples include Loughran and Vijh (1997); Rau and Vermaelen (1998); Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) 




 Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to examine whether managerial conservatism, 
which is proxied primarily by the two managerial pension-related metrics, is (1) an important 
determinant of acquisition choices such as target risk level and method of payment; and (2) can 
account for differences in the announcement and post-announcement price effects of M&As on 
acquirers. Thus, this paper also addresses a topic identified for further research in Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007); namely, the effect of executive pension plans as a form of managerial 
compensation on managerial conservatism and firm behavior.  
 Our paper also differs from previous studies in a number of other ways. First, we examine a 
time period which captures the mandated changes in the disclosure of executive and director 
compensation in the aftermath of the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
(including the mandated requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform). One such 
change is the amendments adopted by the SEC in 2006 to the disclosure requirements for 
“executive and director compensation, related party transactions, director independence and 
other corporate governance matters and security ownership of officers and directors” (SEC, 
2006). Second, we not only examine announcement returns but we also examine post-
announcements returns using benchmark models that are more robust and commonly used in 
current research. Third, with a less dated sample we capture the effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis, and thus, are better able to make a more timely contribution to the ongoing debate on the 
driving forces behind returns on and after M&A announcements and to the more general 
literature of corporate governance, director and executive compensation and firm performance. 
Fourth, we appear to be the first to use PBHAR (Pure Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns) as an 
alternative measure to account for issue price effects when examining the (post-) announcement 
price effects for acquirers using the stock method of payment. 
 Our results from both time-series and cross-sectional panel logistic regressions support the 
conclusion that firms with higher inside debt and compensation leverage are more likely to use 
cash versus stock as the method of payment over the next two years. Based on the logistic 
marginal effects of inside debt for year t – 1, the probability that cash will be the M&A method-
of-payment is 4.8% higher (with one-unit increase) for the highest versus lowest inside debt 
quartile. We observe a monotonic increasing (decreasing) relation between the quartile 
assignments of pension-related metrics and the managerial acquisitiveness with cash (stock) as 
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the method of payment.5 The logistic marginal effect of inside debt for the highest quartile is 4.0% 
lower with a one-unit increase than that for firms in the lowest quartile of inside debt when stock 
is the method of payment. The results are not weakened by the inclusion of a number of other 
control variables with statistical power such as the relative differences of the two pension plan 
metrics and debt-to-assets between the acquirer and the target, CEO age, hubris, political 
orientation, expected CEO tenure, announcement returns, stock price, market capitalization, and 
cash flow risk. 
 Without first adjusting for any equity issue effect, our CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) 
results for the announcement window [-1, 1] days based on the five-factor (Fama and French, 
2015) and four-factor (Carhart, 1997) models confirm previous findings that acquirers using 
stock (cash) as the method of payment significantly underperform (outperform) their pricing 
benchmarks. With such an adjustment (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2016), we find that the 
PCAR for [-1, 1] for acquirers using stock are still negative but now are insignificant. For the 
three post-announcement windows, the (P)Alpha are insignificantly positive (significantly 
negative) for acquirers using cash (stock) as the method of payment. When we differentiate by 
method of payment and pension-related metric we observe that the PCAR and PAlpha 
monotonically worsen with increasing inside debt (i.e., greater managerial conservatism).6  
 The announcement price effects using the factor models are robust when we add various 
control variables that have been identified as being significant determinants of such effects.  The 
announcement and post-announcement price effects using the five (or four) factor models also 
are robust when we measure price effects using the BHARs or PBHARs.  
 We make a number of contributions to the executive behavior, executive compensation and 
M&A literatures. 
 First, we show that managerial conservatism is a plausible alternative explanation for 
explaining various acquisition choices and associated price effects. The finding of improving 
                                                          
5  We report results for both inside debt and compensation leverage quartiles in Table 4. For all the subsequent tests, 
our results using compensation leverage are unreported for brevity purposes as they are similar to those for inside 
debt. All of these results are available upon request. 
6 PAlpha where the P refers to pure are the estimated intercepts (commonly referred to as Jensen alphas) obtained 
when a four- or five-factor model, such as the Fama and French (2015) model, are estimated for post-announcement 
windows and then adjusted to account for the equity issue effect as detailed in Appendix B if the M&A method of 
payment is stock. 
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announcement and post-announcement price effects with higher CEO and board compensations 
is consistent with the notion that existing executive compensation practices appear to reward 
decision-making productivity. However, since announcement and post-announcement price 
effects improve with less deferred compensation (lower inside debt), this implies that the 
duration of the compensation package determining managerial conservatism is an important 
determinant of these price effects. 7 
 Second, we contribute to the ongoing and lively debate dealing with perceptions of a 
disconnect between executive compensation and firm performance that has led to repeated calls 
for changes in corporate compensation structures including say on pay which is required under 
Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Among the studies that examine the association of 
M&A decisions with CEO or board compensations, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that 
acquirers perform more poorly when their CEOs have small equity stakes. We contribute by 
examining the effects of the components of CEO and board compensations and the duration of 
such compensations (i.e., immediate or deferred).  
 Third, we contribute to the literature that reports that older CEOs are associated with less 
risky firm investment policies (Serfling, 2014), that CEOs with shorter horizons are associated 
with more agency costs, lower firm valuation and higher levels of information risk (Antia, 
Pantzalis and Park, 2010), and that managerial political orientations (as proxied by Republican-
supporting managers) are associated with conservative corporate policies (e.g., Hutton, Jiang and 
Kumar, 2014) and firm tax avoidance (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie and Graffin, 2015). In 
contrast to the significant effect of CEO tenure, we find that neither managerial political 
orientation nor CEO age are significant determinants of the announcement price effects for 
acquirers.  
 Fourth, we contribute to the literature on managerial hubris (overconfidence) where M&As 
are used to fulfil desires for large firm size (Jensen, 1986) or to build empires (Baumol, 1959; 
Mueller, 1969). Consistent with the findings of Roll (1986), we find that the announcement price 
effects for acquirers are significantly and negatively related with hubris (overconfidence) for 
both stock and cash M&A methods of payment. Our finding of a significantly negative relation 
                                                          
7  Our findings appear to be inconsistent with the conjecture that inside debt in practice is optimal (e.g., Edmans and 




between managerial overconfidence and announcement price effects is consistent with the 
findings of Goel and Thakor (2008) that firm value declines beyond a certain point with 
increasing managerial overconfidence. Furthermore, by controlling for the convexity of 
managerial compensation (i.e., proportion of compensation-based compensation) by including 
inside debt or alternatively compensation leverage, our finding is consistent with a prediction of 
the theoretical model of Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011) that more highly convex managerial 
compensation is required to motivate increasingly overconfident managers to undertake valuable 
risky projects. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports and analyses the empirical 
findings that examine the impact of managerial conservatism on the acquisition choices of 
acquirers and the price effects of their acquisitions. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) find that the incentive for managers to build their reputations 
results in conservatism and distorts the investment policies of firms in favor of relatively safe 
projects. May (1995) claims that managers consider personal risk when making decisions that 
affect firm risk. Milidonis and Stathopoulos (2014) find that risk-averse CEOs reduce firm risk, 
even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Kim (2014) finds that acquirers with 
conservative CEOs are more likely to use cash as the method of payment for M&As. Thus, our 
first two testable hypotheses are: 
𝐻0
1: Acquirers with more conservative managers are more likely to acquire less risky (e.g., 
public) firms.8 
𝐻0
2:  Acquirers with more conservative managers are more likely to choose cash as the 
method of payment. 
 Low (2006) finds that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low 
managerial equity-based incentives. Theory predicts that CEOs holding large amounts of inside 
debt (i.e., present value of executive pensions divided by total assets) will display lower levels of 
risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In general, the literature suggests that 
                                                          
8 Pension-related compensation is examined for CEOs and Total or cash compensation is examined for the CEOs 
and directors throughout this paper to maintain consistency with most of the literature. 
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managers who are heavily compensated with debt-based instruments, such as pensions, tend to 
manage the firm more conservatively because they are more exposed to default risk (Sundaram 
and Yermack, 2007). Further, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) report that the inside 
debt holdings of CEOs expose the CEOs to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, 
since such claims are generally unsecured and unfunded firm liabilities. Cassell et al. (2012) 
provide evidence that CEOs with large inside debt holdings manage the firm more 
conservatively. This leads to the expectation that the choice of cash as the method of payment by 
acquirers depends on whether the CEO’s compensation is more immediate (such as cash 
compensation) or more distant (such as pension fund entitlements). Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
𝐻0
3: The relative importance of pension obligations to the firm (i.e., inside debt) and pension 
compensation to firm executives (i.e., compensation leverage) is positively related to the choice 
of cash as the method of payment by acquirers. 
 Dybvig and Warachka (2015) provide compelling evidence that the relationship between firm 
performance and Tobin’s Q is confounded by endogeneity. Managerial inefficiency due to 
conservative underinvestment lowers firm performance but increases Tobin’s Q. Although 
Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White (2015) find that the pension plans of top executives are 
associated with agency problems and negatively affect future firm performances, some scholars 
find evidence that inside debt could be optimal and efficient. 9  Hegde and Mishra (2017) 
demonstrate that value is created when risk takers acquire risk-avoiding target firms, but this 
value is destroyed when bidders with a conservative investment policy acquire risk-taking target 
firms. We expect announcement and post-announcement returns of acquirers who use different 
methods of payment will be impacted by the managerial conservatism associated with 
managerial pension-related compensation. In particular, we expect that announcement and post-
announcement returns worsen with an increasing reliance on pension plan compensation. Thus, 
our fourth hypothesis is: 
𝐻0
4: The (post-) announcement CAR (and BHAR) adjusted for the equity issue effect for both 
cash and stock financed M&As deteriorate as the ratio of pension plan obligations to total assets 
increases. 
                                                          
9  See e.g. Edmans and Liu (2010), Sundaram and Yermack (2007), Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2010), 
Campbell, Galpin, and Johnson (2016). 
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 Our conjecture is based on the findings that managerial and director compensations can be 
related to future firm performance.10 The productivity (or optimal contracting) view argues that 
pay effectively rewards scarce decision-maker (executive or director) talent and productivity 
since pay is the result of efficient bargaining between shareholders and managers that aims to 
best mitigate the principal-agent problem.11 In contrast, the entrenchment (or managerial power) 
view argues that current pay practices are inefficient wealth transfers from shareholders to 
decision makers due to the discretion that the latter exercise over setting their own pay (Bebchuk, 
Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Several studies report that board 
effectiveness is adversely affected by informational asymmetry problems between management 
and the board, and by board cultures that discourage constructive criticism (e.g., Jensen, 1993). 
Other studies find that higher managerial compensation levels are associated with interlocking 
boards of directors (Hallock, 1997), and that CEO compensation is related to a CEO’s risk-
aversion and time preference (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Among the studies that examine 
the relation between executive compensation and firm performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003), excess compensation of directors and/or CEOs generally 
is found to be related to poor future firm stock market performance (Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 
2006; Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2014).12 In contrast, Nguyen and Nielsen (2014) find that the 
executive pay-contribution relationship is stronger for higher levels of compensation and that the 
labor market is effective in sorting executive pay with executive performance. On the other hand, 
total compensation when more immediate is also expected to have a different impact on acquirer 
returns than when it is more distant (or when pension fund entitlements are more dominant). 
Thus, our fifth hypothesis is:  
𝐻0
5: The (post-) announcement CAR (and BHAR) adjusted for the equity issue effect for both 
cash and stock financed M&As improve with increasing total executive compensation. 
 Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) document that the announcement returns of stock deals 
is positive once the price pressure from M&A arbitrageurs is controlled for. Savor and Lu (2009) 
document that stock acquirers do not underperform a well-chosen control group (i.e., bidders that 
                                                          
10 See e.g. Murphy (1999), Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006), and Agrawal and Chadha (2006). 
11 This view began with Lucas (1978) and has been extended by Tervio (2008), Gabaix and Landier (2008), amongst 
others. See Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2013) for an excellent discussion on the evolution of what we 
know about executive compensation. 
12 Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) report largely similar results when they eliminate firms making acquisitions during 
the year prior to portfolio formation. 
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subsequently cancel announced stock transactions for some exogenous reason). Officer, Poulsen 
and Stegemoller (2009) report significantly higher acquirer returns for stock-swap acquisitions of 
difficult-to-value targets. Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) document that once the equity 
issue effect is controlled for, the value effect of stock-deals and cash-deals are not statistically 
different. Nevertheless, we expect superior (post-) announcement price effects for acquirers 
using cash versus those using stock as the method of payment when we control for relative 
managerial conservatism and the equity issue effect. Thus, our sixth hypothesis is: 
 𝐻0
6: The (post-) announcement price effects are superior for acquirers using cash versus those 
using stock as the method of payment after controlling for relative managerial conservatism and 
the equity issue effect. 
2.3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 We collect our initial sample of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) announced from 1992 to 
2014 from the Thomson Securities Data Company (SDC) database. M&As retained for further 
analysis are those for deal values of at least $1 million where the acquirer seeks to acquire more 
than 50% of the shares of the target to own 100% of the target’s equity at the completion of the 
transaction, were completed within 1000 days to avoid look-ahead bias, and were publicly traded 
domestic acquirers with return data available in the CRSP data base and share prices exceeding 
$1 on the day before the announcement date. We also removed acquirers that are ADRs, REITs, 
Closed-end funds, and otherwise not standard common equity as in Diether, Lee and Werner 
(2009). We hand-collect additional information on the pension plans of all firm executives 
(typically five per firm-year) and on the M&As such as withdrawn dates, methods of payment, 
and closing dates.13  
 We obtain accounting data from 1991 to 2014 from the COMPUSTAT Annual File, market 
data (e.g. shares outstanding and returns) from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
institutional holdings from Thomson Financial (based on 13F filings), and CEO age and 
compensation data for senior managers and directors from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp if 
available for the year prior to the M&A announcement. For some of our analyses, we use the 
initial sample of firms in Compustat and CRSP. After dropping some M&As with acquirers 
                                                          
13 The size of our sample is comparable to other studies that use hand-collected data on M&A deals (e.g., Boone and 
Mulherin, 2007, 2008; Liu and Wu, 2014). As previously found by Liu and Wu (2014), we identify some incorrect 
method of payment entries in the M&A data available from the Thomson Security Data Company database. 
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whose data are missing in either COMPUSTAT or Execucomp, our final sample has 11,417 
M&A announcements involving 6598 unique acquirers. The method of payment is stock for 
2344 M&As, cash for 5645 M&As, and mixed stock and cash for 3428 M&As.  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
 Panel A of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all of our variables measured one year 
prior to the M&A announcements for the firm-year observations for our initial sample. Panel B 
presents similar statistics for the 11,417 M&A announcements (involving 6598 unique firms and 
8189 unique acquirer-year observations) in our final sample. Acquirers in our final sample have 
average inside debt and compensation leverage of 0.624 and 0.093, respectively, after both have 
been multiplied by 1000 for expositional purposes throughout the paper.14 The acquirers have a 
mean director total compensation of $110,564, a mean CEO total compensation of $7,166,570, a 
mean institutional ownership fraction of 0.510, a mean market capitalization of $3.011 billion, a 
mean annual share turnover of 1.564, and a mean price of about $26. We find that acquirers 
generally have higher mean CEO and director total compensations than those of the initial 
sample (see Panel A of Table 2.1). The average acquirer is larger in size with higher sales, higher 
share turnover and share price, more positive past returns, and higher institutional ownership and 
market capitalization. Benchmarked against the sample that also includes nonacquirers, the 
average acquirer has a lower cash flow risk and debt/asset ratio (0.040 and 0.241, respectively, 
compared to 0.061 and 0.297 for the benchmark sample). Panel C reports summary statistics for 
the sample of SEO firms that are available from the Thompson Financial SDC New Issues 
Database that are used when estimating the equity issue effect associated with an M&A acquirer 
using the stock method of payment. 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
 Panels A and B of Table 2.2 report correlations between the director and executive 
compensation variables for the initial and final sample of acquirers, respectively, for which such 
data are available. All correlations are consistent with previous studies. Compensation leverage 
                                                          
14 The methods for computing inside debt and compensation leverage are described in Appendix A. 
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and inside debt are correlated at 0.603 in the initial sample and at 0.576 in the final sample. 
Nevertheless, any multicollinearity problem among variables is generally slight, as the values of 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are low enough to be very acceptable.15 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Unless stated otherwise, the presence of an endogeneity problem with the variables used in 
the regressions in this section of the paper is rejected using a Hausman-Wu test. We report 
results using the characteristics of the CEO, and generally only report results that are different 
when we replace CEO characteristics with those of the top five executives. 
2.4.1 Managerial Conservatism, Target Riskiness and Debt Payment 
 Since our concern is with the effect of managerial conservatism, we begin by examining the 
determinants of managerial conservatism and how managerial conservatism changes post-
acquisition for single and multiple acquirers (i.e., acquirers who make more than one acquisition 
during the examined period).  For this purpose, we compute the change in compensation leverage 
as ΔCompLev = CompLevpost – CompLevpre. We compute the change in inside debt in three 
ways; namely, ΔInsDebt1= [PVBpost / TApost] - [PVBpre / TApre]; ΔInsDebt2 = [PVBpost - PVBpre] 
/ TApre; and ΔInsDebt3 = [PVBpost / (TApost – TAacquired)] - [PVBpre / TApre], where ΔInsDebt2 
uses the same total assets pre- and post-announcement, and ΔInsDebt3 removes the total assets 
of the acquired when computing the inside debt post-announcement. The summary statistics for 
the full sample, the subsample of acquirers and the subsample of non-acquirers are presented in 
panels A, B and C, respectively, of Table 2.3. We observe quite different results for the two 
subsamples. All the means and medians are negative and significant for the acquirers. In contrast, 
all the means and medians are positive insignificant. The magnitudes of these averages, however, 
are quite small. 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 To identify the determinants of the pre-to-post announcement changes in these proxies for 
managerial conservatism, we run a series of cross-sectional regressions for each acquisition date 
                                                          
15 In all the regressions throughout this paper, the rule of thumb used to check for troublesome multicollinearity is 
that the variance inflation factor (VIF) is ten or greater. However, whenever the VIF exceeds four and is below ten, 
other factors that affect the stability of the estimates are examined to ensure the consistency of the estimations. See, 
e.g., Belsley (1984) and O’Brien (2007) for more details. 
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and report their time-series averages in Table 2.4. Based on these results, we observe the 
relations for single acquirers, multiple acquirers and non-acquirers with their high and low 
managerial conservatism terciles where the terciles assignments are based on either the InsDebt 
or CompLev values for the pre-announcement period. We observe that the change in managerial 
conservatism generally is negative and significantly related with both single and multiple 
acquirers in both the low and high terciles of pre-announcement managerial conservatism. We 
also observe that the magnitude and significance of the mean estimated coefficients is almost 
always higher for single versus multiple acquirers. A number of other variable have a significant 
effect on managerial conservatism for all eight regression tabulations in Table 2.4. The effects 
are significantly negative for cash mergers, low GDP growth (LGG), a Republican Party 
orientation of managers (MGR) and policy uncertainty (PUI) and significantly positive for equity 
market capitalization (CAP), more than 67% of CEO’s stock options in the money (Hubris), 
mispricing measure (MP-FM) and return run up (Return). 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 We continue with a test of our first hypothesis (𝐻0
1) by examining if more conservative 
managers are more likely to acquire less risky targets.16 We use five measures of target riskiness 
as dependent variables in Table 2.5. The first is a dummy variable equal to 1 for targets that are 
public (0 otherwise) in columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.5 since public targets are considered to be less 
risky than private ones (Kim, 2014). 17  The next three dependent variables are the relative 
differences between the acquirer and the target for each of three metrics in columns 4 to 6 to 
measure the relative riskiness of the target compared to the acquirer. The choice of these metrics 
is based on the conjecture that more conservative acquirers will choose targets with values of 
debt-to-assets or the two pension-related metrics that are lower compared to their own values. 
The final dependent variable is the debt payment ratio based on the conjecture that acquirer 
conservatism leads to a higher proportion of the use of debt to finance the method of M&A 
payment. 
                                                          
16 In our many untabulated specifications, we include two or three of unreported variables (e.g., CEO CComp, 
Director CComp, Adv/Assets, Inv/Assets, CEO Chair, CEO Gender, CEO Tenure, Ins Ownership, %Internal, 
Internal CEO, Price, R&D/Assets, ROA, and Volatility) each time to examine the robustness of our results when we 
exhibit less concern about multicollinearity. For brevity purposes, these results are not reported unless the inclusion 
of these variables materially changed our reported findings. 




[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 Inside debt and compensation leverage are included as our primary explanatory variables. 
Their values for each year for this and subsequent sections of this paper are sorted into quartiles 
(I lowest and IV highest) since their effect on managerial conservatism may not be monotonic. 
As discussed in Section 1, the literature also reports that manager conservatism is positively 
associated with the age of a manager, political orientation (Republican or Democrat), expected 
CEO tenure, and debt-to-assets; and negatively associated with manager hubris. A number of 
previous studies argue that M&A activities are associated with firm misvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf 
& Viswanathan, 2004; Mitchell, Pulvino & Stafford, 2004; Akbulut, 2013). We include these 
explanatory variables and CEO and board compensation and various other firm, CEO, director 
and governance characteristics as control variables (see Appendix 2.A for their detailed 
definitions).18  
 The results reported in columns 1 to 3 in Table 2.5 are based on logistic regressions and those 
in columns 4 to 7 on cross-sectional regressions. Statistical significance is based on standard 
errors that are clustered conservatively at the industry level since those clustered by industry and 
year produce lower standard errors. We now discuss the most notable results in Table 2.3. We 
observe similar effects of various independent variables and controls on the propensity of 
acquirers to acquire a less risky target and to finance the M&A cash payment using debt. To 
illustrate, we observe that acquirers with higher levels of inside debt (and similarly for 
compensation leverage) are more likely to target a public firm (columns 1 to 3), to prefer a target 
with a greater relative difference in the debt-to-assets ratio between themselves and the target 
(column 4), to prefer a target with a greater relative difference in the two pension-related metrics 
between themselves and the target (columns 5 and 6), and to choose to finance the M&A 
transaction by using more debt (column 7). 
 As expected, the results reveal a monotonically increasing positive relation for all model 
specifications between each of the five dependent variables and the quartile assignments of the 
pension-related metrics as proxies for managerial conservatism. Consistent with the expected 
impact, we find an increased likelihood of acquirers targeting a public firm or a firm with 
relatively lower debt-to-assets and/or pension-related metrics with increased managerial 
                                                          
18 Many of these control variables are used by, e.g., Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006).  
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conservatism. The magnitude of the effect is large and significant, as the difference in the 
coefficients between the first and the fourth quartile for the pension-related metrics is statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  
 When the dependent variable is the public target dummy variable and quartiles of the two 
pension-related variables and CEO age interacted with each pension-related metric are included, 
we find that the Pseudo R2 becomes 0.133 in column 2 compared to 0.059 in column 1 of Table 
2.5, the significances of the estimated coefficients of the interacted CEO age become even more 
significant, and all the estimated coefficients for the quartiles of the pension-related metrics are 
significantly positive. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for past return, cash flow risk, and 
debt-to-assets are generally lower in magnitude and the coefficients for the announcement 
returns are higher in magnitude.19 Thus, the effects of the pension-related metrics on the choice 
of a public target are not subsumed by the inclusion of the other firm and governance variables.  
 With regard to the other control variables, the likelihood that the acquirer will target a public 
firm or a firm with lower relative values of debt-to-assets and the pension-related metrics is 
significantly higher for firms with an older CEO, Republican Party orientation, higher 
announcement returns, higher cash flow risk, and longer expected CEO tenure; and significantly 
lower for a hubris CEO, poor macroeconomic conditions, higher mispricing, higher policy 
uncertainty,20 higher past average return, and higher market capitalization. These findings are 
consistent with previous evidence that Republican-supporting managers maintain more 
conservative corporate policies (Hutton, Jiang and Kumar, 2014; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie 
and Graffin, 2015), that older CEOs adopt less risky policies (Serfling, 2014), that a shorter CEO 
tenure horizon is associated with a higher level of risk taking (Antia, Pantzalis and Park, 2010), 
that firms hold liquid assets when financing costs are high during poor macroeconomic 
conditions (Erel, Jang, Minton, and Weisbach, 2017), and that hubris managers are less risk 
averse due to their overconfidence (Baumol, 1959; Mueller, 1969; Roll, 1986). More importantly, 
we find that when firm mispricing (MP-HP) is included that hubris (overconfidence) becomes 
insignificant or marginally significant for two dependent variables, suggesting that the former 
                                                          
19 In our untabulated results, we obtain similar changes for the magnitudes of the coefficients and the Pseudo R2 
when we include the same independent variables except for the two pension-related metrics. 




generally captures most of the effects of the latter.21 A plausible explanation is that a firm’s CEO 
is more likely to exhibit hubris (overconfidence) during periods of higher firm MP-HP. Based on 
untabulated results, the likelihood that the acquirer will target a firm of a lower relative debt-to-
assets ratio or a lower pension-related metric level is significantly and positive related with the 
interactions of the pension-related metrics with CEO age. Thus, the likelihood of acquirer risk 
taking is lower with greater managerial conservatism as captured by the interaction of CEO age 
with the pension-related metrics. Finally, our conclusions remain unchanged when data for the 
top five executives replace that for the CEO (i.e., pension-related metrics, manager age, political 
orientation and expected tenure). 
 To summarize, our findings in this section support the first hypothesis (𝐻0
1) and the third 
hypothesis (𝐻0
3) in that acquirers with more conservative managers and those using cash as the 
method of payment are more likely to acquire less risky firms, i.e., public firms, firms of lower 
relative debt-to-assets ratios or lower relative pension-related metrics, and are more likely to 
choose debt to fund cash M&A payment. In addition, we find that more immediate compensation, 
i.e., CEO (and director) total compensation and cash compensation, is not associated with the 
acquirer’s propensity to consider riskiness when choosing a target. These findings are consistent 
with our expectation that managerial conservatism and risk tolerance in M&A activities depend 
on whether the compensation is more distant (such as pension fund entitlements) or more 
immediate (such as cash compensation). In addition, managers exhibit more hubris when their 
firms are more overvalued as indicated by the relations involving the mispricing measure MP-HP. 
2.4.2 Likelihood of Choosing Each Method of Payment with Higher Pension-related 
Metrics   
 In this section, we conduct logistic regression tests of our second and third hypotheses to 
determine if an acquirer firm is more likely to use cash (stock) as the method of payment with 
increases in the levels of its pension-related metrics. Thus, the dependent variable is set to 1 if a 
firm makes at least 1 M&A bid with cash (or alternatively stock) payment in year t, and 0 
                                                          
21 Our untabulated results for all seven model specifications presented in Table 5 show that hubris mostly loses 
significance when our measure of mispricing (MP-HP) is included. When MP-HP is excluded from the regression 
when the dependent variables are Debt/Assets-Rel, InsDebt-Rel, and CompLev-Rel, the estimated coefficients for 
Hubris are -3.71, -6.03, and -17.42, respectively, and are all significant at the 1% level. When DebtP is the 
dependent variable and MP-HP is included, the estimated coefficient of Hubris is an insignificant -1.79. 
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otherwise. We estimate logistic regressions first using the time series of M&A announcements 
and then using a cross-sectional analysis.  
2.4.2.1 Time-series analysis 
 Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the logistic regression results separately with explanatory 
variables measured at year t–1 and at year t–2 relative to the M&A announcement year t for all 
firms with available governance data even if they never made an M&A bid in year t. Once again, 
we observe a monotonically increasing positive relation for all model specifications between the 
quartile assignments of the pension-related metrics and managerial acquisitiveness using cash 
payment, which suggests that firms with more conservative managers are also more likely to 
choose cash as the method of payment, in support of 𝐻0
2 . The differences in the estimated 
coefficients between the first and the fourth quartiles for inside debt and compensation leverage 
are statistically significant at the 5% or better level for both firm years. The monotonically 
positive relations between the dependent variable and both pension-related metric quartile levels 
are visually illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.1. The likelihood of choosing cash payment 
changes by 4.8% [i.e., exp(0.04716) -1] and 9.8% [i.e., exp(0.09353) -1] based on the estimated 
coefficients for the differences in the coefficients between the highest and lowest quartiles for a 
one-unit increase in inside debt and compensation leverage, respectively, for year t–1 reported in 
column (2) of Panel A of Table 2.6. We obtain support for our third hypothesis (𝐻0
3) based on the 
significantly positive relationship between the likelihood of choosing cash as the method of 
payment and the debt-to-assets ratio. 
[Insert Table 2.6 and Figure 2.1 here] 
 We find that many of the other independent variables are similarly associated in terms of 
signs with the acquirer’s choice of cash payment. In particular, the likelihood of cash payment is 
higher for acquirers in periods with higher relative debt-to-total assets, higher pension-related 
metrics, higher debt-to-assets, older CEOs, Republican Party orientation, single acquirers, and 
longer expected CEO tenure; and significantly lower for higher cash flow risk, higher past 
average returns, hubris CEO, poor macroeconomic conditions, multiple acquirers, higher policy 
uncertainty, higher firm mispricing (MP-HP) which tends to subsume the effect of CEO Hubris 
when both are included, higher announcement returns, and larger firm size. Interaction of CEO 
age with the pension-related metrics leads to a greater effect of managerial conservatism on 
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choice of cash as the method of payment. Interestingly, while cash flow risk positively affects 
the likelihood of an acquirer choosing a less risky firm (Table 2.5), it negatively affects the 
acquirer’s choice of cash as the method of payment.  
 Panel B of Table 2.6 reports results on whether an acquirer using stock as the method of 
payment is significantly related to the quartile level of the pension-related metrics. Previous 
studies find negative post-announcement price pressure for M&As using stock as the method of 
payment.22 We observe a monotonic decrease in the likelihood with an increase in the quartile 
level of the pension-related metrics, as is visually illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2.1. The 
likelihood of choosing stock payment changes by -4.0% [i.e., exp(-0.04128) -1] and -13.2% [i.e., 
exp(-0.14199) -1] based on the estimated coefficients for the differences in the coefficients 
between the highest and lowest quartiles for a one-unit increase of inside debt and compensation 
leverage, respectively, for year t–1 reported in column (2) of Panel B of Table 2.6. With regard 
to the control variables, the likelihood that stock will be the method of M&A payment is 
significantly higher with poor macroeconomic conditions, multiple acquirers, higher policy 
uncertainty,23 higher Q, higher sales, higher stock return, higher MP-HP, and hubris manager,24 
and significantly lower for firms with higher debt/asset ratio, higher announcement return, older 
CEO, single acquirers, and Republican Party orientation. Although the interaction of CEO age 
with the pension-related metric is significantly and negatively related with the likelihood that the 
acquirer will choose stock as the method of payment, we find that the relative differences in 
debt-to-assets, inside debt, and compensation leverage between the acquirer and target, and 
expected CEO tenure are all not significantly associated with the likelihood of the acquirer 
choosing stock as the method of payment.  
 A firm’s Q and sales were not associated significantly in the cross-sectional regressions with 
the likelihood of an acquirer targeting a less risky firm in a previous section and in the time-
series regressions for the choice of cash as the payment method in this section. However, both 
                                                          
22 Examples include Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
and Akbulut (2013). 
23 This finding appears to be consistent with Nguyen and Phan (2017) who find that policy uncertainty motivates 
acquirers to use stock as the method of payment, and with Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) who find that policy 
uncertainty is associated with greater stock price volatility and reduced investment. 
24 Our findings are mostly consistent with previous studies that use the same variables. For example, Martin (1996) 
finds that the likelihood of a M&A using stock as the payment method increases with higher pre-acquisition market 




regressors are positively associated with an acquirer’s choice of stock as the method of payment 
in the time-series tests. In addition, the acquirer’s likelihood of choosing cash (stock) as the 
method of payment is significantly affected negatively (not significantly affected) by firm size.  
 Thus, the evidence is consistent with hypotheses 𝐻0
2  in that the probability of using cash 
(stock) as the M&A payment method is higher (lower) during periods with higher quartile levels 
of pension-related metrics. These probabilities are not associated with CEO total compensation. 
These findings are consistent with our expectation that the managerial acquisitiveness involving 
cash (stock) as the method of payment depends on whether the compensation is more distant 
(such as pension fund entitlements) or more immediate (such as cash compensation).  
2.4.2.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 The results from the time-series logistic regressions reported in the previous section indicate 
that firms are more likely to use the cash method of payment if they have higher levels of the 
pension-related metrics. In this section, we test if these results are robust using cross-sectional 
logistic regressions. Table 2.7 reports the cross-sectional results for the initial sample when the 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the method of payment is 100% cash and 0 otherwise. As in 
previous tables to maintain some brevity in presentation, the estimated coefficients for some 
independent variables are not reported. Consistent with the time-series logistic regression results, 
acquirers in quartiles with higher pension-related metrics use cash more often as the method of 
payment (columns 2, 4 and 5). This effect is generally more pronounced in the cross-section as 
the difference in the coefficients for the two extreme pension-related quartiles is larger than that 
from the time-series tests. The likelihood of choosing cash payment changes by 4.5% [i.e., 
exp(0.04379) -1] and 16.7% [i.e., exp(0.15443) -1] based on the estimated coefficients for the 
differences in the coefficients between the highest and lowest quartiles for a one-unit increase of 
inside debt and compensation leverage, respectively, for year t–1 reported in column (2) of Table 
2.7. The likelihood of choosing cash payment changes by 4.6% [i.e., exp(0.04531) -1] and 14.9% 
[i.e., exp(0.13911) -1] based on the estimated coefficients for the differences in the coefficients 
between the highest and lowest quartiles for inside debt and compensation leverage, respectively, 
for year t–2 reported in column (4) of Table 2.7.  




 The results from the logistic regression estimations using the time-series (or cross-section) of 
M&A announcements are consistent with our second and third hypotheses (𝐻0
2 and 𝐻0
3) using the 
quartiles of the two pension-related metrics. These results find that the quartile levels of the 
pension-related metrics are positively (negatively) and significantly related to the choice of cash 
(stock) as the method of payment by acquirers, and that acquirers in higher quartiles of the 
pension-related metrics are more (less) likely to choose cash (stock) as the method of payment.25  
The results are robust to the inclusion of a number of firm and governance variables. Although 
our findings do not exclude the possibility that decision-maker “excess” pension plans could also 
be associated with firm overvaluation and future poor performance, our results are strongly 
consistent with the inference that the pension plans of decision-makers (e.g., CEOs) contain 
information about the managerial choice of method of payment for future M&As. 
2.4.3 (Post-) announcement M&A Returns Differentiated by Method of Payment 
 In this section, we first examine the CAR without and with an adjustment for the equity issue 
effect for the M&A announcement window [-1, +1] differentiated by the method of payment (i.e., 
stock, mixed, cash, and long stock & short cash) reported in the top rows of Panel A and B of 
Table 2.8.  These CARs are estimated in a second step using the estimated parameters of the 
five-factor Fama-French (2015) model in the first step (greater details are provided in Appendix 
2.B). 26  Our results for the announcement window are consistent with those reported in the 
literature of significantly negative and positive average CAR using stock and cash as the method 
of payment, respectively, when no adjustment is made for the equity issue announcement effect.  
Consistent with the findings of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016), the average CAR for [-1, 
+1] for M&As using stock as the method of payment that are a significantly -281.12 bps in Panel 
A become an insignificant -18.71 bps in Panel B for PCAR which accounts for the equity issue 
announcement effect. However, this is significantly lower by 34.73 bps than the significant mean 
of 16.02 bps for M&As using cash as the method of payment which does not need to account for 
the equity issue effect. More notably, these results are somewhat different using the CAR from 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. As tabulated in Panel B of Online Table O.3, the average 
PCAR for [-1, +1] for M&As using stock as the method of payment which accounts for the 
                                                          
25 These conclusions are qualitatively unchanged using Probit regressions, which are available on request. 
26 The announcement and post-announcement CARs from the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) tabulated in 
Online Table O.3 are not materially different. 
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equity issue announcement effect is a significant -19.97 bps and is significantly lower by 37.27 
bps than the significant mean PCAR of 17.31 bps for M&As using cash as the method of 
payment that does not need to account for the equity issue effect.27 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
 We now examine the results for the three post-announcement periods. Here we examine the 
post-announcement Alpha and PAlpha of the time-series of equally-weighted portfolios of 
acquirers differentiated on the method of payment (i.e., stock, mixed, cash, and long stock & 
short cash) that are formed in calendar time. Each monthly portfolio in the time series, which 
consists of a minimum of five firms that made acquisitions in the previous month, remains 
unchanged until the last day in the evaluation window as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000).28 The 
(P)Alpha of each of these static, equally-weighted portfolios are estimated in-sample using the 
Fama-French five-factor model over subsequent windows of [2, 64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] days. 
Based on a comparison of the PAlpha in Panel B with the Alpha in Panel A of Table 2.8, we 
observe that their estimates for the three post-announcement windows when stock is the method 
of payment are diminished in magnitude in Panel B but remain significantly negative at the 0.05 
level or better when they reflect the equity issue effect. All of the post-announcement Alpha in 
Panel A and PAlpha in Panel B are statistically negative. The average Alpha and PAlpha in 
Panel A and B, respectively, for the post-announcement windows for M&As using cash as the 
method of payment are positive but insignificant. They are significantly better than those for 
their M&A counterparts using stock as the method of payment for all post announcement 
windows. 
2.4.4 (Post-) announcement PCAR and PAlpha for Acquirers Doubled Sorted by Method of 
Payment and Each Pension-related Metric  
 In this section, we examine the announcement PCAR and post-announcement PAlpha for 
acquirers doubled sorted by method of payment and pension-related metric type. The results 
reported in Table 2.9 and depicted in Figure 2.2 from the five-factor model of Fama and French 
                                                          
27 The latter is likely to be overstated if the acquirer issues debt and/or equity to fund a cash acquisition. We also 
show in Online Table O.4 that the estimates of the equity issue effect for both the five- and four-factor models are 
considerably larger in magnitude using the linear prediction method, and that they have the largest magnitudes 
among the propensity scoring based estimates using 1 to 1 matching.  




(2015) are not materially different from those for the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) 
tabulated in Online Table O.5 and depicted in Figure 2.2. For interpretative purposes, it is 
important to remember that managerial conservatism increases with an increasing quartile level 
for inside debt and decreases with an increasing quartile level for total compensation. Holding 
the method of payment and the window constant, the results are consistent with our fourth and 
fifth hypotheses. The mean PCAR and PAlpha reported in Panels A and B deteriorate 
monotonically as inside debt moves from quartile I to quartile IV (i.e., towards higher 
managerial conservatism), and in all comparisons the differences between these two quartiles is 
significant. The only mean that is positive (and significant) for all quartiles is the PCAR for the 
[-1, 1] window for M&As using cash as the method of payment, and all the other means are 
significantly negative in quartile IV. As expected, the means reported in Panels D and E improve 
monotonically as total compensation moves from quartile I to quartile IV (i.e., towards lower 
managerial conservatism), and in all comparisons the differences between these two quartiles is 
significant. The only mean reported in Panels D and E that is positive (and significant) for all 
quartiles is for the [-1, 1] window for M&As using cash as the method of payment, all the other 
reported means are significantly negative in quartile I, and all the means are significantly 
positive in quartile IV. 
 [Insert Table 2.9 and Figure 2.2 here] 
 As a test of the sixth hypothesis, we compare corresponding cells in Panel A with those in 
Panel B and those in Panel D with those in Panel E of Table 2.9 with the exception of those cells 
in the column headed by I-IV. In all cases we observe that the PCAR for the [-1, 1] window and 
the PAlpha for the other three windows for acquirers using cash as the method of payment are 
superior to those using stock as the method of payment. Thus, we still observe a material 
difference by M&A method of payment even when we carefully control for the equity issue 
effect and relative managerial conservatism. 
2.4.5 Results for Regressions between Announcement PCAR and Managerial Conservatism 
for M&A Acquirers 
 The double-sorted results reported in the previous section in Table 2.9 provided some initial 
evidence that the PCAR (i.e., CAR after adjusted for the equity issue effect) for window [-1, 1] 
for inside debt quartile I (lowest quartile of managerial conservatism) are significantly positive 
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and negative for acquirers using cash and stock method of payment, respectively; and that the 
PCAR monotonically deteriorate so that the differences between inside debt quartile I and 
quartile IV (the lowest and highest quartiles of managerial conservatism, respectively) are 
significantly positive. This result implies that managerial conservatism has similar effects on the 
PCARs for window [-1, 1] for M&As using the stock and cash methods of payment. We now 
examine if this initial implication is robust by running cross-sectional regressions including other 
determinants of M&A PCAR identified in the M&A and corporate governance literatures (e.g., 
stock return, stock volatility, market capitalization, stock price, Q, sales and ROA).29 All the 
independent variables are measured at year t-1 to deal with possible endogeneity. 
 Summary regression results are reported in Table 2.10 for the 3-day PCAR from the five-
factor Fama and French (2015) model for M&As using the following methods of payment: stock, 
cash, and stock or cash.30 In columns 1-4 of Table 2.10, we observe a monotonic more negative 
(less positive) and significant relation between the M&A PCARs for acquirers and the inside 
debt quartiles when stock (cash) is the method of payment. This is consistent with our fourth 
hypothesis 𝐻0
4. Interestingly, if no differentiation is made between the method of payment (see 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.10), we observe results that are consistent with those reported earlier 
in section 4.4. Consistent with the results differentiated by method of payment, the M&A 
announcement PCARs of the acquirers are significantly and positively related with CEO and 
board compensation, relative inside debt (InsDebt-Rel) and relative compensation leverage 
(CompLev-Rel), which is consistent with 𝐻0
4. These results are consistent with the conjecture 
that the agency problems associated with the pension-related compensations of top executives 
are interpreted by the market with an M&A announcement as negative indicators of future firm 
performance (Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White, 2015). As we found in the previous section, we 
still observe a material difference in PCAR for the announcement window for issuers 
differentiated by M&A method of payment even when we not only control for the equity issue 
effect and relative managerial conservatism but also for other factors that are known to be 
determinants of announcement window PCAR. 
                                                          
29 Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoler (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Berry, Bizjak, and Lemmon 
(2006), Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). 
30 The corresponding summary regression results reported in Online Table O.6 for the 3-day PCAR from the four-
factor Carhart (1997) model for M&As using the various methods of payment are not materially different. Standard 
errors are clustered at the industry level in all our tests, and they are tighter when clustered by industry and year. 
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[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
 As expected and consistent with former studies,31 the PCAR[-1, 1] for acquirers are related 
positively with expected CEO tenure (ExpTenure), relative debt-to-assets (DA-Rel), poor 
macroeconomic conditions,32 policy uncertainty and price run-up (Return),33 and negatively with 
market capitalization, multiple acquirer34 stock price, stock mispricing (MP-HP), and managerial 
hubris. Although a managerial orientation to the Republican Party is used as a proxy for 
managerial conservatism in the literature, MGR Rep is not significant in any of the results 
reported in Table 2.10. Furthermore, the [-1, 1] PCAR for acquirers is significantly and 
negatively related with the acquisition of public targets when the method of payment is stock. 
The positive relation of the [-1, 1] PCAR for acquirers with the relative differences in the 
pension-related metrics and the debt-to-assets ratio of the acquirers relative to that of their targets 
is consistent with our previous findings. This preference by more conservative managers for 
safer targets appears to be indirectly consistent with the previous findings in the literature that 
value may be destroyed if a conservative acquirer acquires a risk-taking target (Hegde and 
Mishra, 2017) and that managerial M&A objectives can affect the premiums paid (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  
2.4.6 Additional Robustness Test: (Post-) announcement PBHARs 
 We use the procedure detailed in Appendix 2.B to compute the (post-) announcement 
PBHARs (i.e., BHAR corrected for the equity issue effect) for the sample of acquirers. The mean 
PBHARs for different quartiles of inside debt of the acquirers using stock and cash as the method 
of payment over the four windows are reported in Table 2.11.35 These results are strikingly quite 
similar to those obtained earlier using the PCAR. To further test the robustness of our inferences 
for the sixth hypothesis, we compare corresponding cells in Panel A with those in Panel B and 
those in Panel D with those in Panel E of Table 2.11 with the exception of those cells in the 
                                                          
31 For these firm characteristic variables, see e.g. Akbulut (2013), Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004), and Blau, 
Fuller and Wade (2014). 
32 This is consistent with the findings that announcement abnormal returns increase with poor macroeconomic 
conditions (Wann and Lamb, 2016; Erel, Jang, Minton and Weisbach, 2017).  
33 This is consistent with the finding by Nguyen and Phan (2017) that acquirers gain greater shareholder value from 
M&A transactions during periods of higher policy uncertainty. 
34 This finding appears to support evidence reported by Ismail and Abdallah (2013) that returns for frequent 
acquirers decrease constantly. 
35 Unlike a portfolio matching approach, the BHAR firm matching approach avoids a skewness bias when individual 
firm returns are more positively skewed than portfolio returns. 
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column headed by I-IV. In all cases we observe that the mean PBHAR for acquirers using cash 
as the method of payment are superior to those using stock as the method of payment. Thus, we 
still observe a material difference by M&A method of payment even when we carefully control 
for the equity issue effect, relative managerial conservatism and the method for estimating the 
abnormal returns for the acquirers for the (post-) announcement windows. Thus, our inferences 
for the fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses based on the PCAR are unchanged using the PBHARs. 
[Please insert Table 2.11 here] 
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we report empirical evidence that supports a managerial conservatism 
explanation for the likelihood of various acquisition choices of acquirers and the (post-) 
announcement price effects on acquirers. With regard to acquisition choices, we find that 
acquirers with more conservative managers are more likely to target less risky firms, to use cash 
as the method of payment, and to target public firms or firms with relatively lower ratios of debt-
to-assets and/or pension-related metrics. We also find that managers exhibit more hubris when 
their firms are in periods of higher firm mispricing. 
 With regard to M&A price effects for acquirers, we find that the negative (positive) price 
effects for acquirers using stock (cash) as the method of payment remain when we account for 
the equity issue effect and that both sets of price effects deteriorate monotonically with greater 
managerial conservatism.  These results remain robust when we use either a four- or five-factor 
model or the BHAR methodology to estimate the price effects. We conjecture that our results 
differ from Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) because we rely on multi-factor instead of 
single-factor models in estimating the price effects for a different (more recent) time period 
(1992-2014 versus 1985-2009). 
 Our findings are consistent with the conjecture of Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White (2015) 
about the impact of the agency problems associated with greater managerial conservatism, and 
the findings of Hegde and Mishra (2017) that demonstrate that value is created when risk takers 
acquire risk-avoiding target firms, but is destroyed when more conservative risk takers acquire 








ACQUIRER CHOICES AND PRICE EFFECTS: ROLE OF MANAGERIAL 
INTEREST ALIGNMENT, VALUE BELIEFS, CONSERVATISM AND CSR 
RANKINGS 
 3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Managerial attributes and actions can have significant impacts on a firm’s choices and 
performance. Managerial conservatism affects the choice of payment method and the price 
effects associated with M&A announcements (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; May, 1995; 
Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2014). Acquirers with more conservative managers are more likely 
to use the cash method of payment (Kim, 2014) and to have lower M&A price effects (Phan, 
2014). Managerial conservatism when proxied by inside debt (i.e., present value of executive 
pension benefits divided by total firm assets) is associated with conservative firm policies (e.g., 
Wei and Yermack, 2011) and firm-value destroying agency issues (Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and 
White, 2015).  
 Since managers are more likely to know the true value of their firms due to their 
informational advantage (Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 1999; Seyhun, 1988), managers of 
overvalued acquirers tend to choose stock as the method of payment (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) that appears to lead to value destruction. Measures 
of overvaluation used in this literature include the market-to-book (MB) ratio; 36  long-run 
abnormal returns (e.g., Loughran and Vijh, 1997), pre-M&A annnouncement abnormal insider 
trades (Akbulut, 2013), or just assuming that some degree of overvaluation is present in all stock-
financed M&As (e.g., Savor and Lu, 2009). The price effects and long-term operating 
performance for acquirers also are related to a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
ranking (Deng, Kang and Low, 2013), which is determined to some material extent by 
managerial attributes and actions. Much of the negative announcement price effects for acquirers 
using the stock method of payment has been attributed to price pressure induced by M&A 
arbitrage short-selling, which is measured using monthly and SHO daily short interest data in 
                                                          
36 Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) use the ratio of price to book value of equity (MB) and the ratio 
of price to residual income value, whereas Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan  (2005) use a decomposition 
of MB to obtain misvaluation measures at the firm and industry levels. All proxies for misvaluation are noisy. For 
example, the MB ratio may also capture growth opportunities, risk or managerial discipline (Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000; Loghran and Ritter, 2000). 
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Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) and Liu and Wu (2014), respectively. Furthermore, most 
of the price effect for the joint takeover/equity-issue event is attributable to the equity-issue 
component when the method of payment is stock (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2016).  
 The above literature concentrates on only a subset of the above determinants, does not 
sufficiently address their joint effects and only deals with managerial interest alignments with 
shareholders (debtholders) when it coincides with managerial conservatism and does not 
examine what affects some of these more important determinants. Thus, this paper has four 
major objectives. The first objective is to examine the effects of managerial interest alignment 
with its shareholders (MIAwEQ) and with its debtholders (MIAwDBT) that we introduce to the 
literature, informativeness of executive insider trading about their firm’s value as captured by 
their abnormal net purchase ratio (CANIPR) that compliments the measure of (Akbulut, 2013), 
managerial conservatism measured by pension-related metrics (e.g., InsDbt) and corporate social 
responsibility ranking (CSRcom) on M&A method-of-payment choices and (post-) 
announcement price effects. We also include other determinants such as short-selling due to its 
relation with the arbitrage price effect (Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2004; Liu and Wu, 2014) 
and/or firm misvaluation (Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone, 2015) and commonly used 
determinants of misvaluation discussed above. The second objective is to assess the determinants 
of the announcement price effects when the price effects are after the removal the equity issue 
effect associated with the stock method of payment for not only shareholders but also 
bondholders (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2016).  
 The third objective is to use the two-stage regression model of Mitchell, Pulvino and 
Stafford (2004) with additional determinants of the price effects to examine the portion of the 
mean price effect attributable to arbitrage short selling and to use two covariance decomposition 
methodologies to examine the proportional explanatory power of each determinant in the second-
stage estimation. The fourth and final objective is to extend the literature by being the first to 
identify the determinants of managerial interest alignment with its shareholders and with its 
debtholders, informativeness of executive insider trading about their firm’s value as captured by 
their abnormal net purchase ratio, managerial conservatism measured by one of the two pension-
related metrics and corporate social responsibility ranking in a simultaneous five-equation model 
estimated using three stage least squares (3SLS).  
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 We now briefly summarize our findings. Using Probit regressions, we observe that the 
likelihood that stock is chosen as the method of payment increases with greater managerial 
interest alignments with shareholders and decreases with greater managerial interest alignments 
with debtholders. The likelihood of cash (stock) being used as the method of target payment is 
higher with lower (higher) acquirer misvaluation (consistent with Ben-David, Drake and 
Roulstone, 2015), and is higher (lower) with higher managerial conservatism, proportion of 
institutional ownership, acquirer leverage, managerial relative incentive ratio, and volatility of 
returns. Only the choice of cash payment is related (positively) to a firm’s CSR ranking. 
 When we single sort the pure stock price effects for acquirers by method of payment that is 
adjusted for the equity issue effect, we obtain a result similar to that of Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2016) that the mean price effect decreases substantially in magnitue for the acquirers 
using stock as the method of payment. While the pure price effects are significantly inferior for 
the stock versus cash payment method for the announcement window, they are significantly 
superior for the three post-announcement windows. We double sort quartiles of pure price effects 
for the announcement and three post-announcement windows first by method of payment and 
then separately by either pre-announcement managerial interest alignment with shareholders, 
managerial interest alignment with debt holders, abnormal insider trading by acquirer executives, 
or CSR ranking. For all double sorts, we observe that both the announcement and post-
announcement price effects for acquirers improve as the pre-announcement managerial interest 
alignment with its shareholders (debtholders) increases (decreases), as the pre-announcement 
abnormal net purchase ratio of the executives of the acquirer increases, which implies that these 
insiders consider the acquirer to be undervalued, and as the pre-announcement average of the 
combined CSR scores of strengths minus concerns for the acquirers increases. 
 To examine equity issue effects for bondholders, we first single sort the pure bond price 
effects for acquirers by method of payment that is adjusted for the equity issue effect. We find 
that the mean positive price effect decreases substantially in magnitue and becomes insignificant 
for the acquirers using stock as the method of payment, and that the pure price effects are 
significantly superior for the stock versus cash payment method for the announcement window 
and the three post-announcement windows. We also double sort quartiles of pure price effects for 
the announcement and three post-announcement windows first by method of payment and then 
separately by either pre-announcement managerial interest alignment with shareholders or with 
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debt holders. For all double sorts, we observe that both the announcement and post-
announcement price effects for acquirers improve as the pre-announcement managerial interest 
alignment with its debtholders (shareholders) increases (decreases). 
 We continue by examining whether various factors identified in the literature can explain the 
pure price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements. As expected, pure price effects for 
acquirers are monotonically more positive (negative) for greater firm managerial interest 
alignments with shareholders (debtholders). The pure price effects also are positively related to 
the cumulative abnormal net insider net purchase ratio, the misvaluation measure, CSR ranking 
(consistent with Deng, Kang and Low, 2013), and total executive compensation (consistent with 
the pay-for-performance hypothesis); and they are negatively related to the change in the ratio of 
short volume to total trading volume for the announcement window relative to its previous level, 
size of the acquirer, proportion of stock (but not cash) in the M&A payment (consistent with 
Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2004; Akbulut, 2013), and pre-announcement standard deviation 
of daily returns for the acquirer (consistent with Travlos, 1987). Interestingly, the commonly 
used measures of managerial conservatism (inside debt and compensation leverage) become 
insignificant at conventional levels when our measure of managerial interest alignment with 
debtholders is included in the estimation. 
 We apply the two-stage regression model of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) to gauge 
the impact of arbitrage short-selling on the pure stock price effects during the M&A 
announcement window. We extend their methodology by not only examining the portion of the 
mean stock price effect that can be attributed to arbitrage short selling when determinants of the 
price effects are added to the second-stage estimation but by also using two covariance 
decomposition methodologies to examine the proportional explanatory power of each 
determinant in the second-stage estimation. We find strong evidence for the importance of short 
selling in explaining the pure stock price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements, and for 
the explanatory power importance of managerial interest alignment with its shareholders and 
bondholders, and for acquirer misvaluation as perceived pre-announcement by the general 




 Among our many findings based on the simultaneous five-equation model, we find that: (i) 
pre- to post-M&A changes in managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) are 
negatively (positively) related with changes in managerial conservatism, and both are related 
with changes in CSR ranking; (ii) pre- to post-M&A changes in the cumulative abnormal net 
insider purchase ratio is positively associated with changes in CSR, managerial incentive, and 
managerial interest alignment with debtholders (only when the method of M&A payment is 
stock); (iii) the pre- to post-M&A changes in the CSR composite rankings are positively related 
to changes in the cumulative abnormal net insider purchase ratio (consistent with the “errors-in-
expectations” argument of Derwall, Koedijk and Horst, 2011), managerial conservatism 
measured by the pension-related metrics, managerial incentive, institutional ownership, 
managerial interest alignment with both its shareholders and bondholders, and residual analyst 
coverage; and (iv)  the pre- to post-M&A changes in managerial conservatism are positively 
related to changes in compensation leverage, CSR ranking, managerial incentive, institutional 
ownership, and managerial interest alignment with debtholders. 
 We make a number of contributions to the literature on managerial interest alignment and 
managerial conservatism. First, we provide measures of interest alignment with shareholders and 
with bondholders that have significant power in explaining the choice of M&A payment method 
and acquirer price effects associated with M&As for both shareholders and bondholders. Second, 
we show that the two pension-related metrics used to proxy for managerial conservatism (Wei 
and Yermack, 2011) become insignificant determinants of acquirer equity price effects when we 
account for managerial interest alignment with its debtholders. Third, we show that both 
managerial conservatism and managerial interest alignment are related (positively and negatively) 
with the likelihood of a specific method of payment (cash and stock respectively). Fourth, we 
find that managerial interest alignment (and not managerial conservatism) has a significant effect 
on the acquirer price effects for the M&A announcement window when we extend the M&A 
arbitrage analysis of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004). Fifth, we find that while pre-to-post 
M&A changes in managerial conservatism are significantly related to managerial interest 
alignment with both shareholders and debtholders over the M&A announcement window, such 
changes in managerial interest alignment with debtholders (not shareholders) are significantly 
related to managerial conservatism over the M&A announcement window. 
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 We make a number of contributions to the informed investor trading literature (e.g., 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller,  Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; Song, 2007). First, our 
measure of insider net trading for acquirers is not only a significant determinant of the choice of 
M&A payment method and the pure price effects (post-) announcement but it exhibits low 
correlations with a similar measure by Akbulut (2013) and with other commonly used measures 
of misvaluation.  Second,  using the five-equation simultaneous model, we find that the pre- to 
post-M&A changes in the cumulative abnormal net insider purchase ratio are affected by 
changes in CSR ranking and managerial interest alignment with shareholders and debtholders 
only when the method of payment is stock, but not with managerial conservatism. 
 We make a number of contributions to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature. 
First, we provide evidence that an acquirer’s CSR ranking is related (positively) to the choice of 
cash and not stock as the method of payment. Second, we extend the findings of Deng, Kang and 
Low (2013) to show that acquirer equity price effects improve monotonically with an increase in 
the pre-announcement quartile means of the combined CSR scores of strengths minus concerns 
for the acquirers. Third, we extend the M&A arbitrage analysis of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford 
(2004) by showing that the CSR ranking of the acquirer and the difference in the CSR rankings 
of the acquirer and target have a significant positive and negative effect, respectively, on the 
acquirer price effects for shareholders for the M&A announcement window. Fourth, we 
document the effects that pre-M&A changes in managerial interest alignments, commitments and 
incentives have on the changes in the CSR rankings of acquirers over the M&A announcement 
window. Fifth, we find that managerial interest alignment with shareholders and with 
debtholders have different acquirer price effects for shareholders and debtholders. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents measures of 
managerial interest alignments and of the informativeness of executive insider trading about their 
firm’s value. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 provides a description of the data and 
sample. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2. MEASURES OF MANAGERIAL INTEREST ALIGNMENTS AND EXECUTIVE 
BELIEFS ABOUT THEIR FIRM’S VALUE 
3.2.1 Measures of Managerial Interest Alignments 
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 Ross and Said (2015) define managerial commitment as an obligation to serve an interest 
even if that interest is distinct from one’s self-interest, so that the interests and actions of 
committed managers are aligned with those for which they have an obligation to serve. 
Managerial interest alignment is related to a manager’s “skin in the game”, which can be 
captured by their equity(-like) or debt(-like) claims in their firms (similar argument in Wang, Xie, 
and Xin, 2017). Traditionally, managerial interest alignment is measured by the percentage of the 
firm’s equity owned by the executives (e.g., CEO or typically the five top executives in the 
aggregate).  Our measure of managerial interest alignment with equity holders (MIAwEQ) for 
firm i is given by the proportion of equity (Stock) and stock option value (Options) held by the 
executives:37  
 𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where J  refers to the firm’s top executive(s), and EqBki,t to the book value of firm equity.  
 Managers also have “skin in the game” through their holdings of corporate debt instruments 
(Debt) and debt-like instruments such as the present value of their pensions (PVP) and deferred 
compensation (DefComp). Since pension benefit claims are firm obligations that are unfunded 
and unsecured, the value of this type of inside debt is at risk with firm default. Thus, executives 
and external creditors are exposed to similar default risk concerns (Edmans and Liu, 2011). 
Given a firm’s book value of long-term liabilities (LTLBk), our measure of managerial interest 
alignment with debt holders (MIAwDBT) is given by: 
 𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐷𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 We use these two metrics whose calculation details are provided in Appendix 3.A separately 
since their directional effects are likely to differ. Greater MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) increases the 
alignment of the interests of executives with equity holders (debtholders) and increases (reduces) 
their incentives to expropriate debtholders through asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Edman and Liu, 2011).  
3.2.2 Measure of the Informativeness of Executive Insider Trading about their Firm’s 
Value 
                                                          
37 Palia (2001), for example, also includes stock options.  
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 Given their better access to private firm-specific information (Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 
1999; Seyhun, 1988), executives are more likely to trade more opportunistically when their true-
value estimates differ sufficiently from those of other investors. Furthermore, various studies 
find that the trades of corporate insiders have predictive power as they are informative about 
future changes in firm fundamentals (e.g., Tavakoli, McMillan and McKnight, 2012; Cziraki, 
Lyandres and Michaely, 2017) and that insiders make positive abnormal returns (e.g., Agrawal 
and Nasser, 2012). We use a modified version of the measure of Akbulut (2013) whose 
estimation is described in Online Supplementary Appendix 1 (henceforth Appendix S1) to test if 
the beliefs of an acquirer’s executives about their firm’s true value as revealed by their insider 
trades is related to the M&A method of payment choice and (post-) announcement price effects.     
 The consensus belief of the executives of an acquirer about their firm’s value is measured 
using their abnormal net insider purchase ratio (ANIPR) cumulated over the two quarters prior to 
the M&A announcement day (CANIPR) which is positive when aggregate purchases exceed 
aggregate sales. When implementing the estimation procedure described in Appendix S1, we 
only use insider open-market purchases and sales and option exercise purchases (i.e., codes P, S 
and m, respectively) after excluding all amended and inconsistent filings (code A according to 
Blau, Fuller and Wade, 2014), all transactions by executives who left the combined firms, and all 
insider transactions by trusts, large individual shareholders, non-executive directors and 
institutional shareholders. Unlike Akbulut (2013), we use propensity score instead of 
characteristic cell matching to correct for sample selection bias due to observable differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) and estimate 
CANIPR using dynamic panel regressions instead of a series of cross-section regressions to 
address endogeneity concerns (e.g., Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). We also add proxies for 
short selling and corporate governance based on the literature findings that they are significantly 
related to insider trading. 
 The results for the estimations used in measuring abnormal insider trading CANIPR are 
reported in an online supplementary appendix (see Table S1.1) for 12,342 manager-
announcement quarters involving 7102 managers, 802 acquirers and the 1566 M&A 
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announcements. 38 Except for share turnover which is a regressor in the model of Akbulut (2013), 
the coefficients of the other determinants of abnormal insider trading are significant at the 1% 
level with their expected signs in all but a few estimations. The estimated coefficients for the 
regressors included in our estimations but not in Akbulut (2013), which are CG, CGbroad, and 
ShortO, are always significant at the 1% level or better. While the estimated coefficient for prior 
trading has its expected sign, its value is much lower than the one obtained by Akbulut (2013). 
 We examine if our CANIPR measure of the informativeness of executive insider trading about 
their firm’s value differs from the following misvaluation measures used in the literature:  Prior 
abnormal insider trading (PAIT) measure as in Akbulut (2013); the three components of the 
decomposed MB of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) [RKRV];39 the RKRV 
valuation model estimate (RKRV-HP) obtained using the three-step regression procedure of 
Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010) on an unbalanced, rolling ten-year panel with firm fixed effects 
for all the firms in each industrial sector; and the market-to-book (MB Ratio) equity ratio (e.g., 
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006, as a proxy for misvaluation, growth 
opportunities, and agency problems). We find that all the correlations for CANIPR with the 
misvaluation measures are positive and significant at the 1% level or better but small in 
magnitude with the highest correlation in magnitude being 0.2671 with PAIT. The other 
correlations are 0.1845 with RKRV-HP, 0.1675 with RKRV (2005) firm-specific error 
component (RKRV_FIRM), 0.1530 with RKRV (2005) long-run pricing to book component 
(RKRV_LONG), 0.1307 with RKRV (2005) time-series sector error component (RKRV_TIME) 
and 0.1103 with the market-to-book ratio (MB Ratio). This indicates that CANIPR captures 
something that is not captured by any of these other measures although they share some common 
features. 
 
3.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 The literature generally finds that managers who are heavily compensated through debt-based 
instruments, such as pensions, are likely to manage the firm more conservatively because they 
                                                          
38 The variance inflation factors (VIF) indicate that multicollinearity is acceptable since the highest VIF for a control 
variable is 5.132 (ratio of equity to total compensation or #Equity) and the VIF for the variable of interest (previous 
trading or InsTrdj,t-1) is only 1.422. Allisson (2012) shows that a VIF below 10 for a control variable will not impair 
the performances of the control variables as long as the VIF of the variable of interest is acceptable. 
39 The ratio decomposition is based on the 12 industrial sectors used by Liu and Wu (2014). 
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are more exposed to default risk (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and 
Stuart, 2012). Kim (2014) finds that acquiring firms with more conservative CEOs are more 
likely to choose cash to finance their M&As. These findings lead to the expectation that 
managers with greater interest alignments with shareholders (debtholders) will prefer stock (cash) 
as the method of M&A payment. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Managers with greater interest alignments with shareholders (debtholders) prefer stock 
(cash) as the method of M&A payment.  
 The finding of Kabir, Li and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) that bond yield spreads are negatively 
and positively related with defined benefit pensions and stock plus option holdings of managers, 
respectively, suggests that debt-like and equity-like payments may have different directional 
impacts on M&A (post-) announcement price effects. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 40 
 H2a: Managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) is positively (negatively) 
related to M&A (post-)announcement equity price effects. 
 H2b: Managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) is negatively (positively) 
related to M&A (post-)announcement bond price effects. 
 Inside debt holdings may be beneficial in constraining aggressive managerial behaviors due to 
their effect on managerial conservatism (Wei and Yermack, 2011). However, such holdings are 
associated with agency conflicts, lower pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm value 
destruction (Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White, 2015). While Phan (2014) reports that the 
likelihood of value-destroying M&As is reduced with greater CEO inside debt holdings, such 
holdings may deter managers from engaging in risky transactions that contribute to the wealth 
maximization of shareholders. Thus, we expect that managerial conservatism as captured by 
executive holdings of debt-like claims negatively (positively) affects shareholders’ (debtholders’) 
wealth. Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
H3: An acquirer’s (post-)announcement stock (bond) price effects are negatively (positively) 
related to managerial commitment. 
                                                          
40 The literature provides strong evidence that insider short selling negatively impacts a firm’s M&A (post-) 




Akbulut (2013) finds that overvalued equity measured using insider trades causes managers 
to destroy shareholder value by their choice of stock as the method of payment. Blau, Fuller and 
Wade (2014) find that the negative post-announcement price effects for acquirers are orthogonal 
to the level of post-announcement short selling. Using short interest as a misvaluation measure 
that distinguishes itself from the Q-theories, Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone (2015) report that 
misvaluation is a strong motive for M&A decisions, and that it can explain under- (over-) 
performance of stock (cash) acquirers. With interests more aligned with shareholders 
(debtholders), executives should be more (less) motivated by firm misvaluation in their M&A 
decision making when firm misvaluation is an important determinant of such decisions. We 
expect that the strength of an acquirer’s managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(debtholders) is positively (negatively) related to the acquirer’s overvaluation pre-announcement 
as measured by our misvaluation measures when the method of payment is stock and selection 
bias is controlled for. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is:  
H4: The strength of the alignment of an acquirer’s executives with its shareholders 
(debtholders) is positively (negatively) associated with the acquirer’s overvaluation pre-M&A 
when the method of payment is stock. 
 While the agency view of CSR considers CSR as being value destroying, the risk mitigation 
channel, grounded in stakeholder-based theory, implies that CSR is positively related to a firm’s 
value since the risk reduction associated with CSR is value enhancing. Furthermore, CSR 
activities may produce goodwill or moral capital for shareholders,41 and preserve financial 
performance by providing an insurance-like reduction in a firm’s risk exposure (Godfrey, 2005; 
Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009).  Ferrell, Liang and Renneboog (2016) find that well-
governed firms suffer less from agency concerns and engage more in CSR. They find a positive 
relation between CSR and value, and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between 
managerial entrenchment and value. We expect an acquirer’s CSR ranking to be positively 
related to the interest alignment of its executives with both its shareholders and debtholders. 
Thus, our fifth hypothesis is:  
                                                          
41 Godfrey (2005) finds many benefits associated with CSR, including greater legitimacy among communities and 
regulators, more effective employee commitment, greater trust by suppliers, and enhanced brand and credibility with 
customers. Other benefits include less severely impacted by a crisis (Bouslah, Kryzanowski and M’Zali, 2016), a 
greater decoupling of the effects of negative events from the rest of the firm (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and less 
intense scrutiny from regulators (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009).  
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H5: An acquirer’s CSR ranking is positively related with its managerial interest alignment 
with its shareholders and debtholders. 
Higher executive compensation can increase the level of informational asymmetry between 
management and the board, and may lead to board cultures that discourage constructive criticism 
(e.g., Jensen, 1993). Several studies find that higher managerial compensation is related to 
interlocking boards of directors (Hallock, 1997), and that pay-performance sensitivity decreases 
with risk-aversion and that differences in time preference are related to compensation patterns 
(Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Studies find that a firm’s CSR ranking is negatively related 
with executive compensation (e.g., Callan and Thomas, 2011; Miles and Miles, 2013). CSR is 
significantly related with total and cash compensation (Cai, Jo and Pan, 2011) and with total 
compensation that includes stock options (Rekker, Benson and Faff, 2014). We expect that a 
firm’s CSR ranking is negatively related to the total compensation of its executives. Thus, our 
sixth hypothesis is: 
H6: An acquirer’s total compensation of its executives is negatively related with its CSR 
ranking. 
 As discussed above, the findings of Kabir, Li and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) suggest that 
managerial interest alignment with its shareholders and with its debtholders will have different 
directional relations with managerial conservatism. Thus, our seventh hypothesis is: 
 H7: Managerial conservatism is negatively (positively) associated with managerial interest 
alignment with their firm's shareholders (debtholders). 
 
3.4. SAMPLE, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Our initial sample consists of both completed and withdrawn M&As announced between 
August 1, 2009 and December 31, 2015 for NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed firms. Following 
former studies (e.g., Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2004; Liu and Wu, 2014), a record from 
SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions database is retained in our sample if M&A documents are 
available, deal value is not less than $20 million, acquirers are publicly traded domestic firms 
with CRSP database coverage, the percent of shares sought by the acquirer is more than 50%, 
and share price is above $1 on the day before the announcement date. As in Diether, Lee and 
 43 
 
Werner (2009), transactions involving REITs, ADRs and Closed-end funds are removed. We 
hand-collect various information about the M&As, such as announcement dates, withdrawn dates, 
closing dates, exchange ratios, pricing periods, and methods of payment.42 To avoid time overlap 
for some of the tests, we keep only the first announcement for acquirers with multiple 
announcements in a year. Our final sample for these tests that includes data for all variables 
consists of 1,566 M&A announcements that involve 882 unique acquirers, 951 unique target 
firms, 1,498,876 stock-day observations, and cash, stock, cash&stock and other methods of 
payment for 1089, 259, 208 and 10 M&As, respectively.43  
 We obtain data on CEO and top executive compensations from Standard and Poor’s 
Execucomp, insider trading data from the Thomson Financial Insiders Database (e.g., trading 
amounts, date and type of managerial trade, and managerial position code), short sales data from 
Finra, 44  equity ownerships of unaffiliated institutional holders with aggregated holdings 
exceeding 5% from CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) filings, number of analysts following a firm from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimation Services (I/B/E/S) database, accounting data from the 
COMPUSTAT Annual File,45 and shares outstanding and returns from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), and bond prices and returns from the TRACE database.  Aggregation of 
the intraday short sales data during regular trading sessions into daily data allows us to 
                                                          
42 Boone and Mulherin (2007a, 2008) and Liu and Wu (2014) also use hand-collected information for comparable 
sample sizes. We identify and correct some incorrect reports dealing with the method of payment in the filings 
available from SDC, as by Liu and Wu (2014). For example, the SDC document indicates that shareholders of 
Chattem Inc were entitled to receive cash in lieu of fractional shares and 0.71 shares of Sanofi-Aventis SA Class A 
common stock for each common share of Chattem Inc. While SDC listed the consideration as HYBRID (i.e., a 
combination payment of cash and stock, dated on Dec 21, 2009), the correct payment method is stock swap. 
Similarly, in the proxy statement in SEC file (S-4), To approve and adopt the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated 
June 16, 2010 between Covidien Ltd, and Somanetics Corp., we find that  each common share of Somanetics Corp 
outstanding immediately before the merger is convertible into (i) $21.00 in cash, with shareholders being allowed to 
choose payment in all stock, all cash, or a combination of stock and cash in one of the two following choices: 50% 
stock/50% cash or 80% stock/20%cash; or (ii) 0.3213 share (subject to adjustment) of Covidien Ltd common stock. 
SDC categorizes the payment as “stock only” while the payment is a mix of stock and cash. Other examples are 
available if requested. 
43 The status of the targets is 818 public targets, 492 private targets, 248 subsidiary targets and 8 other targets. The 
status of the deals is 1432 are completed, 16 are pending, 113 are withdrawn, and 5 are other. 
44The Regulation SHO program requires the exchanges to publish data which contains transaction-level short trades.  
See the website: http://www.finra.org/industry/trf/trf-regulation-sho-2015. Although the SHO data does not indicate 
when short sales are covered or a short transaction is conducted by a market maker, the latter may not be important 
as less than 1% of traded volume involves market makers. The average and median time between the transaction and 
reporting dates for our full sample is 23 and 9 days, respectively. 
45Since the relationship between analyst coverage and firm mispricing or executive compensation may be spurious 
due to the relation of analyst coverage with various firm characteristics, we use the residual value of analyst 
coverage to mitigate this concern as in Yu (2008). 
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implement more accurate examinations than are possible using short interest data at a monthly 
frequency.  
 Table 3.1 presents some summary statistics for various characteristics (as defined in Appendix 
3.A) of our final M&A sample and the sample that also includes acquirers with missing data in 
Compustat or Execucomp. Based on Panel A, the mean number of public bidders is 1.161 and 
the mean percentage of stock (cash) as payment across all the different payment methods is 
20.649% (79.351%). About 53.1% of the M&As are conglomerate based on the dummy variable 
Congl which is one when the 4-digit SIC code of the acquirer and target differ. Based on Panel B 
for our final sample using data for the multi-day announcement window [-1, 1], the mean share 
(Turnover) and short turnovers (%ShortO) are 2.223 times and 26.112 percent, respectively, the 
mean market capitalization is $20.365 billion, the mean pure announcement stock return (PCAR) 
is 0.151%, the mean pure announcement abnormal bond return (PCABR) is -0.063%, and the 
average price of the acquirers is $43.78.46  
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
 Based on Panel C for the final M&A sample using data for the multi-day pre-announcement 
window [-200, -41], acquirers have mean inside debt and compensation leverage of 0.531 and 
0.086, respectively.47 The acquirers have a mean executive total compensation of $6.021 million, 
a mean proportional institutional ownership of 48.303%, a mean market capitalization of 
$21.565 billion, a mean annual share turnover ratio of 0.796, a mean price of about $42.35, and 
average return and stock price volatilities of 1.601% and 2.501%, respectively, and average 
return and bond price volatility of 0.572% and 0.662%, respectively.48 Furthermore, 79.6% of 
the outstanding shares are traded on average daily and shorts on average represent about 23.002% 
of the shares outstanding. The mean short-selling ratios of 28.103% and 30.102% for the full 
period and the announcement windows (Panels C and B, respectively) are comparable to the 
findings of Diether, Lee & Werner (2009). 
                                                          
46Except for PCAR, the reported means are the cross-sectional averages across all the acquirers of the time-series 
averages over the three-day window [-1, 1] for each acquirer.  
47The formulas for computing inside debt and compensation leverage are described in Appendix A. 
48 The reported means are the cross-sectional averages across all the acquirers of the time-series averages over the 
multi-day pre-announcement window [-200, -41] for each acquirer. 
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 Panel D reports summary statistics for the larger M&A sample using data for the multi-day 
pre-announcement window [-200, -41]. This larger sample also includes acquirers with missing 
data in Compustat or Execucomp. The means for acquirers in this larger sample are generally 
smaller than those for our final sample. This includes size ($2.786 vs $21.565 billion), share 
price ($36.25 vs $42.35), institutional ownership (43.203% vs 48.303%), and total compensation 
($5.739 billion versus $6.021 billion). They are larger only for debt/assets (0.341 vs 0.313), 
leverage (0.233 vs 0.229) and return volatility (1.701% vs 1.601%). 
 We partition the M&As into four subgroups according to their choice of payment method and 
test the characteristic differences between the 259 pure stock M&As versus the 1089 pure cash 
M&As. At a 5% or better level for the t-tests, we observe in Table 3.2 that an acquirer with a 
higher insider net purchase ratio, compensation leverage and inside debt, and a lower leverage, 
price volatility, ratio of short sales volume to shares outstanding and change in this short sales 
ratio in the days following the day prior to a M&A announcement is more likely to have chosen 
cash as the method of payment.49 Most of the median differences for these characteristics are 
significant at the 5% significance level based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Column 8).  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
3.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we conduct a series of tests to examine whether managerial interest 
alignments with its shareholders (MIAwEQ) or debtholder (MIAwDBT), managerial conservatism, 
CSR ranking, the informativeness of executive insider trading about their firm’s value (CANIPR) 
and firm misvaluation (RKRV-HP) are related to the acquirer’s choice of the method of payment 
and what are their effects on equity and bond prices for M&A announcements.50  
3.5.1 Sorts by Managerial Interest Alignments with Shareholders and Debtholders 
 We present the mean acquirer and target characteristics for quartiles based on the interest 
alignments of the managers of the acquirers with their shareholders (MIAwEQ) and with their 
bondholders (MIAwDBT) where quartile I (IV) reflects the lowest (highest) interest alignments. 
                                                          
49 Similar results are obtained using the short ratio.  
50 Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone (2015) find that previously documented underperformance of stock acquirers 
and the overperformance of cash acquirers can be attributed to misvaluation as captured by short selling. 
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We observe that most of the mean characteristic differences between quartiles I and IV for 
MIAwEQ in Panel A and for MIAwDBT in Panel B of Table 3.3 are significant at a 5% or better 
level for the t-tests and the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Based on Panel A and the t-test results 
for a significance level of 5% or better, we observe the expected result that only compensation 
leverage, inside debt, probability of cash as the method of payment, executive total compensation, 
and pure bond price effects (PCABR) are lower for the quartile with the highest managerial 
interest alignment with shareholders to that with the lowest. Except for the target is a subsidiary, 
the means for a specific characteristic increase or decrease monotonically as we move from the 
lowest quartile (I) of managerial interest alignment with shareholders to that with the highest 
alignment (IV).  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 Based on t-values significant at the 5% or better level in Panel B, we observe that only cash 
holdings, leverage, % of acquirers that pay with stock, pure announcement stock price effects for 
acquirers, stock price volatility, ratio of short volume to shares outstanding and the change in this 
short ratio after the day prior to the M&A announcements are lower for the quartile with the 
highest managerial interest alignment with debtholders to that with the lowest. Although more 
exceptions exist in Panel B compared to Panel A, the means for a specific characteristic in Panel 
B increase or decrease monotonically as we move from the lowest quartile (I) of managerial 
interest alignment with debtholders to that with the highest alignment (IV). This provides some 
initial qualified support for our second hypothesis. 
 There are a number of interesting takeaways from these results. First, higher managerial 
interest alignments with shareholders (MIAwEQ) have opposite associations with the pure stock 
price effects (PCAR), and pure bond price effects (PCABR) of M&As compared to those from 
higher managerial interest alignments with debtholders (MIAwDBT). Specifically, the pure stock 
price effects increase monotonically from -0.01% for quartile 1 to 0.30% for quartile 4 for 
MIAwEQ and they decrease monotonically from 0.28% for quartile 1 to 0.07% for quartile 4 for 
MIAwDBT. Similarly, the pure bond price effects decrease monotonically from -0.051% for 
quartile 1 to 0.082% for quartile 4 for MIAwEQ and they increase monotonically from -0.072% 
for quartile 1 to -0.043% for quartile 4 for MIAwDBT. Second, the decrease (increase) in 
compensation leverage and inside debt with increasing managerial alignment with shareholders 
 47 
 
(debtholders) is consistent with their effect on managerial conservatism due to their effect on 
executive default risk exposure (Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). Third, increases in 
the ratio of short volume to share outstanding, changes in this short ratio from the day prior to 
the M&A announcements and the use of only stock as the method of payment with an increase 
(decrease) in MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) suggest that overvalued stock is more likely to be used when 
managerial interests are more (less) aligned with shareholders (debtholders). Fourth, the appetite 
for public targets decreases with higher MIAwEQ and increases with higher MIAwDBT. This 
result is consistent with the finding of Kim (2014). Fifth, consistent with our fifth hypothesis, 
CSR strengths exceed concerns for more firms with an increasing managerial interest alignment 
with either shareholders or debtholders. 
3.5.2 Changes in Managerial Interest Alignments Post-M&A and their Determinants  
 In this section, we begin by examining how managerial interest alignments change pre-to-
post-acquisition. The changes are computed in three ways (full details in Appendix 3.A) where 
the first method uses the actual total long-term liabilities or assets pre- and post-announcement, 
the second method uses the pre-announcement total long-term liabilities or assets pre- and post-
announcement, and the third method removes the total long-term liabilities or assets of the 
acquired when computing the interest alignments post-announcement. Based on untabulated 
summary statistics for the full sample, and the subsamples of acquirers and non-acquirers 
available as Table S4.1 in Online Supplementary Appendix S4, we observe that all the mean and 
median changes for the acquirers are significantly negative for MIAwEQ and significantly 
positive for MIAwDBT. In contrast, all the mean and median changes for the nonacquirers are 
insignificant.  
 To identify the determinants of the pre-to-post announcement M&A changes in these proxies 
for managerial interest alignment, we run a cross-sectional regression for each acquisition date 
and report their time-series averages in Table 3.4. We observe that the changes in managerial 
interest alignment with debtholder (shareholders) is negative (positively) and significantly 
related with multiple (single) acquirers when the pre-announcement managerial interest 
alignments of the acquirer are in the low tercile, and positively (negative) and significantly 
related with multiple (single) acquirers when the pre-announcement managerial interest 
alignments of the acquirers are in the high terciles. Cash flow and cash hold consistently have a 
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significant effect on managerial interest alignment. Inside debt, compensation leverage, and firm 
leverage have significantly positive (negative) effects on managerial interest alignment with 
debtholder when the pre-announcement managerial interest alignments of acquirers are in the 
low (high) tercile. In contrast, inside debt, compensation leverage, and firm leverage have 
negative and significant effects on both managerial interest alignments for both high and low 
pre-announcement managerial interest alignment terciles.  The mispricing (RKRV-HP) effect on 
both managerial interest alignments is positive when pre-announcement managerial interest 
alignments of acquirers are in the low tercile. In contrast, the effects are positive (negative) on 
managerial interest alignment with debtholders (shareholders) when pre-announcement 
managerial interest alignments of acquirers are in the high tercile.  
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
3.5.3 Sorts by Cumulative Abnormal Insider Purchase Ratios (CANIPR) 
 We present the mean acquirer and target characteristics for quartiles based on the cumulative 
abnormal insider purchase ratios (CANIPR) for stocks where quartile I (IV) reflects the lowest 
(highest) level of this ratio. We observe that most of the mean characteristic differences between 
quartiles I and IV reported in Table 3.5 are significant at a 5% or better level for the t-tests and 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Based on the t-test results for a significance level of 5% or better, 
we observe that cash flow,  compensation leverage, inside debt, CSR rankingPay%Cash, 
PCAR, proportion of cash M&As, bond price volatility, and target CAR are higher for the 
quartile with the highest versus lowest CANIPR. The means for over 60% of the characteristics 
increase or decrease monotonically as we move from the lowest quartile (I) to the highest 
CANIPR quartile (IV).  
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
 There are a number of interesting takeaways from these results. First, the cumulative 
abnormal insider net purchase ratios (CANIPR) for stock are negatively associated with pure 
bothn the bond price effects (PCABR) and positively associated with the pure stock price effects 
(PCAR). Second, the increase in compensation leverage and inside debt with an increasing 
cumulative abnormal insider net purchase ratio (CANIPR) for stocks is consistently with the 
conjecture that ComLev and InsDebt tend to negatively affect firm value. Third, the appetite for 
public targets decreases with higher CANIPR which is consistent with the findings that insider 
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trading is positively associated with acquirer undervaluation and managerial conservatism.51 
Fourth, CSR concerns exceed strengths for more firms with an increasing cumulative abnormal 
insider net purchase ratio (CANIPR). 
3.5.4 Determinants for the Choice of Method of Target Payment  
 Panels A and B of Table 3.6 report the marginal effects (multiplied by 1000) from Probit 
regressions examining possible determinants of the choice of cash and stock, respectively, as the 
method of payment for targets using industry-clustered standard errors. 52  We observe 
monotonically decreasing (increasing) negative (positive) estimated coefficients for all 
specifications with increasing quartile assignments of managerial interest alignment with 
shareholders (debtholders) with cash (stock) as the method of target payment. This finding 
indicates that acquirers with greater managerial interest alignments with shareholders or 
MIAwEQ (debtholders or MIAwDBT) are less (more) likely to choose cash as the method of 
payment, which supports H1. In contrast, the interaction of the debt and equity proportions held 
by the managers (Eqt*LTL) has no predictive power.  
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
 We observe statistical significance for many other potential determinants. We find that a 
firm’s CSR ranking (CSRcom) is significantly (and positively) related to only the choice of cash 
payment. The dummy variable for the abnormal trading of firm insiders (DumCANIPR) is 
significantly and positively (negatively) related to the likelihood of cash (stock) being used as the 
method of target payment. Their estimated coefficients become highly significant at the 1% level 
when both the misvaluation measure RKRV-HP and the ratio of short interest to shares 
outstanding %ShortO are excluded (columns 3 and 10), suggesting that DumCANIPR captures 
some of the relations between these two determinants and the dependent variables. However, 
%ShortO only becomes significantly related to the choice of payment method (negative for cash 
and positive for stock) when DumCANIPR and a number of other potential determinants are 
excluded from the estimation. In contrast, RKRV-HP is consistently negatively and positively 
related to the likelihood of cash (stock) being used as the method of target payment. Thus, these 
findings are somewhat consistent with the finding by Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone (2015) 
                                                          
51 Kim (2014) finds that conservative managers are more likely to engage in the acquisitions of public targets. 
52 Clustering errors by industry and year yields tighter standard errors. 
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that firms with higher short sales and overvaluation are less likely to engage in cash acquisitions. 
Compensation leverage (ComLev), inside debt (InsDbt), proportion of institutional ownership 
(%Insti), acquirer leverage (Leverage), managerial relative incentive ratio (RelIncentR), single 
acquirers, and volatility of returns (VolatR) are positively (negatively) related with the likelihood 
of cash (stock) being used as the method of target payment. In contrast, cash flow (CashFlow), 
cash held (CashHld), poor macroeconomic conditions, multiple acquirers, higher policy 
uncertainty (PUI) and past returns (PReturn) are negatively (positively) related with the 
likelihood of cash (stock) being used as the method of target payment.53 An acquiring firm’s 
market capitalization is significantly (and negatively) related to only the choice of cash payment. 
3.5.5 (Post-) announcement Price Effects for Acquirer Shareholders: Single and Double 
Sorts 
 Panels A and Panel B of Table 3.7 report equity price effects estimates from the Fama-
French five factor model (2015) not adjusted (CAR) and adjusted (PCAR) for the equity issue 
effect, respectively, for the window [-1, 1] single sorted by method of payment (i.e., cash, stock, 
mixed and all). The significantly negative (positive) mean CAR for stock (cash) without 
controlling for the equity issue effect is generally consistent with the literature. As in Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2016), we observe that the mean price effect from the acquisition 
decreases substantially in magnitue for the acquirers using stock as the method of payment when 
we adjust for the equity issue effect. Specifically, the mean is a highly significant -325.41 bps in 
Panel A and a marginally significant -11.61 bps in Panel B. Even with the adjustment for the 
issue price effect, the mean (pure) price effect is a significant 35.96 bps lower for the acquirers 
using stock versus those using cash as the method of payment.This is considerably lower in 
magnitude than the 349.76 bps difference when no adjustment is made for the issue price effect.  
[Inset Table 3.7 here] 
 We use the calendar-time approach of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) to examine the price 
effects for portfolios of acquirers sorted by the method of payment (i.e., stock, mixed, cash, and 
                                                          
53 Our findings are mostly consistent with previous studies that use the same variables. For example, Martin (1996) 
finds that the likelihood of a M&A using stock as the payment method increases with higher pre-acquisition market 
cap, stock returns and growth opportunities, and decreases with higher cash holdings, block and institutional 
holdings. Our conclusion remains unchanged after replacing CSRcom with DumCSR, and RKRV-HP with each of 
the following in turn: MB Ratio, PAIT, RKRV_FIRM, RKRV_TIME, RKRV_LONG. These untabulated results are 
available upon request. 
 51 
 
long stock & short cash) for three post-announcement periods of [2, 124], [2, 250] and [2, 498] 
days, which represent periods of about 6-, 12- and 24-month, respectively.54 We form equally 
weighted portfolios monthly where each monthly portfolio requires a minimum of five acquirers 
with M&A announcements in the previous 124, 250 or 498 days depending on the post-
announcement period being examined. The price effects or (P)Alpha for each calendar-time 
portfolio for each post-announcement window are estimated in-sample using the Fama-French 
five-factor model. In comparison to the significantly large negative mean Alpha estimate 
reported in Panel A of Table 3.7 for each post-announcement window, the mean PAlpha estimate 
(i.e., Alpha adjusted for the issue price effect) reported in Panel B for each post-announcement 
window when stock is the method of payment is significantly positive but small in magnitude. 
Similarly as reported in the last column of Table 3.7, acquirers using stock payment versus those 
using cash payment exhibit significantly inferior mean post-announcement Alphas (Panel A) but 
significantly superior post-announcement mean PAlphas (Panel B) for shareholders.   
  We now examine in Table 3.8 the quartiles of PCAR and PAlphas for shareholders doubled 
sorted first by method of payment and then separately by either managerial interest alignment 
with shareholders (MIAwEQ), managerial interest alignment with debtholders (MIAwDBT), 
abnormal insider trading by acquirer executives (CANIPR), or CSR ranking (CSRcom). The 
mean PCAR and PAlphas for shareholders are reported for acquirers with cash, stock and all 
payment methods for MIAwEQ and MIAwDBT in Panels A, B and C, respectively, and for 
CANIPR and CSRcom in Panels D, E and F, respectively.55 Holding the method of payment and 
the window constant, these results are consistent with H2. The mean PCAR[-1, 1] are positive 
(negative) across all quartiles for acquirers using cash (stock) as the method of payment. As one 
moves from quartile I to quartile IV, both the PCAR[-1, 1] and the three post-announcement 
PAlpha monotonically improve for MIAwEQ, CANIPR and CSRcom and monotonically 
deteriorate for MIAwDBT when either cash or stock is used as the method of payment.  
 [Insert Table 3.8 here] 
                                                          
54 For more details about this approach, see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000), and Appendix S2 in the separate document, Supplementary Appendices. 
55 Results using the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) are not materially different from the results reported in 
Table 3.8 using the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). The results are untabulated for brevity and are 
available upon request. 
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 We now summarize what we learn from this set of results. For all four sets of double sorts as 
captured by the columns I-IV, we observe that both the announcement and post-announcement 
stock price effects for acquirers improve as the pre-announcement managerial interest alignment 
with its shareholders (bondholders) increases (decreases), as the pre-announcement abnormal net 
purchase ratio of the executives of the acquirer (CANIPR) increases which implies that these 
insiders consider the acquirer to be undervalued, and as the average of the combined CSR scores 
of strengths minus concerns for the acquirer (CSRcom) pre-announcement increases.  
3.5.6 (Post-) announcement Price Effects for Acquirer Bondholders: Single and Double 
Sorts 
 Panels C and D of Table 3.7 reports bond price effects estimates from the 5-factor bond 
model of Fama and French (1993) not adjusted (CABR) and adjusted (PCABR) for the equity 
issue effect for the window [-1, 1] and their counterparts BRAlpha and PBRAlpha for the three 
post-announcement periods of [2, 124], [2, 250] and [2, 498] days single sorted by method of 
payment (i.e., cash, stock, mixed and all). The mean CABR are significant 39.781 bps for stock 
and -8.381 bpd for cash (see Panel C). Consistent with previous results, the mean bond price 
effects become an insignificant 1.412 bps then adjusted for the equity issue effect (see Panel D). 
This mean pure bond price effect is still a significant 9.793 bps higher for the acquirers using 
stock versus those using cash as the method of payment. In comparison to the significantly 
positive mean BRAlpha estimates for the bond price effects reported in Panel C of Table 3.7 for 
each post-announcement window, the mean PBRAlpha estimates (i.e., BRAlpha adjusted for the 
issue price effect on bonds) reported in Panel D for each post-announcement window when stock 
is the method of payment is insignificant and small in magnitude. Furthermore, acquirers using 
stock payment versus those using cash payment exhibit significantly superior mean post-
announcement BRAlpha (Panel C) for their bondholders and still significantly superior post-
announcement mean PBRAlpha (Panel D).   
  We then examine the quartiles of PCABR and PBRAlpha doubled sorted first by method of 
payment and then separately by either managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(MIAwEQ) or with debtholders (MIAwDBT). The mean PCABR and PBRAlpha are reported for 
acquirers with cash, stock and all payment methods for MIAwEQ and MIAwDBT in Panels A, B 
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and C, respectively. 56  Holding the method of payment and window constant, these results 
suggest that managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) is monotonically and 
negatively (positively) related with bond price effects. The mean PCABR[-1, 1] are negative 
across all quartiles for acquirers using cash as the method of payment, and mostly positive for 
acquirers using stock as the method of payment. With movement from quartile I to quartile IV, 
both the PCABR[-1, 1] and the three post-announcement PBRAlpha monotonically deteriorate 
for MIAwEQ and monotonically improve for MIAwDBT when either cash or stock is used as the 
method of payment.  
 [Insert Table 3.9 here] 
 We now summarize what we learn from this set of results. For all the double sorts, we observe 
that both the announcement and post-announcement bond price effects for acquirers deteriorate 
as the pre-announcement managerial interest alignment with its shareholders (bondholders) 
increases (decreases). 
3.5.7 Determinants of the M&A Announcement Pure Stock Price Effects for Acquirers 
 In this section, we examine if the following factors identified in the literature can explain the 
pure price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements: abnormal firm size (Size), percentage 
of cash payment (%Cash), percentage of stock payment (%Stock), the volume of share turnover 
(Turnover), return volatility (VolatR), price volatility (PriceVol), and change in relative short 
selling (⊿%ShortO). To this set of potential determinants, we add our managerial interest 
alignments measures (MIAwEQ and MIAwDBT), our cumulative abnormal insider net purchase 
ratio (CANIPR) of executives, CSR composite (CSRcom), a commonly used misvaluation 
measure (KRKV-HP), managerial relative incentive ratio (RelIncentR), executive total 
compensation (ComTotl), inside debt (InsDbt) and compensation leverage (ComLev). 57  To 
examine if the explanatory power of these potential determinants varies by the width of the 
                                                          
56 Our conclusion remains unchanged when replacing the five-factor bond model of Fama French (1993) with six-
factor bond model of Elton et al. (1995), or two-factor bond model of Karafiath (1988). The results are untabulated 
for brevity purpose and are available on Online Appendix S.3. 
57 We also test for the effects of whether the M&A is a conglomerate (Congl), whether the M&A is finally 
completed (Complete), and whether the M&A is deemed as being hostile (Hostile), and for the effects of other 
variables such as CashFlow, CashHld, Invest/Assets, Qt-1, ROA, R&D/Assets and Sales. To control for possible 
problems from multicollinearity, we repeat the tests after replacing PriceVol with each of these variables. We obtain 
similar conclusions as their estimated coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. For brevity purposes, 
these results are untabluated and are available upon request.  
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announcement window, we use windows from the day prior to the announcement -1 to day j, 
where j = {0, 1, 3, 10}. For specific details about each of these variables refer to Appendix 3.A. 
The Wu-Hausman test rejects the presence of an endogeneity problem with the inclusion of these 
variables and the values of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) indicate the absence of a material 
multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
 Table 3.10 presents the results controlling for conditional heteroscedasticity using stock or 
cash as the method of payment, and similar results are obtained when robust (clustered) standard 
errors are used for hypothesis testing. 58 A primary difference between the estimations is that the 
odd (even) numbered columns exclude the MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) quartiles, ⊿%ShortO and 
RKRV-HP. Consistent with our hypotheses H2 and previously reported results, we observe a 
monotonic more positive (negative) and significant relation between the M&A PCARs for the 
shareholders of acquirers and firm managerial interest alignments with its shareholders 
(debtholders) for all four windows. As expected, the acquirer PCARs are significantly and 
negatively related to the change in the ratio of short volume to total trading volume for the 
announcement window relative to its previous level (⊿%ShortO).59 As expected, the acquirer 
PCARs for its shareholders are significantly and positively related to the cumulative abnormal 
net insider net purchase ratio (CANIPR) and the misvaluation measure (RKRV-HP) for all four 
windows. 60 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
  With regard to the other independent variables, the PCAR are significantly and positively 
related with total executive compensation (ComTotl) in all four windows, which is consistent 
with the pay-for-performance hypothesis. The two pension-related variables, ComLev and InsDbt, 
lose their significantly negative relation with PCAR in all four windows when our measure of 
managerial interest alignment with debtholders is included (see even numbered columns) which 
provides weak support at best for H3 and the conjecture that greater managerial conservatism is 
value destroying (e.g., Wei and Yermack, 2011; Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White, 2015). As 
                                                          
58 Our conclusions remain unchanged when the change in short turnover (⊿%ShortO) is replaced with the change in 
short interest (⊿%Short). 
59 We obtain similar results when we replace RKRV-HP with PAIT, MB, RKRV_FIRM, RKRV_TIME and 
RKRV_LONG successively in the various tests.  
60 In untabulated results, we find that CANIPR always becomes more significant when either RKRV-HP or 
⊿%ShortO are excluded from the estimation. 
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expected, the PCAR are significantly and negatively related with the size of the acquirer (Size) 
and the proportion of stock (but not cash) M&A payment (Prop. Stock / Cash M&A) for all four 
windows. The latter result is consistent with our previously reported results and the literature 
finding that acquiring firms using stock as their method of payment experience more negative 
announcement returns (see, e.g., Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2004; Akbulut, 2013). As 
expected, the PCAR are significantly and positively related with the acquirer’s CSR ranking 
(CSRcom) for all four windows, which is consistent with the finding of Deng, Kang and Low 
(2013) that higher CSR acquirers realize higher M&A announcement returns. The PCAR are also 
significantly and positively related with policy uncertainty and poor macroeconomic conditions. 
The latter result is consistent with the findings that announcement abnormal returns increase with 
poorer macroeconomic conditions (Wann and Lamb, 2016; Erel, Jang, Minton and Weisbach, 
2017). As expected, the PCAR are significantly and negatively related with the standard 
deviation of daily returns for the acquirer over window [-10, -2] for all four windows, which is 
consistent with the notion that acquirers with more volatile returns have greater negative price 
pressure (Travlos, 1987). The PCAR are also negatively related with multiple acquirers, which 
appears to support the evidence reported by Ismail and Abdallah (2013) that returns for frequent 
acquirers decrease constantly. Relations identified as being insignificant for all four windows 
include PCAR with the following: ratio of the proportional equity holdings of executives in the 
acquirer and target (Eq*LTL), institutional investor proportional holdings (%Insti), debt/equity 
ratio of the acquirer (Leverage), residual analyst coverage of the acquirer (ResCov) and single 
acquirers (SAQ).  
3.5.8 Contribution of Specific Determinants to the Mean and Variability of the M&A 
Announcement Pure Price Effects for the Shareholders of Acquirers 
 When examining firm returns surrounding specific events, most traditional studies assume 
that excess demand curves are perfectly elastic (early exceptions include Shleifer, 1986; Harris 
and Gurel, 1986). Using monthly short-selling data, Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) find 
that short interest is abnormally high surrounding M&A announcements, and that acquirers with 
the highest short interest exhibit the most negative post-announcement price pressures. They 
conclude that the effective supply of shares of acquirers increases so much from arbitrage-
motivated short-selling that the excess demand curves for these stocks are downward sloping. 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) argue that the returns from such M&A arbitrage also depend on the 
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post-announcement selling pressure experienced by acquirers. Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) 
report that M&A short-selling does not exert additional pressure on the decreasing prices of 
acquirers since M&A short sellers are generally contrarian traders. Using SHO daily short 
interest data, Liu and Wu (2014) report that the majority of the negative announcement returns 
can be attributed to price pressure induced by M&A arbitrage short-selling. 
  We first use the two-stage regression model of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) to 
determine what portion of the mean PCAR[-1, 1] can be attributed to M&A arbitrage short 
selling during the [-1, 1] window. Their two-stage regression model is: 
⊿%ShortO = { 




(3) 0 Otherwise 
PCAR[-1, 1]    = β0*CashM&A+β1*StockM&A + β2*Fit⊿%ShortO  (4) 
 
All the terms are as previously defined. It is important to note that our results are obtained using 
the actual fixed exchange rate (ER) as in Liu and Wu (2014). Similar inferences are drawn using 
the relative size at deal completion as the ER proxy as in Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004). 
 Eq. (3) attempts to capture changes in daily relative short selling around M&A 
announcements that can be attributed to M&A arbitrage trading. The estimated parameters from 
the estimation of Eq. (3) in the first stage that are reported in Panel A of Table 3.11 are used to 
compute fitted values of ⊿%ShortO (i.e., Fit⊿%ShortO) that are used in the estimation of eq. (4) 
in the second-stage. The difference in the estimated β1 for StockM&A when eq. (4) is estimated 
with and without the inclusion of Fit⊿%ShortO that is reported in Panel B of Table 3.11 
measures the effect from M&A arbitrage short selling on mean PCAR[-1, 1]. 
[Insert Table 3.11 here] 
 We expect to find that this proxy for short selling attributable to M&A arbitrage trading will 
explain a material proportion of the mean PCAR[-1, 1] based on the summary statistics for 
⊿%ShortO over the 3-day window [-1, 1] presented earlier in Panel B of Table 3.1, where the 
daily average change of 112.4% is statistically significant (t-statistic = 6.73) for M&As using the 
stock method of payment while the corresponding change of 68.2% for M&As using cash as the 
method of payment is not significant (t-value = 0. 61). In Panel B of Table 3.11, we observe that 
all of the estimated coefficients for StockM&A and CashM&A are significant at the 0.05 level or 
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better and that the change in their estimated coefficients with the inclusion of Fit⊿%ShortO in eq. 
(4) is greater for StockM&A than for CashM&A. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for 
StockM&A changes by -55.13% from -11.61 bps when Fit⊿%ShortO is not included in eq. (4) to 
-5.21 bps when it is included. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for CashM&A changes by 
only 19.26% from 24.35 bps when Fit⊿%ShortO is not included in eq. (4) to 29.04 bps when it 
is included.  
 Since Fit⊿%ShortO is likely to be a noisy proxy for the short selling that is attributed to 
M&A arbitrage as it may include short selling of the acquirer without buying an offsetting 
position of the target, we now use a modified version of the two-stage regression methodology of 
Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) to determine what portion of the variability of PCAR[-1, 1] 
can be attributed to arbitrage M&A short selling. To do so, we augment eq. (4) with the other 
determinants of PCAR[-1, 1] that we used in previous sections of this paper. We also include the 
difference in the values between the acquirer and its target for some variables whose monikers 
have a _Diff suffix attached to them (e.g., CANIPR_Diff). As in Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang 
(2012), we use a variable reduction process where we eliminate insignificant variables before 
using two methods to gauge the relative importance of the various variables in explaining the 
variation in the PCAR[-1, 1]. The first is the method of Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2012) that 
uses the sample analogue of the ratio of  𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̂?𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑡)/𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑡)  where ?̂?𝑖  is the 
estimated regression coefficient for independent variable 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑃𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑡 is the fitted value of the 
regression for PCAR. The second is the method of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) which 
divides the partial sum of squares for each independent variable by the aggregate partial sum of 
squares across all independent variables in the model. Using either approach, these ratios add to 
one by construction. 
 The results reported in Panel C of Table 3.11 reflect the inclusion of other independent 
variables in eq. (4). We find that the mean PCAR[-1, 1] for the stock and cash method of 
payments are now a significant -2.27 and 33.71 bps. Based on the covariance decomposition 
reported in the last two columns of Panel C of Table 3.11, the explanatory contributions of each 
independent variable is quite similar using either covariance decomposition method. Using the 
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LRZ method, ⊿%ShortO by far has the largest explanatory contribution of 40.6%, followed by 
CANIPR at 8.1%, MIAwEQ at 7.9%, and MIAwEQ_Diff at 7.8%.61 
 To summarize, our results not only provide strong evidence for the importance of short selling 
in explaining the pure price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements but it also supports 
the explanatory importance of acquirer misvaluation as perceived by the general market or the 
executives of the acquirer and the managerial interest alignment with its shareholders and 
bondholders.  
3.5.9 3SLS Estimations of a Simultaneous System of Equations 
 In the previous sections of this paper, both the acquirer choice of method of payment and the 
(post-) announcement stock price effects for acquirers were related to lagged values of the 
following: managerial interest alignment with its shareholders (MIAwEQ) and with its 
debtholders (MIAwDBT), informativeness of executive insider trading about their firm’s value as 
captured by their abnormal net purchase ratio (CANIPR), managerial conservatism measured by 
pension-related metrics (e.g., InsDbt) and corporate social responsible ranking (CSRcom).  In this 
section, we estimate a simultaneous system of equations containing these five variables as 
dependent variables to account for one form of endogeneity by testing if these five variables are 
simultaneously related, and to test if pre-to-post announcement changes in various potential 
regressors can explain the pre-to-post announcement changes in these five dependent variables. 
Previous studies using simultaneous equations models in empirical research strongly suggest that 
firm decisions such as M&As, characteristics such as managerial traits and governance, and 
performance such as social responsibility behavior are likely to be jointly determined (Lee, Liang, 
Lin and Yang, 2016).62  
 A typical equation in the five-equation simultaneous system is given by: 
 𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗ + 𝛿𝛥𝑍𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (5) 
                                                          
61 Our results appear to suggest that investor arbitrage is associated with acquirer misvaluation, which supports the 
argument by Liu and Wu (2014) that the relative size at deal completion is not a clean proxy for ER as it can also 
proxy for overvaluation. 
62 Many papers analyze the simultaneous interrelationships among a firm’s investment, capital structure, and payout 
policy (see, e.g., Fama, 1974; Higgins, 1972; Switzer, 1984; Peterson and Benesh, 1983; Fama and French, 2002; 
Harford, Klasa and Maxwell, 2014; MacKay and Phillips, 2005). The interrelationship between board composition 
and/or ownership with firm performance is also widely examined using simultaneous equations (see, e.g., Woidtke, 




where 𝛥 refers to pre-to-post announcement change; 𝛥𝑌𝑡 is the dependent variable used in this 
equation chosen from ΔMIAwEQ, ΔMIAwDBT, ΔInsDbt, ΔCANIPR or ΔCSRcom; 𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗ is a vector 
of one or more dependent variables other than 𝛥𝑌𝑡included in the equation as a regressor; 𝛥𝑍𝑡 is 
a vector of observable changes in other control variables whose choice is subsequently motivated 
for each equation;  𝜂𝑡 is an unobservable firm effect; and 𝜖𝑡 is a random error term.
  
 We now provide the rationale for the independent variables considered for inclusion in the 
first two equations in the system; namely, when ΔMIAwEQ and ΔMIAwDBT are the dependent 
variables. We expect changes in managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) to 
be negatively (positively) related with changes in managerial conservatism (e.g., InsDbt) and 
positively related with changes in CSR ranking based on the findings reported in Table 3.3 and in 
the Online Appendix Table S4.2, and our discussion in Section 3. We expect changes in ComLev, 
another proxy of managerial conservatism, to be similarly related to changes in managerial 
interest alignments. Based on the finding of Wei and Yermack (2011) that the managerial 
relative incentive ratio negatively (positively) influences returns for shareholders (bondholders), 
we expect a negative (positive) relation between changes in the relative incentive ratio 
(RelIncentR) and changes in managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders). We 
expect that changes in leverage are positively (negatively) related to changes in managerial 
interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) based on the findings that higher leverage is 
associated with higher profit efficiency (Berger and Patti, 2006) and the increased value of 
diversified firms (Ruland and Zhou, 2005). We expect changes in institutional ownership 
(%Insti) to be positively (negatively) related to changes in managerial interest alignment with 
shareholders (debtholders) given the finding that institutional ownership is positively related to 
managerial interest alignment with shareholders (Scholtz, 2009) and that active institutional 
investors can decrease anomalous comovement returns (Ye, 2012). We expect changes in 
managerial stock ownership (%Eq) to be positively (negatively) related to changes in managerial 
interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) based on the argument that equity and debt 
based holdings of managers are related to agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), that 
earnings management declines after the adoption of mandatory stock ownership plans (Quinn, 
2014), that managerial interest alignment is stronger with managerial equity ownership (Nyberg 
et al., 2010), and firm agency costs are negatively affected by managerial firm based wealth 
sensitivity (Belghitar and Clark, 2015). We expect changes in executive total compensation to be 
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negatively (positively) related to changes in managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(debtholders) based on the finding that CEO pay is negatively related to future shareholder 
wealth changes (Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2014).  
 We continue by providing the rationale for the independent variables considered for inclusion 
in the third equation in the system where ΔInsDbt is the dependent variable. We expect that 
changes in InsDbt are positively related with changes in MIAwDBT and CSRcom, and negative 
related with changes in MIAwEQ based on the findings reported in Table 3.3 and in the Online 
Appendix Table S4.2, and our discussion in Section 3. As another proxy for managerial 
conservatism, we expect changes in ComLev to be positively related with changes in InsDbt. We 
expect changes in return volatility (VolatR) and InsDbt to be negatively related based on the 
finding of an inverse relation between stock volatility and InsDbt (Wei and Yermack, 2011).  
Similarly, we expect changes in RelIncentR and InsDbt to be positively related, since InsDbt is 
the numerator of RelIncentR. We expect changes in LGG and InsDbt to be negatively related 
based on the finding that firms hold liquid assets to enhance their investment efficiency during 
poor macroeconomic conditions (Erel et al., 2017). We expect changes in managerial 
conservatism (InsDbt) and policy uncertainty (PUI) to be negatively related as managers become 
more conservative when facing policy uncertainty (e.g., Gulen and Ion, 2016, for lower corporate 
investment). We expect the changes in inside debt to be positively related to changes in 
institutional ownership, managerial equity ownership, stock past returns and leverage, and 
negatively related to changes in firm size based on various findings that include a positive 
(negative) relation between InsDbt and financial slack (financial constraints) (Yu-Thompson, 
Cho and Fu, 2015), positive relation between InsDbt and firm size, institutional holdings, CEO 
equity ownership, stock return and leverage (Cen, 2010), and a negative relation between InsDbt 
and firm size (Olsen and Zaman, 2013).  
 We continue by providing the rationale for the independent variables considered for inclusion 
in the fourth equation in the system where ΔCANIPR is the dependent variable. We expect 
ΔCANIPR to be negatively related with ΔCSRcom, and negatively (positively) related with 
ΔMIAwEQ (ΔMIAwDBT) when stock is the chosen method of M&A payment (i.e., ΔMIAwEQ × 
StockM&A) and MIAwDBT × StockM&A, respectively) based on the findings reported in Table 
3.3 and in the Online Appendix Table S4.2, and our discussion in Section 3. We expect 
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ΔCANIPR to be positively related with ΔVolatR and ΔRKRV-HP based on the argument that 
informed insider trading leads to the choice of riskier investment projects to benefit from their 
increased volatility (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994) and the finding that insider buys are 
positively related to past volatility and the long-term MB ratio (Akbulut, 2013). We expect 
ΔCANIPR and changes in share turnover to be positively associated given that high turnover 
stock portfolios generate superior returns (e.g., Dey, 2005).  We expect ΔCANIPR to be 
positively related to changes in institutional ownership given the finding that institutional 
investors start to accumulate positions in target firms 30 days before an M&A announcement (Li, 
2011). Finally, we expect ΔCANIPR to be negatively (positively) related to multiple acquirers 
(single acquirers) given the finding that returns for frequent acquirers decrease consistently 
(Ismail and Abdallah, 2013).  
 We conclude by providing the rationale for the independent variables considered for inclusion 
in the last equation in the system where ΔCSRcom is the dependent variable. Based on the 
rationale provided previously, we expect ΔCSRcom to be positively associated with ΔMIAwEQ, 
ΔMIAwDBT, ΔInsDbt, and ΔCANIPR. We include ΔComLev and ΔComTotl as regressors as our 
previously discussion suggests that they are respectively positively and negatively related to firm 
CSR ranking. We expect ΔCSRcom to be positively related with changes in managerial incentive 
ratio. We also include various other controls based on the finding of Jo and Harjoto (2011) that 
CSR rankings are positively related to institutional ownership (%Insti), firm size (Size), analyst 
coverage (ResCov), State law (StateLaw), firm diversification (Divers), GIM index (GIndex), 
entrenchment index (EntIndex), CEO nomination committee (CEOnom), percent of shares 
owned by directors (%Director), and board independence (%Board), and negatively related to 
firm leverage, ROA, research and development (R&D), debt to assets (Debt/Assets). We also 
include changes in these variables as controls.  
 We begin our empirical analysis by conducting Hausman (1978) tests to examine if 
simultaneity bias is present in the OLS regression results. We find that not only the five 
dependent variables but most of variables capturing firm characteristic and environment factors 
are endogenous and jointly determined. 63 64  Since our results from 2SLS indicate significant 
                                                          
63 According to Gujarati (2003), the rank condition for identification is:  Rank AΦ = G-1, where Φ is an exclusion 
matrix (1 column for each restriction). The order condition is K – ki ≥ gi, where K is the number of total exogenous 
variables including the constant term, and ki is the number of exogenous variables included in equations i. 
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residual cross-correlations, the 3SLS estimation is more efficient than 2SLS estimation. 3SLS 
uses the disturbance cross-correlations and deals with both underlying endogeneity and cross 
correlations among equations if the system is correctly misspecified (Jackling and Johl, 2009), 
which is supported by our results from a Hausman test.65 
 There is a trade-off between strength and endogeneity when using instruments based on 
lagged dependent variables since shorter lags make the instruments stronger but more 
endogenous, and vice versa.66 Based on test results using different lag lengths, we choose the 5th 
lag of the dependent variables as the instruments for the system of equations.67 To test for 
endogeneity, we run the test of over-identifying constraints using GMM estimation. Based on the 
over-identifying test results reported in Panel A of Table S4.4 in the Supplementary Online 
Appendix, the J-statistics are insignificant, with a probability between 0.312 and 0.593 for the 
five equations, which implies that the differences in the J-statistics are all insignificant.68 Thus 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the over-identifying constraints of using the 5th lag of the 
five dependent variables as instruments, which supports the strength of our instruments. The 
strength of the instruments and the consistency of the GMM estimates are also indicated by the 
Cragg-Donald statistic of 24.205 and 5.913 for the two stages (all above the 5% critical value), 
respectively,69 as reported in Panel C of Table S4.4 in the Supplementary Online Appendix.  
 We execute the GMM endogeneity test to assess the validity of these five instrumental 
variables in dealing with underlying endogeneity; that is, to test whether an endogeneity problem 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
64 We exclude the exogenous variables from observable firm characteristics for each equation. If a suspect variable is 
insignificant in both the 2SLS and OLS equations, and no simultaneous equation bias is found using the Hausman 
test, we do not include that variable in our 3SLS estimation. We obtain similar results when including these 
exogenous variables in our simultaneous equations. 
65  See Table S4.3 of the Online Supplementary Appendix S4. 
66 Some previous studies use the 4th or the 6th lag as instruments (see, e.g., Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012)). 
67 We collected data from August 2002 to July 2008 in order to test lags for the dependent variables as long as 6 
years. Our model is similar to that of Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), p. 390. When replacing the lag length of 5 with 
that of 4 to repeat the test, we observe that the differences in J-statistic for equations [II] and [III] turned marginally 
significant at 0.091 and insignificant at 0.129, respectively, while equations [I], [IV], and [V] are insignificant at 
0.251, 0.319, and 0.462, respectively. The Cragg-Donald statistic for the level and first differences are 19.425 and 
3.59, respectively, all above 10% significance but below 5% significance (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Moreover, when 
replacing the lag of 5 with that of 6, we find that the Cragg-Donald statistic for the levels is 18.974 (above 10% 
significance), and 4.29 for the differences (above 5% critical value).  Meanwhile, the differences in the J-statistics 
are all insignificant at 10% or better. These findings suggest that the 5th lag is the most appropriate length for the 
instruments in our simultaneous equations model. 
68 The probabilities of differences are 0.395, 0.516, 0.472, 0.388, and 0.423 for equations [I], [II], [III], [IV], and [V] 
respectively. 
69 See Stock and Yogo (2005). 
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is present among managerial interest alignment with shareholders and debtholders, managerial 
conservatism, cumulative abnormal trading of firm insiders, CSR composite, and their lags in our 
estimations. The results of the endogeneity tests  based on the GMM estimations suggest that 
none of the differences in J-statistics are significant, which implies that our endogeneity test 
results do not reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. 70  To summarize, the GMM over-
identifying and the endogeneity tests show that endogeneity is not a problem using the fifth lag 
of dependent variables as instruments and that the 3SLS procedure is efficient for our 
estimations.71 
 Table 3.12 presents the summary regression results using RATS where the dependent variable 
of each equation in the system heads one of the columns [I] through [V]. 72 Based on columns [I] 
and [II], we find that pre- to post-M&A changes in managerial interest alignment with 
shareholders (debtholders) are negatively (positively) related with changes in managerial 
conservatism (ComLev and InsDbt) and managerial incentive (RelIncentR), positively related to 
changes in CSR (CSRcom),  positively (negatively) related to changes in institutional ownership 
(%Inst) and managerial equity ownership. The relations of managerial interest alignment with 
CSR and with managerial conservatism are consistent, respectively, with our fifth and seventh 
hypothesis (H5 and H7, respectively).  
[Insert Table 3.12 about here] 
 
                                                          
70 The results are reported in Panel B of Table S4.4. in the Online Supplementary Appendix. 
71 We also find another set of 0-lagged instrumental variables to repeat our tests. We assume that all the regressors 
are endogenous except for firm age, the year dummies, and family firm, Q-ratio, CEO tenure and BM ratio. While 
firm age, our instrumental variable for equation [1] with the dependent variable ΔMIAwEQ, is highly correlated with 
ΔCSRcom, it only influences ΔMIAwEQ, ΔMIAwDBT, ΔCANIPR and ΔIndDbt through ΔCSRcom (i.e., firmage has 
zero covariances with the residuals of the equations containing ΔMIAwEQ, ΔMIAwDBT, ΔCANIPR and ΔIndDbt as 
dependent variables).  Family firm, our instrumental variable for equation [II] with ΔMIAwEQ as the dependent 
variable, is highly correlated with ΔMIAwEQ but only affects ΔMIAwDBT, ΔCANIPR, ΔCSRcom and ΔIndDbt 
through ΔMIAwEQ (i.e., familyfirm has zero covariances with the residuals of the equations with ΔMIAwDBT, 
ΔIndDbt, ΔCANIPR, and ΔCSRcom as the dependent variables). Applying similar criteria, we choose Q-ratio, CEO 
tenure and BM ratio as instrumental variables for equations [III], [IV] and [V] with ΔIndDbt, ΔCANIPR, and 
ΔCSRcom as the dependent variables, respectively. We obtain probabilities of difference of 0.291, 0.530, 0.449, 
0.387, and 0.591 for equations [I], [II], [III], [IV], and [V], respectively, and Cragg-Donald statistic of 26.013 and 
6.921 for the first and second stages, respectively. Our conclusions from using these specific instruments remain 
intact, and the results are available in Table S4.5 of Online Appendix S4. 
72 We first set the list of parameters using a set of NONLIN RATS instructions, create the formulas for the equations 




 Based on column [III] of Table 3.12, we find that the pre- to post-M&A changes in 
managerial conservatism (InsDbt) are positively related to changes in compensation leverage 
(ComLev), CSR ranking (CSRcom), relative managerial incentive (RelIncentR), institutional 
ownership (%Insti), firm leverage, past return, managerial equity ownership and interest 
alignment with debtholders (MIAwDBT). The relation becomes significantly negative for 
changes in poor macroeconomics conditions (LGG), policy uncertainty (PUI), firm size (Size), 
and return volatility (VolatR). Thus, the relation between managerial conservatism and 
managerial alignment with only debtholders (not shareholders) is consistent with the seventh 
hypothesis (H7). Although the conclusions for the first three dependent variables are for the 
relations among the contemporaneous pre- to post-M&A changes, these conclusions support 
hypotheses H4, H5, H6 and H7.  
 Based on column [IV] of Table 3.12, the pre- to post-M&A changes in the cumulative 
abnormal net insider purchase ratio (CANIPR) is positively related with  changes in CSR ranking 
(CSRcom), institutional ownership (%Insti), and managerial interest alignment with debtholders 
when the method of M&A payment is stock (MIAwDBT × StockM&A), and is negatively 
associated with changes in multiple acquirers (MAQ), managerial interest alignment with equity 
holders when the method of M&A payment is stock (MIAwEQ × StockM&A), firm misvaluation 
(RKRV-HP), single acquirers, share turnover, and return volatility (VolatR). The negative 
(positive) relation of CANIPR with managerial interest alignment with shareholders (debtholders) 
when the method of M&A payment is stock is consistent with the fourth hypothesis (H4), and 
with the conjecture that overvalued acquirers are more likely to choose stock as the method of 
M&A payment (Akbulut, 2013; Ben-David, Drake and Roulstone, 2015).  The significant and 
positive relation of pre- to post-M&A changes in the informativeness of executive insider trading 
(CANIPR) with changes in CSRcom and RKRV-HP (based on firm fundamentals) implies that the 
channels that determine investor “errors-in-expectations” are based on both tangible and 
intangible firm fundamentals (Derwall, Koedijk and Horst, 2011).  
 Based on column [V] of Table 3.12, we find that the pre- to post-M&A changes in the CSR 
composite ranking (CSRcom) are positively associated with changes in the cumulative abnormal 
net insider purchase ratio (CANIPR), managerial conservatism measured by pension-related 
metrics (CompLev and InsDbt), relative managerial incentive (RelIncentR), institutional 
ownership (%Insti), managerial interest alignment with both its shareholders and bondholders 
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(MIAwEQ and MIAwDBT), residual analyst coverage (ResCov), firm size (Size), state law 
(StateLaw), firm diversification (Divers), GIM index (GIndex), entrenchment index (EntIndex), 
CEO nomination committee (CEOnom), director share ownership (%Director), and board 
independence (%Board). In contrast, the pre- to post-M&A changes in the CSR composite 
ranking (CSRcom) are negatively related to changes in total executive compensation (ComTotl), 
firm leverage (Leverage), debt to assets, research and development (R&D), and ROA. The 
CSRcom-ComTotl relation is consistent with H6 and similar findings by Callan and Thomas 
(2011) and Miles and Miles (2013)73 and with the finding that executive compensation is 
associated with executive risk aversion and time preference (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013).  
Consistent with the “errors-in-expectations” argument of Derwall, Koedijk and Horst (2011), the 
positive CSRcom-CANIPR relation implies that increases in the abnormal net purchase ratio of 
insiders of acquirers precedes increases in the CSR rankings of their firms. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, we constructed a measure of managerial interest alignment with its 
shareholders (debtholders). We found that managerial interest alignment with its shareholders 
(debtholders) has a monotonically increasing (decreasing) likelihood of using stock (cash) as the 
method of payment in a future M&A, is negatively (positively) related to (post-) M&A 
announcement returns for shareholders, and is positively (negatively) related to (post-) M&A 
announcement returns for debtholders. Although both managerial conservatism and managerial 
interest alignment are related with the likelihoods of respectively the cash and stock methods of 
payment, only managerial interest alignment has a significant effect on acquirer equity price 
effects for the M&A announcement window using an extended version of the M&A arbitrage 
analysis of Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004). 
 Our alternative measure of abnormal insider trading (CANIPR) using recently available SHO 
daily short-selling data reflects this group’s informed beliefs about own-firm value. We find that 
for a future M&A this measure is negatively (positively) associated with the use of stock (cash) 
as the method of payment, and is positively associated with the acquirer’s (post-) announcement 
equity returns. We obtain the same inferences for a measure of relative short interest given that 
                                                          
73 Our conclusions remain intact whether we use the total compensation of the CEO or the top five executives.  
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CANIPR measures undervaluation while relative short interest measures overvaluation. Using an 
extended version of the two-stage regression model of Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), we 
reported strong evidence for the much greater relative importance of short selling in explaining 
the pure equity price effects for acquirers for M&A announcements. When combined with the 
significant explanatory contribution of the abnormal net purchase ratio of the insiders of the 
acquirer, this implies that the pure equity price effects are substantially affected by acquirer 
misvaluation as perceived by the general market or the executives of the acquirer. 
 We found that CSR rankings have a positive relation with the choice of cash as the method 
of M&A payment and with acquirer announcement price effects. We found that CSR changes 
over M&A announcements are positively associated with changes in managerial conservatism, 
managerial alignment with the interests of both shareholders and bondholders and the net 
purchase ratio of the insiders of acquirers, and negatively associated with changes in the total 
compensation of the executives of acquirers. This illustrates the effects of “short-termism” 







CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, VALUE BELIEFS,  
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its relationship with various firm attributes have 
gained increasing importance among practitioners and academic researchers. While various 
investors choose firms based primarily on their CSR activities, other investors consider such 
activities to lesser degrees when making investment decisions. Many of the world’s major 
institutional investors have signed the PRI protocol (Principles for Responsible Investment), and 
most large firms discuss CSR issues in their reports to investors.  
 A growing literature finds mixed or inconclusive relations between CSR with corporate 
governance, executive compensation and other firm attributes such as stakeholder value/wealth, 
stock price performance, risk, financial performance, profitability, and the cost of capital.74 This 
is most likely caused by the proxies used to measure a firm’s attributes, such as firm value and 
executive compensation, and the various ways in which these studies deal with endogeneity. 
 While this literature deals with unobservable simultaneity and heterogeneity in various ways, 
it tends to neglect endogeneity due to the impact on current levels of CSR, firm value, executive 
compensation, and other firm governance characteristics from past values of these variables. 
Traditional fixed-effects estimates tend to decrease the bias from undetected heterogeneity at the 
cost of invoking the unrealistic assumption of strong exogeneity. Other methodologies used in 
the literature to control for endogeneity include: use of an industry-median CSR as an 
instrumental variable (e.g., Cai, Jo and Pan, 2011; Miles and Miles, 2013), use of a system of 
equations to control for simultaneity among identified endogenous variables (e.g., Callan and 
Thomas, 2011), use of two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions with religion rank and a 
dummy for  blue states as instrumental variables for CSR (e.g., Rekker, Benson and Faff, 2014), 
use of two-stage least squares (2SLS)  to control for simultaneity (e.g., Cai, Cui and Jo, 2016), 
                                                          
74 Examples include Pava and Krausz (1996); Baron, Harjoto and Jo (2011); Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003); 
Margolis and Walsh (2003); Lee and Faff (2009); Starks (2009); and Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin (2012). 
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and the use of the Heckman model for a two-stage treatment effect and firm age as an 
instrumental variable to control for endogeneity (e.g., Jo and Harjoto, 2011).   
 The primary objective of this paper is to estimate a four-equation system using econometric 
techniques that address a more comprehensive set of possible endogeneity issues among four 
dependent variables (CSR, firm undervaluation, executive compensation, and firm governance) 
for a sample of 2803 US firms covering the period 1992-2013. To provide tests of the “errors-in-
expectations” hypothesis for the undervaluation of firm CSR performance, we develop and use 
an undervaluation metric that is based on the findings of various studies that insiders tend to be 
better informed about the true values of their firms (e.g., Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 1999; 
Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 1986, 1988; Cui, Jo and Li, 2015), and such insider trades by 
managers are profitable.75 Like the undervaluation metric used by Akbulut (2013), our metric is 
based on trade decisions of managers as captured by insider trade data over the two quarters prior 
to an information event.76 
 We provide evidence that the four dependent variables are dynamic and endogenous as are 
some of the control variables. As a result, we employ a dynamic system-GMM estimator to our 
panel data to quantify the dynamic and simultaneous relationships between these four variables. 
The inferences from the dynamic system-GMM estimations are then compared with those from 
3SLS estimations of the four-equation system. We examine previously untested proxies for two 
of our dependent variables; namely, inside debt and compensation leverage as proxies for 
executive conservatism, and insider trade behavior for firm undervaluation. The motivations for 
these proxies are developed later in the paper. 
 This study contributes to the literature in six distinct ways. First, we test dynamic and 
simultaneous relations among CSR, firm undervaluation, executive compensation and corporate 
governance. According to our knowledge, no other study provides such a comprehensive 
examination of the relationships between these four variables. Second, our evidence that firm 
undervaluation is positively associated with a firm’s future CSR ranking provides new avenues 
of enquiry for both insider trading and firm misvaluation research. Third, we show that two 
                                                          
75 See, e.g., Agrawal and Nasser (2012); Kraft, Lee and Lopatta (2014); Lee, Lemmon, Li, and Sequeira (2014); 
Agrawal and Cooper (2015); Aitken, Cumming and Zhan (2015); Hillier, Korczak. and Korczak (2015). 
76 Ben-David, Drake & Roulstone ( 2015) find that short interest predicts future M&A choices and long-run post-
announcement performance for up to six months prior to the M&A announcement. 
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metrics based on executive pension plans (i.e., inside debt and compensation leverage) have 
corporate effects that differ from those from firm leverage. Our finding that these pension plan 
metrics are positively related to a firm’s future CSR rankings contributes to both the CSR and 
executive compensation literatures by providing further evidence on the effect of managerial 
conservatism on corporate decisions. Fourth, this study contributes to the corporate mispricing 
literature in that our insider trading based undervaluation metric identifies a unique mispricing 
component that is not captured by the commonly used mispricing measures in the literature. It 
also has significant explanatory power for explaining a firm’s future CSR ranking, executive 
compensation and corporate governance. Fifth, this paper contributes to the literature by further 
emphasizing the need to examine the relations among independent and dependent variables and 
their relations with CSR rankings and to the need to use more sophisticated econometric 
techniques (such as system-GMM and 3SLS) to estimate simultaneous systems of equations to 
control for endogeneity and simultaneity. Sixth, this paper contributes to the literature on the 
asymmetric effects of various regressors. To illustrate, we find that institutional ownership, 
shareholder rights, board independence, firm undervaluation and firm size each have an 
asymmetrically greater negative impact on a firm’s CSR as predicted by the findings of Derwall, 
Koedijk and Horst (2011) and Dimson, Karakaş and Li (2015).   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses tested herein 
based on the theoretical and empirical literatures. Section 3 describes the sample, data and 
characteristics of the variables used in the empirical tests. Section 4 presents some preliminary 
empirical results, including the determinants of the likelihood of CSR changes. Section 5 
presents and interprets the results for the simultaneous systems of equations first estimated using 
3SLS and then System-GMM with CSR ranking, firm undervaluation, total CEO compensation 
and a shareholder rights index as the dependent variables. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 The literature, which is selectively reviewed in Appendix 4.A, generally supports a positive 
relationship between a firm’s value and its CSR ranking. However, only the paper by Derwall, 
Koedijk and Horst (2011) examines the relation between a firm’s misvaluation and the ranking 
of its CSR performance. According to their “errors-in-expectations” hypothesis, CSR firms can 
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be undervalued if markets are inefficient in that investors make systematic expectational errors 
about, for example, the net benefits from firm CSR activities.77 In support of this hypothesis, 
Derwall, Koedijk and Horst (2011) find that some CSR practices are not properly valued over the 
short but are over the long run. They also find that values-driven investors use “negative” screens 
while profit-driven investors use “positive” screens. This could lead to an asymmetric effect on 
firm undervaluation from increases and decreases in CSR rankings. Cui, Jo and Li (2015) find 
that both the number and volume of insider trading transactions are positively related with CSR 
activities, and that legal insider transactions are positively associated with CSR engagements. 
Since we expect greater firm undervaluation with a higher CSR ranking, our first hypothesis 
which tests the “errors-in-expectations” hypothesis is: 
 H1: A firm’s undervaluation is related positively with its CSR ranking. 
 Some studies report that corporate governance is related to firm value (Deng, Kang and Low, 
2013; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Johnson and Greening, 1999) or to firm performance 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Other studies claim that firm governance is related positively to 
CSR performance (Callan and Thomas, 2011; Adam and Schwartz, 2009; Jian and Lee, 2015). 
Thus, our second hypothesis which is used to examine the link between firm undervaluation and 
corporate governance is: 
 H2: A firm’s undervaluation is negatively related to the level of its corporate governance. 
 If executive compensation is the result of efficient bargaining between shareholders and 
executives designed to best mitigate the principal-agent problem, the productivity (or optimal 
contracting) view argues that executive compensation effectively rewards scarce decision-
making talent and productivity.78 Due to their influence over establishing the level of their own 
compensation, the entrenchment (or managerial power) view argues that current levels of 
executive compensation are inefficient wealth transfers from shareholders to decision makers 
(Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Some studies (e.g., Nguyen and 
Nielsen, 2014) find a positive relation between executive compensation and firm performance 
that supports the productivity view, while others (Moussa, Rachdi and Ammeri, 2013; Cooper, 
                                                          
77 Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst (2011, p. 2139) provide some reasons why markets may fail to value some CSR 
practices properly. 
78 See Lucas (1978); Tervio (2008); Gabaix and Landier (2008); amongst others. Murphy (1999) provides an 
excellent discussion on the evolution of our understanding of executive compensation. 
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Gulen and Rau, 2014) find a negative relation between excess executive compensation and future 
stock market performance that supports the entrenchment view.79 Although the nature of the 
relation between executive compensation and firm undervaluation can only be determined 
empirically, we expect that the negative relation would prevail. Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
 H3: A firm’s undervaluation is negatively related to the level of its executive compensation. 
 Since CEO compensation is related to a CEO’s risk-aversion and time preferences (Graham, 
Harvey and Puri, 2013), compensation leverage (i.e., the present value of executive pensions 
divided by the sum of this present value and the values of all equity claims held by the 
executives) through its effect on executive risk-aversion or conservatism is expected to be 
negatively related with firm value and positively related with firm undervaluation.  Thus, our 
fourth hypothesis is: 
 H4: A firm’s undervaluation is negatively related to its executive compensation leverage.  
 A growing literature finds that a firm’s CSR ranking and executive compensation are 
negatively related (e.g., Miles and Miles, 2013; Callan and Thomas, 2011), which is consistent 
with the conflict-resolution hypothesis based on the stakeholder theory (Jensen 2002; Calton and 
Payne, 2003; Sherere, Palazzo and Baumann, 2006).80 The relation is significant for total and 
cash compensation in Cai, Jo and Pan (2011), and for total compensation (including long-term 
compensation from stock options) in Rekker, Benson and Faff (2014) who also find that this 
relation is driven by some CSR sub-components (namely, employee relations, diversity and 
environment). Jo and Harjoto (2011) interpret their finding that a firm’s CSR ranking is 
positively related with its industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as supporting the conflict-resolution 
hypothesis. Thus our fifth testable hypothesis is: 
H5: A firm’s CSR ranking is negatively related with its executive compensation. 
 While the CSR literature reports evidence that a firm’s CSR ranking is negatively related to 
its leverage (e.g., Deng, Kang and Low, 2013; Manos and Drori, 2016), the debt component of 
leverage does not distinguish between inside debt (debt held by executives) and debt held by 
others or firm obligations incurred for executive pension plans that are not included in a firm’s 
                                                          
79 Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) interpret the negative relation as being consistent with cronyism. 
80 The conflict-resolution hypothesis states that strong corporate governance forces managers to act in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
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debt.81 Since a firm’s CSR ranking is related negatively to its leverage, we expect that due to 
their hypothesized effects on managerial risk aversion (conservatism) that a firm’s CSR ranking 
will be negatively related to its inside debt and compensation leverage. Thus, our sixth testable 
hypothesis is: 
 H6: A firm’s CSR ranking is inversely related to its inside debt and to its compensation 
leverage. 
According to the conflict-resolution hypothesis, CSR investments are viewed as an effort to 
resolve potential conflicts among various stakeholders. As such, it predicts a positive relation 
between a firm’s CSR ranking and the strength of the concerns of its monitors for a firm’s CSR 
ranking. Monitors include shareholders as captured by the level of shareholder rights, boards of 
directors as captured by, e.g., their level of independence, institutional investors and security 
analysts. According to the agency theory hypothesis (e.g., Barnea and Rubin, 2010), a firm’s 
CSR ranking is determined by a principle-agent relationship, where less monitored managers are 
prone to overinvestment in order to obtain better personal reputations, which eventually leads to 
managerial overconfidence. This agency theory hypothesis predicts a negative relation between a 
firm’s CSR ranking and the strength of the concerns of its monitors for a firm’s CSR ranking. 
Which directional prediction prevails is likely to be monitor-specific and can only be determined 
empirically. Thus, our seventh testable hypothesis is: 
 H7: A firm’s CSR ranking is related to the perceived merits of a firm’s CSR ranking by each 
of the firm’s monitors. 
  
4.3. SAMPLE, DATA AND VARIABLE CHARATERISTICS 
 Our initial sample consists of over 3000 firms with calendar year-end CSR rankings from 
the MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD) database. This is reduced to a final sample of 2803 firms 
representing 25,571 firm-year observations over the period from 1992 to 2013 after deleting 
firm-year observations missing the required data from the sources identified below for the 
following: insider trading, institutional holdings, number of analysts following a firm, 
                                                          
81 See, e.g., American Academy of Actuaries, 2004, Fundamentals of Current Pension Funding and Accounting for 
Private Sector Pension Plans. 
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governance, and financial and market performance. Equity ownerships are obtained from 
CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) filings for unaffiliated institutional holders whose aggregated holdings 
exceed 5%. We estimate residual coverage using the number of analysts following a firm that is 
available from the Institutional Brokers Estimation Services (I/B/E/S) database.82 The 24 firm-
level anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) used to construct the shareholder rights index IndexGIM 
(ranging from 0 to 24) are drawn from the RiskMetric database.83 We assume that the 
shareholder rights provisions reported for a firm for any given year by RiskMetric continue to be 
in place up to the year of their update (as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, 2010; Bebchuk 
and Cohen, 2005).  Compensation data are obtained from Compustat’s Executive Compensation 
Database (ExecuComp). Traded bond data are hand collected from Mergent's Bond Record 
database (previously Moody's), and audit committee director appointments are hand collected 
from Form 8-K filings with the SEC by disclosed issuers.84 The financial and stock market data 
are obtained from Compustat and CRSP, respectively. 
 Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study that are 
described in Appendix 4.B. In these tabulations firms are considered as having (no) CSR 
engagements if they have (no) ranking observations. These summary statistics are consistent 
with those reported in previous CSR studies (e.g., Cai, Jo and Pan, 2011; Deng, Kang and Low, 
2013; Rekker, Benson and Faff, 2014). Table 4.2 reports the bivariate correlation matrix for the 
independent variables of our main interest herein. Consistent with previous papers, CSR ranking 
(CSRcom) is related positively to board independence (%Board) and institutional share 
ownership (%Insti). CSR ranking is significantly correlated with all governance variables and 
negatively correlated with CEO compensation. The correlation coefficients between CSR 
ranking and the remaining variables that range from 0.07 to 0.32 are slightly higher in absolute 
values and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Correlations exceeding 0.3 are 
between the residual coverage with CSRcom, CSR, and CSRnet, between the residual coverage 
with R&D/Sales and IndexGIM, between IndexGIM with IndexGIMt-1, Uvdum with CSRnet, and 
between InsDbt with ComLev. 
                                                          
82 The potential relation of analyst coverage to various firm characteristics will lead to a spurious relationship 
between analyst behaviors and firm mispricing or executive compensation. As in many previous studies, we follow 
Yu (2008) and use the residual value of analyst coverage (i.e. residual coverage) to mitigate this concern. 
83 Measures of corporate governance from the MSCI ESG STATS database are not used because they are very 
different from conventional corporate governance measures (Jo and Harjoto, 2012). 
84 We obtain data from August 2004, which is when the new SEC disclosure rule became effective. 
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 [Please place Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here.] 
 The method detailed in Appendix 4.C is used to estimate the values of the AIB (Abnormal 
Insider Buys) misvaluation measure. Table 4.3 reports the time-series means of the coefficients 
from yearly regressions of insider trading on the control variables specified in equation (C.1).85 
Almost all of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level with their expected signs. 
As expected, prior insider trading (lnTrading) is positively associated with current insider trading 
with estimated coefficients of 0.2014 to 0.4732 that are similar to the coefficients of 0.1915 to 
0.4639 obtained by Akbulut (2013). This implies that the relation between past and current self-
trading of insiders is similar when examined annually rather than quarterly. Similarly, prior 
insider trading in peer firms (Ptrading) is positively related with current insider trading. Open 
market buys and sells are positively associated with manager ownership (Ownership) while 
option exercise purchases are negatively associated with manager ownership. The three types of 
insider transactions are negatively associated with total assets (Assets), residual coverage 
(ResCov) and the percentage of equity in the CEO’s total compensation (%ComTotl), and 
positively associated with total CEO compensation (ComTotl). The negative association of open-
market purchases with the percentage of institutional investors (%Insti) becomes positive for 
open-market sales and option-exercise purchases.   
[Please place Table 4.3 about here.] 
 We now examine if the AIB misvaluation estimates are different from other misvaluation 
measures commonly used in the literature and defined in Appendix 4.B. We find that AIB is 
markedly different given its very low and statistically significant correlation with these 
alternative misvaluation measures. Based on untabulated results, AIB’s correlation is 0.0512 with 
MPHP; 0.1207 with the PAIT measure of Akbulut (2013), 0.1143 with Tobin’s Q; 0.0845 with 
the Pastor and Veronesi (2003) MB ratio (PV_MB), 0.0691 with the Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson and Teoh (2006) (DHRT) misvaluation measure market-to-book ratio; and  0.0513,  
0.0089 and 0.0069 with the long-run pricing to book (RKRV_Long),  time-series sector short-run 
error (RKRV_Sector), and the firm specific short-run pricing error (RKRV_Firm) components 
                                                          
85 In all estimations throughout this study, the criterion used to deal with multicollinearity is that the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) be under ten. In specifications where VIF exceeds four and is below ten, other factors that 
influence the stability of the estimates are considered to ensure the consistency of the estimations. For more details, 
see, e.g., O’Brien (2007). 
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based on the MB ratio decomposition of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (RKRV) 
(2005).  
 
4.4. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.4.1 Characteristics and Determinants of Undervalued Firms 
 Table 4.4 presents summary distributional statistics for AIB (the misvaluation measure based 
on insider trading data where positive values indicate undervaluation) sorted by the subsequent 
differences in the CSR composite for firms. The AIB mean of 0.0044 is highly significant 
(standard deviation = 0.0011) for all firms. Firms with positive CSR changes (△CSRcomi,t > 0) 
have a significantly positive mean AIB of 0.0147 (standard deviation = 0.0023), firms with 
negative CSR changes (△CSRcomi,t < 0) have a significantly negative mean AIB of -0.0091 
(standard deviation = 0.0016), and firms with no CSR changes have a significant but relatively 
small mean AIB of 0.0045 (standard deviation = 0.0009). These results are consistent with our 
conjecture that managers are more informed about the value of their firm’s CSR performance, 
and on balance believe that CSR firms are undervalued. 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 Table 4.5 reports the average values for various characteristics of firms placed in three AIBs 
terciles.86 If insider trading represents managers’ beliefs about firm pricing fundamentals, the 
average firm in the high (low) AIB tercile will be relatively more undervalued (overvalued). 
Columns [I], [II], and [III] report the mean values for the firm characteristics for the High, 
Medium, and Low AIB terciles, respectively. We observe that most of the means for firm 
characteristics in the High versus Low AIB terciles are statistically different. Of primary interest 
is the statistically significant difference of 0.0575 (t-stat = 6.51) for the CSR composite rankings 
between the mean of 0.0348 for the High AIB tercile and -0.0227 for the Low AIB tercile. This 
indicates that firms in the high (low) tercile of abnormal net insider share purchases, on average, 
precede a positive (negative) CSR composite ranking. Using a 5% critical t-value, the firms in 
the High AIB tercile compared to those in the Low AIB tercile have a significantly lower mean 
                                                          
86 Descriptions of all variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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CEO total compensation (ComTotl), shareholder rights (IndexGIM),87 inside debt (InsDbt), 
compensation leverage (ComLev), and debt ratio (Debt/Assets); and significantly higher mean 
diversification level (Divers), likelihood that CEO is also board chair (Duality), periods of 
financial crisis (CRISIS), and/or nomination committee chair (CEOnom), percentage of 
independent directors (%Board),88 percentage of institutional ownership (%Inst), firm size 
(Assets), RKRV’S firm specific short-run pricing error (RKRV_Firm),  MPHP, and R&D ratio 
(R&D/Sales).89 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
 We use fixed-effects panel regressions and two estimation approaches to examine possible 
determinants of firm undervaluation as proxied by Uvdum. For the Heckman two-stage approach 
designed to deal with selection bias, we use the inverse Mills’ ratio (gamma) obtained from a 
Probit model in a first stage estimation as a regressor in the second stage estimation.  For the IV 
approach designed to deal with an endogenous regressor, we use firm age (firmage) as our 
chosen instrumental variable (IV) since firm age is highly correlated with CSRcom but only 
influences Uvdum through CSRcom (i.e., Cov(firmage, ε) = 0).  
 Based on the summary regression results reported in Table 4.6, we observe that 
undervaluation as proxied by the net shares purchased by managers (Uvdum) is significantly and 
positively related with CSRcom in all the specifications, and that this relation does not depend 
upon the choice of which control variables are included in the estimations, such as the inclusion 
or exclusion of the governance or pension-related variables.  We also observe that almost all the 
coefficient estimates for the regressors are significant and robust across the two estimation 
approaches.  A notable exception is the estimated coefficient for institutional ownership (%Insti) 
which is significantly negative in the Heckman two-stage approach but becomes insignificant or 
marginally significant using the IV estimation approach.90 This may reflect to some extent the 
                                                          
87 A higher value of IndexGIM represents stronger shareholder rights (more takeover pressure), and a lower potential 
for managerial entrenchment. This is accomplished by reverse ordering the ranks in the original index. 
88 The percent of independent directors (%Director) is used to measure board independence (Linck, Netter and Yang, 
2008; Hermalin and Wesbach, 1998, 2003; Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008). 
89 Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for the observations for each year and each characteristic fail to reject the 
hypothesis at the 5% level that the sorted firms are normally distributed around the median. 
  
90 Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regressions are estimated by including firm size, debt to assets, and R&D to sales, in 
order to compare the results across the various estimation methods. Gamma (inverse Mills’ ratio) is included along 
with the other control variables in the second stage of this estimation approach. The significantly negative 
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conflicting roles of institutions as investors and monitors (Johnson, 2014). The robustness of the 
significantly positive estimated coefficients for ResCov using various specifications of the two 
estimation approaches suggests that firm undervaluation based on insider expectations increases 
with greater lagged residual analyst coverage when ResCov is used as a proxy for the underlying 
expectations of analysts with higher values corresponding to better aggregate measures of their 
actual expectations about a firm’s true value.91  
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
4.4.2 Determinants of the Likelihood of CSR Changes 
 Table 4.7 reports summary results for logistic regressions when the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable based on changes in one of three CSR rankings which are commonly used in the 
literature, namely, CSRcom, CSRstr, and CSRcon.92 Consistent with many previous studies (e.g., 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Jo and Harjoto, 2011), most of the independent variables are 
significantly related to the likelihood of a change in a CSR ranking and have opposite signs when 
dummies capturing changes in CSR strengths and concerns (DΔCSRstr and DΔCSRcon, 
respectively) are examined separately. As expected, positive (negative) changes in the 
likelihoods of CSRcom and CSRstr are negatively (positively) related to total CEO compensation 
(ComTotl) and positively (negatively) related to the undervaluation dummy variable based on the 
AIB tercile rankings (Uvdum), and positive (negative) changes in the likelihoods of CSRcon are 
positively (negatively) related to ComTotl and negatively (positively) related to Uvdum. The 
relationships between each of the three CSR rankings measures and firm undervaluation as 
measured by Uvdum remain qualitatively unchanged in untabulated results when MPHP is 
replaced with one of the other mispricing measures, i.e., PAIT, Tobin’s Q, PV_MB, DHRT, 
RKRV_Long, RKRV_Sector, and RKRV_Firm.  
 Thus, the estimated relation between changes in CSR and ComTotl are consistent with the 
predicted sign for the conflict-resolution hypothesis for H5, and the relations of CSR changes 
with Uvdum are consistent with the predicated sign for the risk-mitigation hypothesis for H1. Our 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
coefficients for Gamma suggest the existence of a potential sample selection bias in the estimations if not adjusted 
for. 
91 ResCov measures a firm’s unexpected analyst following. 
92 The summary regression results for two other commonly used measures of CSR rankings are reported in the 
Online Internet Appendix Table I.2 which is a separate document from this paper that is available upon request. The 
results are qualitatively the same when we use Probit models to estimate the likelihood of a CSR change. The 
untabulated results also remain intact when we control for risk using the standard deviation of stock returns. 
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findings for the relations of CSR changes with Uvdum also are consistent with a number of 
previous studies that identify a positive relationship between CSR activities and firm value (e.g., 
Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013; Edmans, 2012; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Lins, Servaes and 
Tamayo, 2016; Derwall, Koedijk, and  Horst, 2011). 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
 We find weak evidence for a relationship between each of the three CSR ranking measures 
and the two pension-related variables. Specifically, the likelihood of positive changes in 
composite CSR rankings (DΔCSRcom) is significantly and negatively related with inside debt 
(InsDbt), the likelihood of positive (negative) changes in the CSR strength rankings (DΔCSRstr) 
is significantly and negatively (and positively) related with inside debt (InsDbt) and the 
likelihood of positive (negative) changes in CSR concern rankings (DΔCSRcon) is significantly 
and positively (negatively) related with compensation leverage (ComLev).  These results are 
consistent with the predicted sign for these pension-related variables due to their hypothesized 
effects on managerial risk aversion as stated in H6. 
 For the other regressors and in the interests of brevity, we only discuss the results reported in 
Columns [1] and [2] of Table 4.7 for positive changes. We observe that the likelihood of a 
positive change in a firm’s combined CSR ranking (D∆CSRcom) increases for firms with the 
following characteristics: more diversified (Divers), less leveraged (Debt/Assets), larger (Assets), 
higher R&D ratios (R&D/Sales), lower shareholder rights (IndexGIM), CEO is the chair or a 
member of the board nomination committee (CEOnom), higher percentage of independent board 
directors (%Board), higher institutional ownership (%Insti), and higher residual coverage 
(ResCov). The results for CEOnom, %Board, %Insti and IndexGIM support H7 and the 
expectation that the relation is monitor specific.  
 Based on the Wald test, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level that the differences in the 
coefficients estimates between the samples of positive and negative changes in the CSR rankings 
are the same. Furthermore, the elasticities are larger for %Insti, IndexGIM, %Board and Uvdum 
and lower for firm size for the regressions based on positive changes in CSRcom and CSRstr than 
for negative changes in CSRcon.93 This finding is indirectly consistent with the finding of 
                                                          
93 The lower relative effect on negative versus positive changes for CSR concerns, ∆CSRcon, for %Insti, 
IndexGIM, %Board and Uvdum, for example, is consistent with the results reported in the other columns, since a 
negative (positive) ∆CSRcon represents an increase (decrease) in CSR rankings. The elasticity at the sample mean 
for a level variable is given by (𝑑𝑦 𝑦⁄ ) (𝑑𝑥 𝑥⁄ )⁄  = 𝛽 ×(?̅? ?̅?⁄ ) , where ?̅? is the sample mean of the independent 
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Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst (2011) that value-driven investors primarily use negative screens to 
avoid controversial stocks, while profit-driven investors use positive screens, and with the 
finding of Dimson, Karakaş and Li (2015) that positive (zero) cumulative abnormal returns are 
associated with (un)successful CSR engagements. 
 
4.5. RESULTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS SYSTEMS OF EQUATIONS 
4.5.1 3SLS Estimations of a Simultaneous System of Four Equations 
 The literature has abundant applications of simultaneous equations models in finance research 
given the fact that firm decisions, characteristics, and performance may be jointly determined 
(Lee, Liang, Lin and Yang, 2016). Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) examine the joint 
determination of managerial incentives and policy choices using three stage least squares (3SLS), 
whereas Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) employ a two-equation model using 2SLS to estimate 
the relationship between executives’ incentive compensation and firm risk for the banking 
industry.  
  The relation among the four variables should be contemporaneously determined and be taken 
into account in a simultaneous equations framework. CSR papers using 3SLS include Callan and 
Thomas (2011), Mishra and Modi (2013), Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) and Bouslah, 
Kryzanowski and M'Zali (2016). Another important source of endogeneity arises because firm’s 
current actions will affect its control environment and future performance (Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter; 2012).  
 In this section, we examine whether these four variables are simultaneously determined and 
whether a number of variables have power to explain these four variables. To address this issue, 
we use three stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate a simultaneous equations system that 
includes one equation for each of these four independent variables that are both internal and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variable x, 𝛽 is the estimated coefficient for x, and ?̅? is the sample mean of the dependent variable y. We obtain 
elasticities of 0.0042 {i.e., 0.008 ×0.5201/1.000}, 0.0047{i.e., 0.009 ×0.5201/1.000}, 0.0094{i.e., 0.018 ×
0.5201/1.000}, 0.0109{i.e., 0.021 ×0.5201/1.000} for the level variable %Insti in columns (1) to (4), 
respectively, implying that the relative effect of a change in %Insti is greater for negative versus positive changes in 
CSRcom (i.e., D∆CSRcom). For log variables such as Assets, the elasticities are given by (𝑑𝑦 𝑦⁄ ) (𝑑𝑥 𝑥⁄ )⁄  = 𝛽 ?̅?⁄ . 
For dummy variable Uvdum, the elasticity is given by (dy/y)/(dx/x) = dln(y)/(dx/x) = 𝛽/x = β. The elasticities are 
0.062, 0.085, 0.095, 0.183 for the dummy variable Uvdum in columns (1) to (4), respectively. 
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external to the firm. The system in line with the classical form for tests of structural equations is 
given by:  
  𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑌𝑡
∗ + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the dependent variable used in a specific equation in the system chosen from 
CSRcom, Uvdum, ComTotl and IndexGIM; 𝑌𝑡
∗ is a vector of one or more dependent variables 
other than 𝑌𝑡 included in the equation as regressors; 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of other observable control 
variables whose choice is subsequently motivated for each equation;  𝜂𝑡 is an unobservable firm 
effect; and 𝜖𝑡 is a random error term. 
 First equation in the system. We start by exploring the potential independent variables for the 
first equation where CSRcom is the dependent variable. We expect CSR to be positively related 
to firm undervaluation, board independence, CEO nomination committee, institutional ownership, 
residual coverage, firm diversification, firm size, R&D to sales, and negatively related to 
executive compensation, shareholder rights, inside debt, compensation leverage, and debt to 
assets, based on our discussion in Section 2, and the findings reported earlier in Tables 2 and 7. 
We expect that the financial crisis is related to CSR rankings based on evidence that the relation 
between CSR rankings and risk is significantly different in the crisis period (Bouslah, 
Kryzanowski and M'Zali, 2016).We also include a number of other controls based on the 
findings of Jo and Harjoto (2011) that CSR rankings are positively related to CEO duality 
(Duality), State laws (StateLaw), entrenchment index (EntIndex), the index of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003; 2010),94 percent of shares owned by directors (%Director), and to the measure of 
firm valuation (MPHP).  
 Second equation in the system. We expect firm undervaluation (Uvdum) to be positively 
associated with CSR, inside debt, compensation leverage, percent of shares owned by directors 
(%Director), board independence (%Board), CEO duality (Duality), CEO nomination, family 
firm, residual coverage (ResCov), firm diversification (Divers), firm size, and R&D to sales, and 
negatively associated with executive compensation, shareholder rights, institutional ownership 
(%Insti), debt to assets, based on our discussion in Section 2 and the findings reported earlier in 
Tables 2, 5 and 6. We expect firm undervaluation to be positively related with VolatR and MPHP 
                                                          
94 We use our shareholder rights index instead which is the inverse of the GIM index. 
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given the finding that informed insider traders choose riskier investment projects to benefit from 
their increased volatility (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994) and the argument that insider purchases 
are positively associated with past volatility and the long-term MB ratio (Akbulut, 2013). We 
expect firm undervaluation and share turnover to be positively related since stock portfolios with 
high turnovers generate superior returns (Dey, 2005). We expect that the financial crisis is 
associated with firm undervaluation (Uvdum) based on the finding by Akin, Marín and Peydró 
(2016) that trades by top five executives reveal their understanding of bank risk-taking before 
and during the crisis. 
 Third equation in the system. We expect executive compensation (ComTotl) to be negatively 
associated with CSR, firm undervaluation (Uvdum), residual coverage (ResCov) and shareholder 
rights (IndexGIM) based on our discussion in Section 2, and the findings reported earlier in 
Tables 2, 6 and 7. Earlier studies (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt, 1984; Warner et al., 1988; 
Murphy, 1999) find that firm performance is positively related with CEO compensation. Given 
the finding of Gulen and Ion (2016) that industry and size adjusted CEO pay are negatively 
associated with future shareholder returns, we expect executive compensation to be positively 
related with past returns (PReturn). We expect a positive relation between executive 
compensation and blockholder interest (BlockH) based on the finding by Bethel et al. (1998) that 
active blockholders enhance shareholder value although Holderness (2003) concludes that 
blockholders not only have incentives to monitor management but they also might consume 
corporate resources. We expect executive compensation to be negatively related to institutional 
ownership (%Insti) based on the finding by Hartzell and Starks (2003) that concentrated 
institutional ownership moderates executive compensation and after considering the effect of the 
finding by Woidtke (2002) that the monitoring role of some institutions may potentially be 
compromised due to their conflicts of interest with other shareholders. Our expectations for other 
controls are based on the finding by Rüdiger (2009) that executive compensation is positively 
related with CEO duality, firm size, and return volatility (VolatR), and negatively related with 
firm mispricing. 
  Fourth and final equation in the system. We expect shareholder rights (IndexGIM) to be 
negatively related with CSR, executive compensation, and firm undervaluation based on our 
discussion in Section 2, and the findings reported earlier in Tables 2, 5, 6 and 7. Shareholder 
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rights are expected to be positively related with cash compensation as in Belghitar and Clark 
(2015) based on the finding that higher cash compensation lowers agency costs by providing 
risk-averse managers the opportunity to diversify externally (Belghitar and Clark, 2015). We 
expect shareholder rights to be associated with bond yield spreads (Spreads) and blockholdings 
(BlockH) given the finding that lower debt financing costs are associated with the increased use 
of antitakeover measures (Klock, Mansi and Maxwell, 2005) and lower yields are associated 
with the presence of institutional blockholders, particularly in the presence of multiple 
antitakeover measures (Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2004). We expect shareholder rights to be 
negatively related with past returns based on the findings of a positive relation between the use 
of antitakeover measures and firm poor performance (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Field and 
Karpoff, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Coates IV and Subramanian, 2003; and 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) and poor firm future operating performance (Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2006) and from the presence of negative abnormal returns surrounding antitakeover 
adoptions that suggest that antitakeover measures (ATMs), on average, entrench managers 
(Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Reingaert, 1988). We expect shareholder rights to be positively 
related with board independence based on the finding by Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) that 
market reactions to abnormal returns surrounding antitakeover adoptions depend on board 
structure. We expect corporate board ownership (CBO) to be associated with shareholder rights 
based on the finding of Bhagat and Bolton (2006) that corporate board ownership is a more 
appropriate measure of corporate governance than the index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003; 
2010) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004).  We expect shareholder rights to be related with 
inside debt and compensation leverage based on the finding of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) 
that inside debt which better aligns CEO incentives with those of debtholders has a role in 
mitigating a potential risk-shifting agency problem  of managers associated with deferred 
compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the finding that the use of debt compensation of 
managers (e.g., inside debt) is better than bonuses to deal with potential managerial agency 
problems (Edmans and Liu, 2010). 
 To identify the system, we first apply Hausman (1978) tests to each equation to select the 
endogenous variables. Exogenous variables are drawn from the corporate governance and firm 
characteristics that are out of the control of managers (e.g., the percentage of institutional share 
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ownership) or predetermined (e.g., whether or not the firm is a family firm). 95 The coefficients 
obtained from OLS estimation of the relations among the four variables set forth in the model are 
inconsistent when simultaneous equation biases are present.  We use Hausman (1978) tests to 
identify the possible presence of simultaneity bias in the OLS regression results.96 In addition to 
the four variables, most of the governance and firm characteristic variables were also found to be 
endogenously and jointly determined. We find significant residual cross-correlations in 2SLS 
estimation. Thus, 3SLS estimation procedure is efficient in addressing the cross-correlations of 
the disturbances. The simultaneous equation estimation with 3SLS is chosen over ordinary least 
squares (OLS) because it emits unbiased and consistent estimated coefficients for the exogenous 
variables and it facilitates an examination of interdependence among endogenous variables that 
are related to common exogenous variables. According to Jackling and Johl (2009), 3SLS 
regression is preferred over 2SLS because 3SLS addresses both potential endogeneity and cross 
correlations between equations if the system includes no misspecified equation,97 98 which is 
supported by our Hausman test results reported in Online Internet Appendix Table I.3.  
 We assume that all the regressors are endogenous except for firm age, the year dummies, 
family firm, CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q. While firm age, our instrumental variable for equation 
[I], is highly correlated with CSRcom, it only influences Uvdum, ComTotl and IndexGIM through 
CSRcom (i.e., firmage has zero covariances with the residuals of the equations containing Uvdum, 
ComTotl and IndexGIM as dependent variables).  Family firm, our instrumental variable for 
equation [II], is highly correlated with Uvdum but only affects CSRcom, ComTotl and IndexGIM 
through Uvdum (i.e., familyfirm has zero covariances with the residuals of the equations 
containing CSRcom, ComTotl and IndexGIM as dependent variables). Employing similar criteria, 
                                                          
95 Some previous studies use similar technique for preliminary choice of exogenous variables. See, e.g., Switzer 
(2007). 
96 When no simultaneous equation bias was identified using the Hausman (1978) test for a suspected endogenous 
variable in an equation and the variable was insignificant in both the OLS and 2SLS estimation, it was removed 
from our 3SLS estimation. The results remain similar when we include such variables as exogenous variables in the 
3SLS model. 
97 As argued by Chen and Lee (2010), 2SLS and 3SLS estimations are respectively limited and full information 
methods. The 3SLS estimation is more efficient because it accounts for the information from a full system of 
equations. The 3SLS method estimates all structural parameters of this system jointly which allows for any 
contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances in the different structural equations. 
98 Jointly determined in the system, these dependent and independent variables are correlated with the disturbance 




we choose CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q as instrumental variables for equations [III] and [IV], 
respectively.  
 To conduct endogeneity tests, we execute tests of over-identifying constraints using GMM 
estimation and report the results in Online Internet Appendix Table I.4. Panel A. We observe that 
the J-statistics are insignificant for all the four equations, with probabilities between 0.203 and 
0.471. Thus, for all the four equations we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the over-
identifying constraints of the four instrumental variables, which validate our instruments. Next, 
we conduct the GMM endogeneity test to examine whether these four instrumental variables are 
valid in addressing the underlying endogeneity problem, or whether this problem arises among 
CSR composite, firm undervaluation, executive compensation, shareholder rights, and their lags 
in our estimations. The results of the endogeneity tests reported in Panel B of Online Internet 
Appendix Table I.4. from GMM estimations reveal that the differences in J-statistics are all 
insignificant,99 implying that the endogeneity test results cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity. To sum up, using these four instruments, the GMM over-identifying tests and the 
endogeneity tests support that endogeneity is not an issue and that the three stage least squares 
procedure is a valid methodology for our estimations.  
 Table 4.8 reports the summary regression results from the 3SLS estimations of our system of 
four simultaneous equations.100  Column [I] reports the results when CSR composite rankings are 
regressed on the other three dependent variables and various control variables. Column [II], [III] 
and [IV] present the summary regression results for similar model formulations for the other 
three dependent variables. We observe that the other three dependent variables and the lagged 
dependent variable are simultaneously related to the dependent variable in each equation. We 
now discuss only the relations that are significant at a 0.05 level or better. 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 Based on column [I] of Table 4.8, we find that CSR composite rankings (CSRcom) are 
positively associated with our managerial trading measure of firm undervaluation (Uvdum) and 
negatively related with total CEO compensation (ComTotl) and our shareholder rights measure 
                                                          
99 The probabilities of difference are 0.501, 0.533, 0.473, and 0.392 for equation [I], [II], [III] and [IV] respectively. 
100 First, we set the list of parameters in the system according to a set of NONLIN RATS instructions. Second, we 
create the formulas for the equations using FRML. Third, we set up the list of instruments using command 
INSTRUMENTS. Finally, we estimate the model using NLSYTEM using the INST option. 
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(IndexGIM).  This positive relation between CSRcom and Uvdum is consistent with our 
conjecture that higher CSR rankings are related to higher managerial net share purchases, which 
suggests that their managers believe that their firms’ undervaluations will diminish when the 
market begins to more accurately value their firms’ CSR. This result is consistent with the 
positive relation postulated in H1. With regard to its relationships with the controls, the CSR 
composite ranking (CSRcom) is positively related with relative director ownership (%Director), 
proportion of independent directors (%Board), institutional ownership (%Insti), residual analyst 
coverage (ResCov), degree of firm diversification (Divers), ln of total assets (Assets), R&D-to-
sales ratio (R&D/Sales), state law (StateLaw), and entrenchment index (EntIndex). The estimated 
relations between CSRcom and the variables measuring the perceived merits of a firm’s CSR 
ranking by each of the firm’s monitors are consistent with H7. The negative relation of CSRcom 
with the debt-to-assets ratio (Debt/Assets) is consistent with our expectation that leads to the 
negative relation postulated in H6.  
 Based on column [II] of Table 4.8, we find that our managerial trading measure of firm 
undervaluation (Uvdum) is positively associated with CSR composite rankings (CSRcom), 
consistent with the “errors-in-expectations” hypothesis that investors are likely to make more 
“errors-in-expectations” with higher CSR rankings as predicted for H1. The findings that the 
managerial trading measure of firm undervaluation (Uvdum) is negatively associated with 
shareholder rights (IndexGIM) and with total CEO compensation (ComTotl) are consistent 
respectively with the predicted sign for H2 and with the predicted sign from the conflict-
resolution hypothesis for H3. With regard to its relationship with the controls, our managerial 
trading measure of firm undervaluation (Uvdum) is positively related with the alternative 
mispricing estimate (MPHP), relative director ownership (%Director), proportion of independent 
directors (%Board), CEO is board chair (Duality), residual coverage (ResCov), firm is family 
firm (FamilyFirm), degree of firm diversification (Divers), ln of total assets (Assets), share 
turnover (Turnover) and return volatility (VolatR), and negatively related with the debt-to-assets 
ratio (Debt/Assets). The significant and positive relation of firm undervaluation based on insider 
trading with CSRcom and MPHP based on firm fundamentals implies that the channels that 




 Based on column [III] of Table 4.8, we find that total CEO compensation (ComTotl) is 
negatively related with the CSR composite ranking (CSRcom), firm undervaluation (Uvdum) and 
shareholder rights (IndexGIM). The negative relation with CSRcom is consistent with the 
conjecture that CEOs of more socially responsible firms are paid less. With regard to the controls, 
CEO compensation (ComTotl) is positively related with blockholdings (BolckH), ln of total 
assets (Assets), CEO is board chair (Duality), and past return (PReturn), and negatively related 
with the proportion of institutional ownership (%Insti). The latter result is consistent with the 
monitoring role of institutions and analysts. 
 Based on column [IV] of Table 4.8, we find that shareholder rights (IndexGIM) is, as 
expected, negatively related with the CSR composite ranking (CSRcom) and our managerial 
trading measure of firm undervaluation (Uvdum).  With regard to the controls, corporate 
shareholder rights (IndexGIM) is negatively related with past return (PReturn), and positively 
affected by board independence (%Board), the proportion of blockholdings (BlockH), executive 
cash compensation (ComCash), bond yield spreads (Spreads), and corporate board ownership 
(CBO). 
 The above results may not be robust if the control variables used are related to past values of 
the dependent variables (e.g., Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). Following Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter (2012), Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin (2016), amongst others, and in order to 
determine the most appropriate model specification for testing our hypotheses, we examine how 
strongly current levels and changes of various control regressors, such as %Board, InsDbt, Assets 
or ΔAssets and Δ%Insti, are related to lags of the other variables (both dependent and 
independent). The summary results for these OLS regressions are reported in Panels A and B of 
Table 4.9. We find that both current levels and differences in the levels of the control variables 
are all significantly related to their past values. This finding supports the assertion that not only 
the four dependent variables are endogenous, but also that some of the control variables also are 
possibly endogenous.  
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
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 The results for tests of strict endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 285)101 reported in Table 4.9 
indicate that the estimated coefficients from regressions of the current values of four 
representative control variables on the past values of all the other variables are all significantly 
different from zero. This implies that none of these four variables are strictly exogenous.102  
4.5.2 System-GMM Estimation of the Relationships among the Four Dependent Variables  
 The system-GMM requires that the instruments (lagged variables) are exogenous to current 
shocks in the dependent variables. As in previous studies (e.g., Beltratti and Paladino, 2015; Cai, 
Cui and Jo, 2016; Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016), we use two tests to examine the 
exogeneity of instruments. The first one is the second-order serial correlation test to ensure that 
enough lags of the dependent variables are included. If our model has enough of a lag length, we 
could consider lagged dependent variables beyond those lags as potential instruments for current 
shocks in the dependent variables. Thus, the first difference residuals are correlated and second 
differenced residuals are not if our model has the required lag length, using the autocorrelation 
tests of the first [AR(1)] and second  [AR(2)] differences, respectively. The second approach is a 
Hansen test of over-identification. We can test whether over-identification is a problem for our 
model as our system-GMM includes several lags. The Hansen test generates a J-statistic and 𝜒2 
distribution under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The exogeneity tests of Difference-in-
Hansen are under the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments for the equations in levels. This 
test computes the increase in J when the given subset is added to the estimation set up. The 
change in J is χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of added instruments. We use the 
finite sample correction for variance proposed by Windmeijer (2005) to address the downward 
bias of the standard errors. 
 Applying screening criteria to choose the instrumental variables for the simultaneous system 
of 3SLS, we choose family firm, firm age, CEO tenure and Tobin’s Q as the instrumental 
variables for the equations with CSRcom, Uvdum, ComTotl and IndexGIM, respectively, as the 
                                                          
101 Suppose Xi,t includes the explanatory and a series of control variables, we then estimate the following fixed-
effects model to test for strict endogeneity: pi,t = α + βXi,t + ΩWi,t+2 + ηi,t + ϵi,t                        t = 1992, …, 2011              (2) 
where Wi,t+2 represents a subset of the corporate control and governance variables. The null hypothesis of strict 
exogeneity, Ω = 0, is that future values of these control variables are unrelated to current changes in the CSR 
ranking measures. 
102 Our conclusions are robust when we replace changes in the CSR composite with changes in CSR strength or 
changes in CSR concerns. 
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dependent variable. Many previous studies (e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997; Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker, 1995; Stock and Yogo, 2005) demonstrate that estimates from instrumental variables 
regressions could be biased when the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
variables. However, the literature of IV regression has not identified a single rule to assess the 
joint strength of instruments used in the dynamic panel system GMM estimator.  
  Table 4.10 reports the results from our examination of the relation among the four variables 
of primary interest using a system-GMM estimation for each of the four equations. Compared to 
our results from the 3SLS simultaneous system with four equations, we identify three new 
findings. First, the estimated coefficients of inside debt and compensation leverage are all 
negative and significant at the 1% level in both the CSRcom (column [I]) and firm 
undervaluation equations (column [II]) while the estimated coefficients of total compensation 
remain negative and significant. Thus, more deferred (e.g., pension) compensations from both 
the perspective of the firm and its executives are negatively related to a firm’s CSR ranking and 
its undervaluation, consistent with H3, H4, H5, and H6. Second, total compensation is negatively 
and significantly associated with IndexGIM (column [IV]). Finally, institutional ownership (a 
firm monitoring proxy) is negatively and significantly related to both firm undervaluation and 
total compensation (columns [II] and [III] respectively) but positively and significantly related to 
CSRcom (column [I]). 
 We find that both the lagged CSR rankings and the alternative undervaluation factor (MPHP) 
are positively associated with Uvdum (column II). To obtain their relative effect on Uvdum, we 
calculate a ratio of 0.367 for the elasticity of MPHP to that of CSRcom.103 This implies that 
errors-in-expectations due to not only the CSR channel but also other channels (e.g., other firm-
specific activities) need to be accounted for when examining the relation between CSR and firm 
value. As such, this finding has implications for the findings of other studies (e.g., Dimson, 
Karakaş and Li, 2015; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Derwall, Koedijk and Horst, 2011). However, 
such an examination lies beyond the scope of this study. Consistent with our results reported in 
Tables 6 and 7, lagged MPHP is not related to current CSRcom when lagged firm undervaluation 
(Uvdum) is accounted for (column I), and both lagged CSRcom and MPHP are significantly 
related to current firm undervaluation (column II).  Thus, lagged Uvdum (insider assessment of 
                                                          
103 We obtain the following MPHP and CSRcom elasticities ratios:  β1( ?̅?1/?̅?)/β2(?̅?2/?̅?) = β1?̅?1/β2?̅?2 = 
(0.072×0.0253)/(0.011×0.4517) =  36.7% . 
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“errors in expectations” embodied in firm value) subsumes the association of lagged MPHP 
(overall market’s assessment of “errors in expectations” embodied in firm value) with CSRcom 
but both lagged CSRcom and lagged MPHP are associated with Uvdum. Furthermore, the latter 
result indicates, as expected, that being informed is not confined to firm insiders.  
 When including the interaction of the pricing measure (MPHP) with the post-SOX period 
dummy which is equal to one if a financial expert appo (see Online Internet Appendix Table 
I.6),104 we find that the estimated coefficients for this interaction variable and MPHP by itself are 
always significant but with opposite signs. Other conclusions drawn earlier remain essentially 
unchanged. For robustness purposes, we also use 4-lagged independent variables as instruments 
to repeat our estimation.105 Our conclusions remain similar and the results are available in Online 
Internet Appendix Table I.7. 106 107 We recognize that the system GMM estimation is for a single 
                                                          
104 SOXpost is equal to 1 if a firm appointed expert directors to the audit committee in a year of the post-SOX period 
and the sum of the two coefficients is significantly different from zero and has the same sign as MPHP by itself. Thus, 
the effects of the mispricing measure MPHP on each of the four dependent variables was lower in magnitude for the 
post-SOX versus pre-SOX period. This expands on the study of Singhvi, Raghunandan and Mishra (2013) who find 
that the market reactions to the appointment of expert directors for the three years of 2004, 2006 and 2008 are not 
significantly different from zero.  
105 We first use the Stat 13 xtdpdsys instruction to set the instruments, then use the varlist instruction to specify the 
predetermined variables and the endogenous variables to be included in the model with the option level of 95%, then 
we use the artests instruction to set 2 as the maximum order of the autocorrelation to be calculated; Finally, we use 
the xtabond instruction to perform the Blundell-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. 
106 If p is the independent variable and X includes all the regressors, system-GMM involves estimating the following: 
| 
△pi,t 
|  =  α  +  β | 
△Xi,t 
|  +  ϵi,t                                             (3) 
pi,t Xi,t 
To assess the strength of the instruments, the system being estimated is divided into its constituent equations of differences and of 
levels. The strength of lag differences as instruments in the level equations is first assessed. Then the strength of lagged levels as 
instruments in the differenced equations is evaluated. The equation in levels is given by: 
 pi,t = α + βXi,t + εi,t (4) 
and the equation in differences is given by: 
 △pi,t = α + β△Xi,t + ѳi,t (5) 
107 There is a trade-off between endogeneity and strength when using instruments of lagged dependent variables 
since longer lags make the instruments less endogenous but weaker, and vice versa. Based on test results using 
different lag lengths, we select the 4th and 5th lags of the dependent variables as the instruments for the system of 
level and differenced equations, respectively. Based on the GMM estimation results reported in Online Internet 
Appendix Table I.7, the AR(1) is below 0.3% and 0.4% and the AR(2) is above 23.8% and 14.9% for all four 
differenced equations and four level equations, respectively. The Hanson test results are between 14.9% and 34.7% 
and between 13.8% and 41.11 for all four differenced equations and four level equations, respectively. The 
Difference-in-Hanson values are between 11.3% and 51.2% and between 21.7% and 53.2% for all four differenced 
equations and four level equations, respectively. When using the 5th and 6th lags of the dependent variables as the 
instruments for the system of level and differenced equations, we find that for equation [II] in levels that the AR(1) 
and AR(2) are 4.6% and 7.2%, respectively. This suggests that the null hypothesis of no serial correlations cannot be 
rejected at the 1% and 5% levels for the first and second orders, respectively, although the results from the AR(1), 
AR(2), Hanson test of overidentification, and Diff-in-Hanson are acceptable for equations [I], [III] and [IV].  When 
using the 3th and 4th lag of the dependent variables as the instruments for the system of level and differenced 
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equation estimation. In order to estimate the system together, we also conduct seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) and obtain similar conclusions based on the results reported in 
Online Appendix Table I.8.108 Figure 4.1 depicts the relations between changes in the CSR 
composite and the other three variables for overvalued and undervalued firms in Table 4.10 
column [I]. For firms with higher abnormal insider buys (greater firm undervaluation), positive 
changes in CSR composite rankings are more likely to be associated with lower total CEO 
compensation, and firms with lower shareholder rights are more likely to be associated with 
positive changes in CSR composite rankings. The trends are similar for the overvalued firms 
with the exception that most of the CSR composite changes are negative.  
 [Insert Table 4.10 and Figure 4.1 about here] 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
 This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the relations among CSR composite 
rankings, firm undervaluation, executive compensation and corporate governance, which are 
increasingly important areas for practitioners and academic researchers. We construct a measure 
of undervaluation based on insider trading that captures mispricing information that has not been 
fully captured by the commonly used mispricing measures in the literature. We use system-
GMM and 3SLS estimations of a system of four simultaneous equations to control for 
endogeneity and simultaneity.  
 We report strong evidence that firm undervaluation is positively related to a firm’s future 
CSR rankings. This suggests that the trading of managers is informed about misvaluation due to 
“errors-in-expectations” related to a firm’s CSR rankings. We find that inside debt (a proxy for 
managerial conservatism) is negatively related to a firm’s future CSR ranking. The general small 
elasticities of independent variables used to explain the net buying behavior of a firm’s managers 
suggest that the primary driver of such trading behavior is private information.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equations, respectively, we observe that the Hanson test of overidentification and Diff-in-Hanson test can be rejected 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for equation [IV] in differences.  
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Figure 2.1.  Plots of the estimated coefficients for two pension-related metrics by quartile as regressors in 
logistic regressions for acquirer choice of cash (stock) as the method of payment 
Panels A and B depict the estimated coefficients for two pension-related metrics (i.e., inside debt and compensation 
leverage) by quartile from time-series logistic regressions used to identify the determinants of acquirer choice of 
cash in Panel A and stock in Panel B. The numerical values so plotted are tabulated in column 2 of Panel A of Table 
2.6 for cash payment and in column 2 of Panel B for stock payment. Quartiles I (lowest) and IV (highest) refer to the 
1st and 4th quartile, respectively. 



















Figure 2.2. Plots of the estimated coefficients for inside debt and total compensation by quartile for the PCAR 
and PAlpha for (post-) M&A announcement windows for acquirers 
These panels include plots of the mean PCAR for the announcement window [-1, 1] and mean PAlpha for three 
post-announcement windows for a sample of firms that engaged in M&As between 1992 and 2014 and are double 
sorted by method of payment (stock and cash) in year t and pension-related metric (i.e., inside debt and total 
compensation) in year t-1 where t is the M&A announcement year. The reported values in basis points (bps) are 
obtained using the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015) 
adjusted for the equity issue effect to get PCAR and PAlpha. The announcement CAR for the window [-1, 1] are 
based on model coefficients estimated in the first step for each model over the window [-200, -41]. Post-
announcement performance is estimated in-sample as the intercept of the four- (five-)factor model for portfolios for 
windows of [2, 64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] trading days representing periods of about 3-, 6-, and 12-months, 
respectively. These portfolios are formed at the end of each announcement month that has a minimum of five such 
events as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and held unchanged until the ending day specified in each post-
announcement window. Values depicted in Panels A, B, C and D are drawn from Panels A, D, B and E, respectively, 
of Table 2.9. Values depicted in the remaining panels are drawn from values in the online appendix. Quartiles I 
(lowest) and IV (highest) refer to the 1st and 4th quartile of inside debt or compensation leverage, respectively, 
where managerial conservatism increases with a higher inside debt quartile and decreases with a higher total 
compensation quartile. 
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Figure 4.1. Relations among CSR composite, firm undervaluation, CEO total compensation, and shareholder 
rights  
Panels A and B report the relations between three variables (i.e., firm undervaluation, CEO total compensation, and 
shareholder rights) and the future CSR composite as reflected in Table 4.10 column [I]. Panel A and Panel B include 
the sample firms in the High AIB and Low AIB terciles, respectively, as described in Table 4.5. The changes in the 
CSR composite are the future CSR composite ranking minus the mean CSR composite ranking for the full sample. 



























































































Table 2.1. Summary descriptive statistics for the samples of acquirers (initial and final) and SEOs 
This table provides summary descriptive statistics for the variables used herein for our initial, final, and SEO 
samples in Panels A, B and C, respectively. Numbers in brackets are the natural logarithm values for some variables 
whose non-log values are in thousands of units. All variables are as defined in Appendix 2.A. I and III represent the 
median values in quartile I and III, respectively. The initial sample consists of the firms with matched compensation 
and firm data obtained from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp and COMPUSTAT. N is the number of firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2014.  
Panel A of Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the initial sample at year t – 1. N = 24,428 
Variable Mean I Median III Standard Deviation 
Adv/Assetst-1 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.051 
Cap($k) 
1.482 0.051 0.173 0.741 4.117 
[14.209] [10.840] [12.061] [13.516] [2.189] 
CashFlowRisk t-1 0.061 0.048 0.059 0.667 0.071 
Cash M&A 0.231 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.421 
CEO Age 56.014 49.000 56.000 61.000 74.000 
[4.026] [3.892] [4.025] [4.111] [4.304] 
CEO CComp 
1,314,482 817,402 1,410,701 1,904,253 114,902 
[14.089] [13.614] [14.159] [14.460] [0.817] 
CEO TComp 
5,785,034 3,536,102 6,211,890 8,924,630 6,760,302 
[15.571] [15.079] [15.640] [16.004] [1.023] 
CEO Chair 0.715 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.449 
CEO Gender 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 
CEO Tenure 7.412 4.510 8.000 12.721 6.471 
CompLev 0.083 0.003 0.035 0.311 0.234 
ΔCompLev -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.006 0.031 
Debt/Assetst-1 0.297 0.201 0.286 0.397 0.152 
Dir TComp 
80,142 49,021 78,624 1,059,023 45,371 
[11.292] [10.800] [11.272] [13.873] [0.510] 
Dir CComp 
31,198 19,690 29,251 41,409 13,202 
[10.348] [9.888] [10.283] [10.63] [0.321] 
%Equity 0.021 0.012 0.020 0.067 0.056 
ExpTenure -0.756 -10.000 0.000 8.000 7.419 
InsDebt 0.504 0.012 0.371 1.703 3.850 
ΔInsDebt1 -0.003 -0.021 -0.003 0.028 0.213 
ΔInsDebt2 -0.003 -0.019 -0.002 0.022 0.197 
ΔInsDebt3 -0.003 -0.015 -0.003 0.019 0.184 
Ins Ownership 0.377 0.089 0.305 0.612 0.311 
Internal CEO 0.783 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.412 
Inv/Assetst-1 0.081 0.062 0.080 0.104 0.072 
LGG 0.218 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.413 
MAQ 0.314 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.464 
Mixed M&A 0.140 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.347 
MGR Rep(CEO) 0.302 0.000 0.122 1.000 0.459 
MGR Rep 0.289 0.000 0.102 1.000 0.456 
Price 
21.627 14.920 24.460 27.006 36.225 
[3.074] [2.702] [3.197] [3.296] [1.008] 
PUI 123.875 100.000 123.000 133.000 42.892 
Qt-1 1.801 1.308 1.791 1.917 1.043 
R&D/Assetst-1 0.039 0.024 0.040 0.069 0.087 
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Return t-1, t-3 0.167 0.110 0.165 0.182 0.177 
ROA t-1  0.152 0.131 0.151 0.165 0.113 
ROA t-1, t-3 0.518 0.403 0.522 0.558 0.364 
Salest-1 ($k) 
4,332,042 3,084,482 4,702,115 6,401,565 8,539,104 
[15.282] [14.942] [15.364] [15.672] [1.224] 
SAQ 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.326 
Stock M&A 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.293 
Turnover 1.387 0.469 1.104 2.204 1.802 





Panel B of Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the final sample of acquirers at year t – 1. N = 8,189 
Variable Mean I Median III Standard Deviation 
Adv/Assetst-1 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.033 
Ann Return 0.011 -0.021 0.011 0.042 0.089 
BM Ratio 0.506 0.252 0.423 0.692 0.348 
Cap($k) 
3.011 0.370 0.509 0.820 6.575 
[14.917] [12.821] [13.140] [13.617] [3.007] 
CashFlowRisk t-1 0.040 0.020 0.041 0.476 0.051 
Cashhold 0.152 0.030 0.068 0.203 0.184 
Cash Merger 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
CEO Age 56.371 50.000 56.000 61.000 73.000 
(4.032) (3.912) (4.025) (4.111) (4.290) 
CEO Chair 0.698 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.457 
CEO Gender 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 
CEO CComp 
1,738,212 901,773 1,734,660 2,561,708 162,251 
[12.674] [13.712] [14.366] [14.756] [0.590] 
CEO TComp 
7,166,570 4,500,927 7,166,623 11,648,054 8,072,652 
[15.785] [15.320] [15.785] [16.270] [1.831] 
CEO Tenure 7.782 4.916 8.000 13.467 9.731 
CF/EQ 0.063 0.036 0.061 0.106 0.122 
CompLev (k) 0.093 0.008 0.109 0.308 0.210 
ΔCompLev -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.059 
Debt/Assetst-1 0.241 0.187 0.236 0.332 0.152 
DebtP 0.239 0.015 0.417 0.601 0.630 
Dir CComp 
36,220 21,501 36,251 51,234 9,759 
[10.497] [9.980] [10.498] [10.844] [0.712] 
Dir TComp 
110,564 61,004 110,572 1,261,303 55,630 
[11.613] [11.019] [11.613] [14.048] [0.671] 
Diversific 0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.464 
ExpTenure -0.713 -11.000 0.000 8.000 7.025 
%Equity 0.023 0.014 0.022 0.069 0.026 
Hostile 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.179 
Income Ratio 0.114 0.041 0.117 0.168 0.123 
InsDebt (k) 0.624 0.113 0.577 1.697 3.041 
ΔInsDebt1 -0.017 -0.036 -0.013 0.023 0.404 
ΔInsDebt2 -0.016 -0.034 -0.012 0.019 0.387 
ΔInsDebt3 -0.014 -0.026 -0.009 0.016 0.363 
Ins Ownership 0.510 0.227 0.483 0.741 0.326 
Internal CEO 0.779 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.413 
Inv/Assetst-1 0.079 0.051 0.080 0.107 0.064 
LGG 0.223 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.429 
MAQ 0.637 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
MGR Rep(CEO) 0.293 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.455 
MGR Rep(Five) 0.280 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.449 
Mixed Merger 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.458 
Multibid 0.637 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
Qt-1 1.712 1.194 1.710 1.813 0.937 
Price 
25.715 7.053 16.920 38.122 26.415 
[3.247] [1.953] [2.828] [3.640] [1.233] 
Public Target 0.412 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.492 
PUI 124.125 99.000 123.000 132.000 41.052 
R&D/Assetst-1 0.038 0.023 0.039 0.067 0.039 
Return t-1, t-3 0.197 0.140 0.195 0.232 0.277 
ROA t-1  0.181 0.148 0.183 0.221 0.512 
ROA t-1, t-3 0.548 0.433 0.542 0.639 0.578 
Salest-1 ($k) 
6,573,251 4,103,514 6,573,543 8,328,927 2,261,724 
[15.699] [15.227] [15.700] [15.935] [1.359] 
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SAQ 0.363 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.481 
Stock Merger 0.205 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.403 
Tender 0.392 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.488 
Transaction Size 0.278 0.051 0.106 0.283 0.616 
Transaction Value ($m) 538.722 18.629 87.738 201.724 3,864.030 
Turnover 1.564 0.547 0.951 1.680 5.374 
Volatility 0.484 0.398 0.483 0.607 0.119 
Withdrawn 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.123 
No of Announcements: 11,417 
 
 
Panel C of Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the SEO sample at year t – 1. N = 26,113 
Variable Mean I Median III Standard Deviation 
BM Ratio 0.417 0.143 0.311 0.509 0.296 
Cap($Billion) 
2.413 0.139 0.497 1.895 7.267 
[14.696] [11.842] [13.116] [14.455] [4.231] 
Cashhold 0.183 0.027 0.085 0.338 0.315 
CF/EQ 0.052 0.008 0.062 0.119 0.129 
Combined 0.356 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.479 
Debt/Assetst-1 0.259 0.176 0.251 0.358 0.207 
Income Ratio 0.083 0.032 0.122 0.173 0.302 
Pure Primary 0.613 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.487 
Return t-1, t-3 0.223 0.169 0.205 0.267 0.309 
Transaction Size 0.265 0.054 0.135 0.312 0.711 
Transaction Value ($m) 78.263 18.629 65.264 123.256 2,536.251 





Table 2.2. Correlations between various compensation variables 
This table presents the correlations between the various compensation variables (including inside debt and 
compensation leverage) in year t – 1 for the 24,428 firm-year observations for the initial sample in Panel A and the 
6598 firms involved in the 11,417 M&A announcements in our final sample in Panel B. The variables are defined in 











Panel A: Initial Sample 
     CEO CComp 1.000 0.594 0.149 0.351 0.301 0.222 
CEO TComp 
 
1.000 0.321 0.311 0.504 0.281 
CompLev 
  
1.000 0.161 0.221 0.603 
Dir CComp 
   
1.000 0.490 0.167 
DirTComp 
    
1.000 0.237 
InsDebt 
     
1.000 
CEO Age 0.065 0.041 0.064 0.089 0.054 0.087 
Hubris 0.108 0.468 0.275 0.377 0.158 0.321 
MGR Rep 0.152 0.311 0.304 0.451 0.532 0.267 
Value Dir Options 0.401 0.477 0.292 0.551 0.623 0.327 











Panel B: Final Sample 
     CEO Ccomp 1.000 0.610 0.274 0.337 0.262 0.341 
CEO Tcomp 
 
1.000 0.350 0.364 0.476 0.297 
CompLev 
  
1.000 0.248 0.314 0.576 
Dir CComp 
   
1.000 0.520 0.308 
DirTComp 
    
1.000 -0.211 
InsDebt 
     
1.000 
CEO Age 0.075 0.049 0.071 0.097 0.064 0.034 
Hubris 0.098 0.412 0.277 0.397 0.151 0.268 
MGR Rep 0.124 0.395 0.260 0.433 0.512 0.201 
Value Dir Options 0.361 0.482 0.242 0.524 0.677 0.264 




Table 2.3. Summary statistics for pre-to-post changes in managerial conservatism 
This table provides summary descriptive statistics for the changes in the two variables, InsDebt and CompLev, used 
herein to measure managerial conservatism for our initial, acquiring and non-acquiring samples in Panels A, B and 
C, respectively. ΔInsDebt1= [PVBpost /TApost] - [PVBpre /TApre]; ΔInsDebt2 = [PVBpost - PVBpre] / TApre; ΔInsDebt3 
= [PVBpost / (TApost – TAacquired)] - [PVBpre /TApre]; ΔCompLev = CompLevpost – CompLevpre; and all variables are as 
defined in Appendix 2.A. I and III represent the median values in quartile I and III, respectively. The values used are 
from the annual financial statements. The initial sample consists of the firms with matched compensation and firm 
data obtained from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp and COMPUSTAT. N is the number of firm-year observations 
from 1993 to 2014. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for 
t-tests of the means and Wilcoxon tests of the medians. 
 Mean I Median III STD T-test Wilcoxon 
Panel A. All firm-year observations N=23,207 
ΔCompLev -0.001* -0.004 0.000 0.006 0.031 0.091 0.072 
ΔInsDebt1 -0.003* -0.021 -0.003 0.028 0.213 0.054 0.049 
ΔInsDebt2 -0.003*** -0.019 -0.002 0.022 0.197 0.008 0.019 
ΔInsDebt3 -0.003** -0.015 -0.003 0.019 0.184 0.013 0.010 
Panel B. All acquirer observations N=7,779 
ΔCompLev -0.004** -0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.059 0.022 0.043 
ΔInsDebt1 -0.017*** -0.036 -0.013 0.023 0.404 0.003 0.011 
ΔInsDebt2 -0.016*** -0.034 -0.012 0.019 0.387 0.004 0.007 
ΔInsDebt3 -0.014** -0.026 -0.009 0.016 0.363 0.010 0.029 
Panel C. All non-acquirer observations N=15,456 
ΔCompLev 0.001 -0.002 0.000*** 0.007 0.041 0.232 0.177 
ΔInsDebt1 0.004 -0.014 0.002** 0.031 0.301 0.121 0.192 
ΔInsDebt2 0.004 -0.011 0.003** 0.023 0.297 0.319 0.216 






Table 2.4.  Summary regression results for the determinants of changes in managerial conservatism 
This table reports time-series averages of the results for cross-sectional regressions between changes in managerial 
conservatism and various one-period lagged potential determinants (except for Ann Return) that are defined in Table 
2.3 and Appendix 2.A. One cross-sectional regression is run for each acquisition announcement that includes the 
acquirer and all other firms in the acquirer sample with data at that point in time.  The assignments to managerial 
conservatism terciles are made using the managerial conservatism values computed for the year prior to year of the 
acquisition announcement.  All models include year and industry dummy variables (YFE&IFE) where the latter use 
the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications.  All mean estimated coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for 
reporting purposes. A Hausman-Wu test rejects the presence of an endogeneity problem. The t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Independent  
Variable 
 AT(L)  AT(H) 
 ΔInsDebt1 ΔInsDebt2 ΔInsDebt3 ΔCompLev  ΔInsDebt1 ΔInsDebt2 ΔInsDebt3 ΔCompLev 



















































































































































































































































































































(IFE&YFE)  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2.5.  Summary regression results for the determinants of acquirers that acquire less risky firms or fund 
the purchase by issuing debt 
This table presents panel regression results of the likelihood of acquiring a less risky firm or of issuing debt to pay 
for the M&A. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.A, and all regressors are lagged one period. For the logistic 
regression results reported in columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the acquirer is acquiring a firm 
that is a public target and is 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in the other columns are Debt/Assets-Rel (column 
4), InsDebt-Rel (column 5), CompLev-Rel (column 6), and DebtP or Debt/Transaction Value (column 7), where Rel 
refers to the difference in this variable between the target and acquirer. I and IV refer to the 1st (lowest) and 4th 
(highest) compensation quartiles, respectively. Assignments to compensation quartiles continue for calendar months 
until the annual compensation update becomes available. The sample includes all the 11,417 M&A announcements 
from 1992 to 2014. All definitions of the variables included in this table are provided in Appendix 2.A. All models 
include year and industry dummy variables (YFE&IFE) where the latter use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
classifications.  All estimated coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for reporting purposes. A Hausman-Wu test rejects 
the presence of an endogeneity problem. The p-values are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent two-
tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Public Target Debt/Assets-Rel InsDebt-Rel CompLev-Rel DebtP 






















































































































































































































Table 2.5.  Continued. 
Independent 
Variable 
Public Target Debt/Assets-Rel InsDebt-Rel CompLev-Rel DebtP 









































































































































































































      



























































































      
(IFE&YFE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 8187 8109 8109 8164 8127 8127 8164 




Table 2.6. Time-series logistic regression results for the likelihood of becoming an acquirer using cash (stock) 
as the method of payment for acquirers differentiated by inside debt and compensation leverage 
This table reports summary results for time-series logistic regressions of the likelihood of becoming an acquirer 
using cash (or stock) as the method of payment for the initial sample of firm-year observations from 1992 to 2014. 
All regressors are lagged one period except for the pension-related metrics that are lagged either one or two years. 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm makes one or more acquisition bids using cash (stock) as the method 
of payment in the year considered in Panel A (Panel B), and 0 otherwise. I, II, III, and IV refer to the first to fourth 
(highest) quartiles in inside debt (InsDebt) or compensation leverage (CompLev). These quartiles are determined for 
each calendar month. Years t – 1 and t – 2 are the year before and the second year before the M&A announcement 
year t. The definitions of all the variables are provided in Appendix 2.A. All estimates are multiplied by 1000 for 
reporting purposes. The p-values are reported in the parentheses. N is the number of observations. All models 
include year and industry dummy variables (YFE&IFE) where the latter use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
classifications. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Likelihood of becoming an acquirer using cash as the method of payment 
 Pension-related Metric Year t-1; 
N = 24,428 
 Pension-related Metric 
Year t- 2; N = 23,565 



























  29.43*** 
(0.002) 

























































  2.85* 
(0.051) 












































































Panel A of Table 2.6. Continued 
 Pension-related Metric Year t- 1  Pension-related Metric Year t- 2 





































































































































































































































IFE&YFE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




Panel B of Table 2.6. Likelihood of becoming an acquirer using stock as the method of payment 
Variable 
Pension-related Metric in t-1; N = 24,428  Pension-related Metric in t-2; N = 23,565 








































































































 -21.14*  
(0.087) 
 















































































































































































































Panel B of Table 2.6. Continued 
Variable 
Pension-related Metric Year t-1  Pension-related Metric Year t- 2 



























































































YFE&IFE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 





Table 2.7.  Cross-sectional logistic regression results for the likelihood of using cash as the method of payment 
for acquirers differentiated by inside debt and compensation leverage 
This table presents logistic regression results of the likelihood of becoming an acquirer using cash as the method of 
payment. All regressors are lagged one period except for the pension-related metrics that are lagged either one or 
two years. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm makes one or more acquisitions using cash as the method 
of payment in the year considered, and is 0 otherwise. I, II, III, and IV refer to 1st (lowest) to 4th (highest) quartile of 
the pension-related metrics. Assignments to these quartiles occur each calendar month and subsequently remain 
unchanged. The sample includes the initial sample of firm-year observations from 1992 to 2014. Year t is the year of 
the M&A announcement. All definitions of the variables used in this table are provided in Appendix 2.A. All 
estimates are multiplied by 1000 for reporting purposes. All models include year and industry dummy variables 
(YFE&IFE) where the latter use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications. The p-values are reported in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 Pension-related Metric Year t-1  Pension-related Metric Year t- 2 
























































































































































































Table 2.7. Continued 
 Pension-related Metric Year t-1  Pension-related Metric Year t- 2 


































































































































































(IFE&YFE) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
NO of Obs. 23,738 23,404 23,401  23,210 23,215 




Table 2.8. (Post-) announcement five-factor (P)CAR and (P)Alpha sorted by M&A method-of-payment 
This table presents mean (P)CAR for the announcement window [-1, 1] and mean (P)Alpha for three post-
announcement windows for a sample of firms that engaged in M&As between 1992 and 2014 and are single sorted 
by method of payment. The reported values in basis points (bps) are obtained using the five-factor model of Fama 
and French (2015) not adjusted (CAR and Alpha) and adjusted (PCAR and PAlpha) for the equity issue effect in 
Panel A and B, respectively. The announcement CAR for the window [-1, 1] are based on model coefficients 
estimated in the first step over the window [-200, -41]. Post-announcement performance is estimated in-sample as 
the intercept of the five-factor model for portfolios for windows of [2, 64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] trading days 
representing periods of about 3-, 6-, and 12-months, respectively. These portfolios are formed at the end of each 
announcement month that has a minimum of five such events as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and held unchanged 
until the ending day specified in the column labeled “horizon”. The number of such post-announcement portfolios is 
2209 for stock, 3207 for mixed and 5612 for cash.  The t-values for tests of the mean values are reported in the 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Horizon 
(Days) 
 Method of Payment 
All Stock Mixed Cash Stock-Cash 






























































































Table 2.9. (Post-) announcement five-factor PCARs and PAlphas for samples double-sorted by M&A method-
of-payment and pension-related metric 
This table reports mean PCAR for the announcement window [-1, 1] and mean PAlpha for three post-announcement 
windows for a sample of firms that engaged in M&As between 1992 and 2014 and are double sorted by method of 
payment and pension-related metric. The reported values in basis points (bps) are obtained using the five-factor 
model of Fama and French (2015) adjusted (PCAR and PAlpha) for the equity issue effect. The announcement CAR 
for the window [-1, 1] are based on model coefficients estimated in the first step over the window [-200, -41]. Post-
announcement performance is estimated in-sample as the intercept of the five-factor model for portfolios for 
windows of [2, 64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] trading days representing periods of about 3-, 6-, and 12-months, 
respectively. These portfolios are formed at the end of each announcement month that has a minimum of five such 
events as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and held unchanged until the ending day specified in the column labeled 
“horizon”. The number of such post-announcement portfolios is 2209 for stock, 3207 for mixed and 5612 for cash. *, 
** and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Eval. Period 
(Days) 
  Inside Debt Quartiles  
All I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV 





















































No of Firms 5612 1194 1310 1506 1602  





















































No of Firms 2209 794 415 567 433  

























































Table 2.9. Continued 
Horizon 
(Days) 
  Total Compensation Quartiles  
All I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV 





















































No of Firms 5612 1580 1301 1579 1152  





















































No of Firms 2209 386 699 753 371  

























































Table 2.10. Summary regression results for the relation between announcement PCARs for acquirers and 
inside debt 
This table presents OLS regression results examining the determinants of announcement PCARs for the window [-1, 
1] where 0 is the M&A announcement day. The announcement CAR for the window [-1, 1] are based on four-factor 
model coefficients estimated in the first step over the window [-200, -41]. PCAR are the CAR adjusted for the 
equity issue effect using the procedure detailed in Appendix 2.B. The sample includes firms that had at least one 
announcement between 1992 and 2014. The independent variables as defined in Appendix 2.A are all measured in 
year t–1 relative to the year of the M&A announcement in year t month m. Quartiles of inside debt are assigned on 
each calendar month. The regressions include industry-fixed effects (IFE&YFE) based on the Fama-French (1997) 
48 industries interacted with year-fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to industry clustering. The p-values are 









































































































































































































































































































































































































No of Obs. 2,275 2,275 5,109 5,109 10,861 10,861 
R2 0.217 0.266 0.112 0.098 0.126 0.085 
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Table 2.11. (Post-) announcement BHARs for acquirers for samples double-sorted by M&A method-of-
payment and pension-related metric 
This table reports the average (post-) announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in basis points of 
acquirers over the three-day announcement window [-1, 1] and the post-announcement evaluation windows of [2, 
64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] trading days representing periods of about 3-, 6-, and 12-months, respectively. The BHAR 
are computed using the procedure detailed in Appendix 2.B. The samples of acquirers are based on a double sort by 
method of payment (i.e., stock, mixed, cash, and long stock short cash) in year t and pension-related metric quartile 
(i.e., inside debt and total compensation) in year t-1 where t is the M&A announcement year. These portfolios are 
formed at the end of each announcement month that has a minimum of five such events as in Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) and held unchanged until the ending day specified in the column labeled “horizon”. Eval. Period refers to the 
evaluation period. The t-values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
Eval. Period 
(Days) 
  Inside Debt Quartiles  
All I II III IV I-IV 





















































No of Firms 5612 1194 1310 1506 1602  





















































No of Firms 2209 794 415 567 433  

























































Table 2.11. Cont’d 
Horizon 
(Days) 
  Total Compensation Quartiles  
All I II III IV I-IV 





















































No of Firms 5612 1580 1301 1579 1152  





















































No of Firms 2209 386 699 753 371  



























































Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for Acquirers  
Panel A reports summary statistics for the final sample for: number of bidders (#Bidders), % of stock and of cash in 
the M&A payment (%Stock and %Cash), and the dummy variable Congl equal to one if the SIC codes of acquirer 
and target differ. Panel B reports summary statistics for the announcement window [-1, 1] for the final sample of 
acquirers for: cumulated abnormal stock returns adjusted for equity issue price effects (PCAR[-1, 1]), average stock 
price (Price), market capitalization (Size), standard deviation of daily stock returns (VolatR) from day t-11 to the 
current trading day t-2; daily high minus low stock price divided by daily high stock price (PriceVol); ratio of short 
to total trade volume (%Short); ratios of trading volumes and of short volumes to shares outstanding (Turnover 
and %ShortO). Panels C and D report summary statistics for various variables defined in Appendix 3.A over the 
window [-200, -41] for the final sample in Panel C and for the sample that also includes acquirers with missing data 
in Compustat or Execucomp in Panel D. $M and $B represent value in millions and billions of dollars, respectively. 
 Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. Min Max   
Panel A:  Final acquirer sample; N = 1,556 
#Bidders 1.161 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.581 1.000 5.000 
%Stock 20.649 0.000 0.000 88.680 19.370 0.000 100.000 
%Cash 79.351 11.320 100.00 100.000 46.710 0.000 100.000 
Congl 0.531 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Final acquirer sample using values for announcement window [-1, 1];  N = 1,556 
PCAR[-1, 1] (%) 0.151 -9.322 0.184 2.294 5.013 -38.776 31.385 
PCABR[-1, 1] (%) -0.063 -5.493 -0.064 1.356 3.412 -17.699 19.512 
Price 43.775 4.392 46.011 291.041 35.332 2.230 599.150 
PriceVol(%) 6.105 2.236 5.741 8.329 4.022 0.519 19.071 
PriceVolB(%) 1.225 0.563 1.227 1.701 0.951 0.086 4.398 
Size($billion) 20.365 2.925 14.752 18.082 19.032 1.980 128.605 
%Short 30.102 19.503 29.129 42.245 17.331 0.000 91.214 
%ShortO 26.112 16.344 25.503 39.104 22.329 0.000 86.005 
⊿%ShortO, Cash 0.682 0.224 0.685 1.158 0.504 0.003 1.371 
⊿%ShortO, Stock 1.124 0.637 1.173 1.995 0.899 0.008 2.660 
Turnover 2.223 0.069 1.012 4.325 2.180 0.013 44.722 
VolatR (%) 2.101 0.931 1.725 3.663 1.314 0.446 7.936 
VolatBR (%) 0.711 0.427 0.710 0.989 0.402 0.122 1.812 
Panel C: Final acquirer sample using values for window [-200, -41];  N = 1,556 
Cashhld 0.091 0.021 0.037 0.112 0.037 0.000 0.158 
CashFlow 0.023 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.016 0.010 0.059 
CSRcom 0.463 0.293 0.419 0.649 0.031 0.000 1.000 
ComTotl ($M) 6.021 1.711 4.039 6.619 3.209 0.986 29.680 
ComLev 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.349 0.062 0.000 0.487 
DumCSR 0.402 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Debt/assets 0.313 0.198 0.291 0.402 0.223 0.102 0.530 
Deal Size 525.700 16.200 56.500 196.200 508.100 2.958 275.400 
%Equity 2.301 1.346 2.421 6.709 3.647 0.338 15.227 
InsDbt 0.531 0.000 0.000 1.767 0.669 0.000 2.490 
%Insti 48.303 20.822 48.109 71.235 21.141 0.000 94.241 
Invest/Assets 0.122 0.049 0.132 0.241 0.148 0.030 0.552 
Leverage 0.229 0.153 0.221 0.316 0.203 0.008 0.470 
LGG 0.313 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
MAQ 0.339 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
MIAwDBT% 2.413 0.302 2.412 2.511 2.112 0.000 12.010 
MIAwEQ% 3.261 0.519 3.263 3.901 3.269 0.110 21.024 
MB 0.892 0.431 0.887 1.420 0.849 -1.474 2.697 
MPFM 0.026 -1.311 -0.011 1.324 0.830 -2.323 2.142 
PAIT 0.005 -0.070 0.005 0.023 0.195 -0.335 0.271 
PReturn (%) 5.130 -0.812 5.165 7.214 8.840 -5.182 18.951 
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Price 42.350 4.051 45.040 293.132 57.980 2.120 519.650 
PriceVol(%) 2.501 1.027 2.224 3.939 3.975 0.611 16.912 
PriceVolB(%) 0.662 0.301 0.661 1.294 1.021 0.122 4.891 
Public target 0.523 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
PUI 119.514 101.000 122.000 135.000 22.771 91.000 139.000 
Q 1.713 0.981 1.323 1.958 0.231 0.732 2.297 
RKRV_FIRM 0.213 -0.129 0.209 0.533 0.631 -0.789 1.241 
RKRV_LONG 0.601 0.152 0.599 1.059 0.622 -0.301 1.587 
RKRV_TIME 0.129 0.021 0.130 0.247 0.235 -0.214 0.458 
ROA 0.159 0.129 0.156 0.162 0.042 0.114 0.198 
R&D/Assets 0.271 0.156 0.293 0.327 0.157 0.091 0.596 
Relative Size 0.244 0.035 0.102 0.233 0.325 0.011 0.971 
ResCov 0.270 -1.176 0.012 1.317 1.112 -2.031 1.943 
Sales($B) 4.503 3.612 5.003 6.706 7.948 0.519 21.963 
SAQ 0.519 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
%Short 28.103 8.919 22.008 81.046 26.043 4.123 62.109 
%ShortO 23.002 7.331 17.722 67.907 42.014 0.030 146.005 
Size ($B) 21.565 2.891 13.554 19.035 49.321 1.980 758.621 
Subsidiary 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.366 0.000 1.000 
Turnover 0.796 0.028 0.756 0.917 0.721 0.023 4.721 
VolatR (%) 1.601 0.916 1.602 1.803 0.945 0.424 5.028 
VolatRB(%) 0.572 0.233 0.571 0.712 0.289 0.114 1.655 
Panel D: Acquirer sample (including those with missing values) using values for window [-200, -41];  N = 
7,812 
CashHld 0.088 0.018 0.035 0.103 0.069 0.000 0.158 
CashFlow 0.021 0.017 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.006 0.059 
CSRcom 0.452 0.281 0.388 0.613 0.142 0.000 1.000 
ComTotl($M) 5.739 1.594 3.842 6.031 3.117 0.439 29.680 
ComLev 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.332 0.093 0.000 0.487 
DumCSR 0.397 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Debt/assets 0.341 0.210 0.309 0.461 0.221 0.102 0.589 
%Equity 2.101 1.113 2.216 6.609 5.430 0.213 15.524 
InsDbt 0.522 0.000 0.000 1.751 0.687 0.000 2.494 
%Insitu 43.203 18.611 46.109 65.323 35.130 0.000 96.8 
Invest/Assets 0.112 0.047 0.111 0.231 0.171 0.010 0.568 
Leverage 0.233 0.159 0.232 0.328 0.232 0.008 0.486 
LGG 0.331 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.471 0.000 1.000 
MAQ 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.288 0.000 1.000 
MIAwDBT% 1.863 0.219 1.850 1.914 2.712 0.000 12.010 
MIAwEQ% 2.110 0.454 2.121 2.349 4.014 0.084 21.024 
MB 0.882 0.424 0.881 1.413 0.893 -1.487 2.733 
MPFM 0.023 -1.432 -0.012 1.310 1.810 -2.511 2.223 
PAIT 0.004 -0.080 0.004 0.021 0.017 -0.361 0.271 
PReturn 3.946 -1.354 4.023 5.815 8.654 -9.548 18.951 
Price 36.250 3.620 39.090 213.850 37.980 1.958 519.650 
PriceVol(%) 2.202 0.929 2.121 3.701 1.342 0.548 6.935 
PriceVolB(%) 0.612 0.403 0.612 0.912 0.622 0.114 4.901 
PUI 118.003 99.000 121.000 134.000 18.015 90.000 139.000 
Q 1.697 0.962 1.311 1.933 0.345 0.706 2.297 
RKRV_FIRM 0.208 -0.131 0.206 0.511 0.954 -0.840 1.254 
RKRV_LONG 0.597 0.149 0.597 1.056 1.171 -0.360 1.622 
RKRV_TIME 0.127 0.020 0.120 0.231 0.252 -0.230 0.463 
ROA 0.153 0.122 0.151 0.159 0.035 0.102 0.198 
R&D/Assets 0.269 0.151 0.281 0.312 0.195 0.087 0.596 
Sales($B) 3.902 3.218 4.623 5.991 4.156 0.219 21.963 
SAQ 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.342 0.000 1.000 
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%Short 27.104 9.131 21.602 79.705 29.301 0.000 65.201 
%ShortO 21.310 6.123 15.936 90.740 23.109 0.000 146.032 
Size($B) 2.786 0.363 0.521 0.871 10.415 0.039 23.621 
Turnover 0.713 0.022 0.702 0.824 0.812 0.021 4.721 
VolatR (%) 1.701 1.031 1.703 2.018 1.142 0.335 5.148 
VolatBR (%) 0.582 0.233 0.581 0.979 0.502 0.109 1.722 
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Table 3.2. Acquirer and target characteristics for four categories of stock method-of-payment percentages 
This table reports the mean characteristics of acquirers and targets sorted into four categories based on the percentage of 
stock in M&A payments. CANIPR is the two-quarter cumulative abnormal insider purchase ratio. CashFlow is free cash 
flow. CashHld is cash holding. CombCAR (TargetCAR) are the stock CAR of the value-weighted acquirer plus target 
(target only). ComLev is compensation leverage. ComTotl is total executive compensation. CSRcom is CSR composite. 
DealSize is total dollar consideration paid to the target. DumCSR is dummy variable equal to one if CSR strengths exceed 
concerns.  InsDbt is inside debt. Leverage is debt to equity ratio. PCAR is acquirer’s pure cumulative abnormal stock 
returns controlling for equity issue effect using Fama-French (2015) 5-factor model. Price and PriceVol are share price 
and its volatility.  Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. R&D/Assets is R&D expenses divided by total assets. Relative size is the ratio of 
deal size to acquirer size. ROA is return on assets. Sales is sales. %ShortO is ratio of short sales volume to shares 
outstanding. ⊿%ShortO is its change over three windows relative to announcement day.  Size is acquirer’s market 
capitalization. TargetAR is target’s abnormal stock return premium. TargetCANIPR is % of targets with CANIPR in top 
33% of all targets.  TargetPublic and TargetSub are their respective percentages. Differences between categories I and IV 
are reported in column (6). Columns (7) and (8) report t-values based on their mean differences and p-values of their 
median differences based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
%Stock =  100% (50-99)% (1-49)% 0%    
 All [I] [II] [III] [IV] [I] – [V] t-Stat p(W) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Obs. 1,556 259 110 98 1089    
CANIPR 0.36% -1.14% -0.85% -0.43% 0.91% -2.05% -1.97** 0.007 
CashFlow 0.023 0.02 0.020 0.023 0.024 -0.004 1.89* 0.041 
CashHld  0.091 0.084 0.004 0.095 0.101 -0.017 0.68 0.122 
CombCAR 22.4% 19.5% 22.4% 21.2% 23.2% -3.7% -1.53 0.117 
ComLev 0.086 0.080 0.081 0.098 0.108 -0.028 5.19*** 0.004 
ComTotl 6.021 6.211 6.522 6.027 5.030 1.181 1.71* 0.093 
CSRcomt 0.463 0.452 0.463 0.480 0.502 -0.050 1.20 0.137 
DumCSR 0.402 0.388 0.391 0.435 0.451 -0.063 1.31 0.114 
DealSize ($billions) 0.526 0.635 0.479 0.516 0.505 0.130 1.68* 0.033 
InsDbt 0.530 0.413 0.581 0.793 0.892 -0.479 3.26*** 0.002 
Leveraget-1 0.029 0.054 0.041 0.027 0.022 0.032 3.11
*** 0.023 
LGG 0.313 0.479 0.326 0.293 0.274 0.205 2.09** 0.053 
MAQ 0.339 0.516 0.373 0.322 0.295 0.221 3.09*** 0.001 
PCAR[-1, 1] 0.15% -0.12% -0.01% 0.16% 0.24% -0.36% -1.17 0.091 
PCABR[-1, 1] -0.063% 0.014% -0.012% -0.039% -0.084% -0.088% -2.13
** 0.022 
Price 42.35 44.061 41.887 40.977 42.113 1.948 1.42* 0.068 
PriceVol 2.501 4.101 2.801 02.401 2.101 2.001 2.39** 0.017 
PriceVolB 0.662 0.712 0.735 0.593 0.649 0.063 0.76 0.154 
PUI 119.514 129.403 121.700 118.45 117.039 12.364 1.69* 0.044 
Qt-1 1.713 1.404 1.533 1.619 1.813 -0.409 1.67
* 0.053 
R&D/Assets 0.271 0.221 0.264 0.278 0.283 -0.062 1.76* 0.031 
Relative size 24.4% 23.90% 14.9% 24.80% 25.40% -1.5% -1.28 0.631 
ROAt-1 0.159 0.121 0.117 0.162 0.172 -0.051 1.79
* 0.048 
Salest-1($billions) 4.503 3.812 4.130 4.122 4.739 -0.927 0.97 0.192 
SAQ 0.519 0.412 0.461 0.477 0.554 -0.142 -1.96** 0.009 
%ShortO 0.230 0.284 0.270 0.243 0.212 0.072 9.16*** 0.002 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 1] 0.783 1.124 0.922 0.864 0.682 0.438 10.12*** 0.001 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 3] 0.588 0.868 0.711 0.692 0.499 0.369 7.41*** 0.009 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 10] 0.475 0.727 0.633 0.518 0.395 0.332 2.57** 0.008 
Size of Acquirer 21.57 26.79 22.34 20.81 20.32 6.47 1.81* 0.094 
TargetAR 20.0% 33.0% 33.747 15.6% 21.6% 11.4% 1.46 0.102 
TargetCAR 32.6% 35.2% 55.1% 16.3% 24.1% 11.1% 1.39 0.110 
TargetCANIPR 33.33% 48.1% 46.7% 33.1% 28.5% 19.6% 1.71* 0.093 
TargetPublic 52.6% 55.30% 51.6% 37.20% 53.40% 1.9% 1.73* 0.026 
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Table 3.3. Acquirer and target characteristics for four quartiles of managerial interest alignments 
This table reports the mean characteristics of acquirers and targets sorted into four quartiles based on managerial interest 
alignment with its shareholders (MIAwEQ) in Panel A and with its debtholders (MIAwDBT) in Panel B. CANIPR is the 
two-quarter cumulative abnormal insider stock purchase ratio. CashFlow is free cash flow. CashHld is cash holding. 
CombCAR (TargetCAR) is the stock CAR of the value-weighted acquirer plus target (target only). ComLev is 
compensation leverage. ComTotl is total executive compensation. CSRcom is CSR composite. DealSize is total dollar 
consideration paid to the target. DumCSR is dummy variable equal to one if CSR strengths exceed concerns.  InsDbt is 
inside debt. Leverage is debt to equity ratio. PCAR is acquirer’s pure cumulative abnormal stock returns controlling for 
equity issue effect using Fama-French (2015) 5-factor model. Pay%Cash (Pay%Stock) is the % of cash (stock) financing 
for the M&A. Price and PriceVol are share price and its volatility. Prop. Cash (Stock) M&A is the proportion of the 
M&As that are pure cash (stock).  Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. R&D/Assets is R&D expenses divided by total assets. Relative size 
is the ratio of deal size to acquirer size. ROA is return on assets. Sales is sales. %ShortO is ratio of short sales volume to 
shares outstanding. ⊿%ShortO is its change over three windows relative to announcement day.  Size is acquirer’s market 
capitalization. TargetAR is target’s abnormal stock return premium. TargetCANIPR is % of targets with CANIPR in top 
33% of all targets.  TargetPublic and TargetSub are their respective percentages. Differences between quartiles I and IV 
are reported in column (6). Columns (7) and (8) report t-values based on their mean differences and p-values of their 
median differences based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
Panel A: MIAwEQ Quartiles 
All I II III IV [I] – [IV] t-Stat. p(W) 
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CANIPR 0.36% 1.29% 0.48% -0.21% -0.12% 1.50% 0.32 0.214 
CashFlow 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.026 -0.005 -1.94* 0.067 
CashHld  0.091 0.084 0.084 0.095 0.101 -0.017 -3.29*** 0.008 
CombCAR 22.4% 13.7% 21.4% 25.3% 29.3% -15.6% -2.12** 0.024 
ComLev 0.086 0.098 0.084 0.084 0.078 0.020 3.23*** 0.002 
ComTotl 6.021 6.711 6.522 5.821 5.030 1.681 1.97** 0.001 
CSRcomt 0.463 0.422 0.433 0.495 0.502 -0.080 -4.36
*** 0.000 
DumCSR 0.402 0.329 0.391 0.437 0.451 -0.122 -5.23*** 0.001 
DealSize ($billions) 0.526 0.435 0.476 0.515 0.676 -0.241 -3.99*** 0.016 
InsDbt 0.530 0.693 0.528 0.482 0.417 0.276 5.19*** 0.005 
Leveraget-1 0.229 0.122 0.227 0.233 0.334 -0.212 -4.69
*** 0.003 
LGG 0.313 0.260 0.272 0.359 0.361 -0.101 -11.20 0.000 
MAQ 0.339 0.326 0.334 0.344 0.352 -0.026 -0.91 0.121 
Pay%Cash 79.351 91.619 86.511 72.241 67.033 24.586 11.39*** 0.002 
Pay%Stock 20.649 11.204 21.348 22.731 27.313 -16.109 -5.19*** 0.003 
PCAR[-1, 1] 0.15% -0.01% -0.09% 0.27% 0.30% -0.32% -6.32
*** 0.001 
PCABR[-1, 1] -0.063% -0.051% -0.058% -0.061% -0.082% 0.029% 5.627
*** 0.000 
Price 42.35 44.06 44.25 40.98 40.11 3.948 1.02 0.113 
PriceVol 2.501 3.052 2.521 2.435 2.112 0.907 1.71* 0.078 
PriceVolB 0.662 0.612 0.738 0.701 0.597 0.015 1.03 0.233 
Prop. cash M&A 70.1% 81.20% 79.90% 62.00% 56.90% 0.243 8.22*** 0.009 
Prop. stock M&A 16.6% 11.20% 15.20% 18.70% 21.30% -0.101 -3.03** 0.018 
PUI 119.514 124.001 119.604 118.442 116.009 7.992 2.11** 0.023 
Qt-1 1.713 1.404 1.766 1.769 1.913 -0.509 -1.35 0.104 
R&D/Assets 0.271 0.261 0.262 0.278 0.283 -0.022 -1.16 0.159 
Relative size 24.4% 19.2% 24.1% 26.0% 28.2% -9.0% -4.37*** 0.014 
ROAt-1 0.159 0.151 0.158 0.162 0.165 -0.010 -1.83* 0.064 
Salest-1($billions) 4.503 3.812 4.339 4.723 5.139 -1.326 -1.77
* 0.092 
SAQ 0.519 0.403 0.519 0.527 0.627 -0.224 -1.01 0.109 
%ShortO 0.230 0.154 0.220 0.250 0.296 -0.142 -3.91*** 0.003 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 1] 0.783 0.300 0.590 0.892 1.351 -1.051 -9.38*** 0.001 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 3] 0.588 0.271 0.403 0.679 0.997 -0.725 -5.62*** 0.002 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 10] 0.475 0.227 0.380 0.580 0.712 -0.485 -2.02** 0.010 
Size of Acquirer 21.57 13.36 21.11 23.09 28.72 -15.36 -1.651* 0.117 
TargetAR 20.0% 16.2% 19.3% 21.3% 23.2% -7.0% -2.06** 0.042 
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TargetCAR 32.6% 26.0% 29.1% 32.2% 43.1% -17.1% -4.88*** 0.004 
TargetCANIPR 33.30% 27.41 -28.102 31.11% 38.09% 27.03% 1.33 0.193 
TargetPublic 52.6% 59.2% 54.4% 49.3% 46.1% 13.1% 4.97*** 0.002 
TargetSub 15.9% 16.40% 16.90% 14.30% 16.00% 0.4% 1.82* 0.060 
Obs.          1,566 391 392 392 391    
 
 
Panel B: MIAwDBT Quartiles 
All I II III IV [I] – [IV] t-Stat. p(W) 
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CANIPR 0.36% -0.26% -0.11% 1.02% 0.79% -1.28% -0.47 0.191 
CashFlow 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.022 0.004 1.65* 0.081 
CashHld  0.091 0.106 0.096 0.084 0.078 0.028 5.09*** 0.008 
CombCAR 22.4% 19.2% 21.7% 22.0% 26.7% -7.5% -1.96** 0.026 
ComLev 0.086 0.061 0.080 0.090 0.113 -0.052 -5.94*** 0.002 
ComTotl 6.021 6.04 5.90 5.75 6.39 -0.35 -11.72*** 0.007 
CSRcomt 0.463 0.290 0.415 0.525 0.622 -0.332 -2.55** 0.034 
DumCSR 0.402 0.231 0.366 0.437 0.574 -0.343 -2.98*** 0.011 
DealSize ($billions) 0.526 0.498 0.489 0.574 0.541 -0.043 -1.65* 0.079 
InsDbt 0.530 0.382 0.520 0.563 0.655 -0.273 -4.92*** 0.003 
Leveraget-1 0.229 0.273 0.240 0.221 0.182 0.091 2.13** 0.015 
LGG 0.313 0.295 0.308 0.319 0.330 -0.035 -1.19 0.102 
MAQ 0.339 0.373 0.337 0.332 0.314 0.059 1.39 0.115 
Pay%Cash 79.351 77.229 78.060 80.005 82.110 -4.881 -5.01*** 0.001 
Pay%Stock 20.649 26.167 22.714 18.712 15.003 11.164 3.29*** 0.008 
PCAR[-1, 1] 0.15% 0.28% 0.14% 0.08% 0.07% 0.22% 3.05
*** 0.007 
PCABR[-1, 1] -0.063% -0.072% -0.067% -0.067% -0.043% -0.029% -3.95
*** 0.001 
Price 42.35 31.20 44.10 53.90 40.20 -9.00 0.97 0.112 
PriceVol 2.501 2.931 2.780 2.332 1.961 0.970 2.96*** 0.016 
PriceVolB 0.662 0.659 0.614 0.673 0.702 -0.043 -0.61 0.191 
Prob. cash M&A 70.1% 59.3% 59.6% 74.0% 87.1% -27.8% -5.94*** 0.006 
Prob. stock M&A 16.6% 19.9% 19.2% 15.3% 12.0% 7.9% -3.51** 0.040 
PUI 119.514 125.049 119.666 118.061 115.280 9.769 1.65* 0.045 
Qt-1 1.713 1.781 1.622 1.761 1.690 0.096 1.83
* 0.072 
R&D/Assets 0.271 0.221 0.270 0.304 0.289 -0.068 -1.56 0.109 
Relative size 24.4% 21.1% 26.6% 25.6% 24.3% -3.2% -3.98*** 0.007 
ROAt-1 0.159 0.163 0.151 0.150 0.172 -0.009 -1.98** 0.051 
Salest-1($billions) 4.503 4.302 4.573 5.107 4.032 0.271 1.70
* 0.104 
SAQ 0.519 0.639 0.512 0.492 0.433 0.206 0.92 0.154 
%ShortO 0.230 0.283 0.243 0.210 0.184 0.099 3.91*** 0.003 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 1] 0.783 1.103 0.823 0.694 0.512 0.591 7.03*** 0.005 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 3] 0.588 0.722 0.606 0.531 0.493 0.229 2.14** 0.012 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 10] 0.475 0.603 0.473 0.423 0.401 0.202 2.91*** 0.004 
Size of Acquirer 21.57 16.020 20.890 21.940 27.430 -11.410 -1.73* 0.040 
TargetAR 20.0% 17.0% 17.6% 20.9% 24.5% -7.5% -1.66* 0.071 
TargetCAR 32.6% 30.9% 30.0% 31.1% 38.4% -7.5% -5.11*** 0.004 
TargetCANIPR 33.30% 29.5% 29.2% 36.2% 38.3% -8.8% -1.07 0.120 
TargetPublic 52.6% 40.2% 53.9% 57.0% 59.3% -19.1% -2.95*** 0.003 
TargetSub 15.9% 19.1% 17.2% 15.4% 11.9% 7.2% 1.91* 0.060 





Table 3.4.  Summary regression results for the determinants of managerial interest alignment changes pre-to-
post M&A 
This table reports time-series averages of the results for cross-sectional regressions between changes in managerial interest 
alignment and various one-period lagged potential determinants (except for Ann Return) that are defined in Table 3.3 and 
Appendix 3.A. A cross-sectional regression is run for each acquisition announcement that includes the acquirer and all other 
firms in the acquirer sample with data at that point in time.  The assignments to managerial interest alignment terciles are made 
using the managerial interest alignment values computed for the year prior to year of the acquisition announcement.  All models 
include year and industry dummy variables (YFE&IFE) where the latter use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications. 
All mean estimated coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for reporting purposes. A Hausman-Wu test rejects the presence of an 
endogeneity problem. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.069 0.074 0.076 0.093 0.066 0.077 
 
0.089 0.102 0.095 0.079 0.082 0.086 
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Table 3.5. Acquirer and target characteristics for four quartiles of two-quarter cumulative abnormal insider 
purchase ratios (CANIPR) 
This table reports the mean characteristics of acquirers and targets sorted into four quartiles based on the two-quarter 
cumulative abnormal insider purchase ratios (CANIPR) for stocks of acquirers. CashFlow is free cash flow. CashHld is 
cash holdings. CombCAR (TargetCAR) is the value-weighted acquirer plus target (target only) stock CAR. ComLev is 
compensation leverage. ComTotl is total executive compensation. CSRcom is CSR composite. DealSize is total dollar 
consideration paid to the target. DumCSR is dummy variable equal to one if CSR strengths exceed concerns. InsDbt is 
inside debt. Leverage is debt to equity ratio. MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) is managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(bondholders). PCAR is acquirer’s pure cumulative abnormal returns for stocks controlling for equity issue effects using 
Fama-French (2015) 5-factor model. Pay%Cash (Pay%Stock) is the % of cash (stock) financing for the M&A. Price and 
PriceVol are share price and its volatility. Prop. Cash (Stock) M&A is the proportion of the M&As that are pure cash 
(stock).  Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. R&D/Assets is R&D expenses divided by total assets. Relative size is the ratio of deal size to 
acquirer size. ROA is return on assets. Sales is sales. %ShortO is ratio of short sales volume to shares outstanding. 
⊿%ShortO is its change over three windows relative to announcement day.  Size is acquirer’s market capitalization. 
TargetAR is target’s abnormal return stock premium. TargetCANIPR is % of targets with CANIPR in top 33% of all 
targets.  TargetPublic and TargetSub are their respective percentages. Differences between quartiles I and IV are reported 
in column (6). Columns (7) and (8) report t-values based on their mean differences and p-values of their median 
differences based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 CANIPR Quartiles 
All I II III IV [I] – [IV] t-Stat. p(W) 
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CashFlow 0.023 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.020 -0.006 -2.31** 0.008 
CashHld  0.091 0.089 0.094 0.071 0.110 0.021 4.08*** 0.003 
CombCAR 22.4% 24.3% 15.3% 25.7% 24.3% -0.0% 1.91* 0.044 
ComLev 0.086 0.103 0.087 0.075 0.079 -0.028 -1.07 0.161 
ComTotl 6.021 5.112 5.720 6.231 7.023 1.911 0.93 0.124 
CSRcomt 0.463 0.433 0.456 0.462 0.501 0.068 2.49** 0.034 
DumCSR 0.402 0.331 0.395 0.420 0.462 0.131 3.82*** 0.009 
DealSize ($billions) 0.526 0.482 0.529 0.519 0.572 0.090 4.93*** 0.007 
InsDbt 0.530 0.602 0.511 0.497 0.510 -0.105 -1.09 0.135 
Leveraget-1 0.229 0.274 0.234 0.213 0.195 -0.079 -1.35 0.114 
LGG 0.313 0.339 0.324 0.301 0.288 0.051 1.20 0.120 
MAQ 0.339 0.362 0.375 0.324 0.295 -0.067 9.30*** 0.004 
MIAwDBT 2.41% 2.89% 2.52% 1.98% 2.25% -0.91% -0.73 0.192 
MIAwEQ 3.26% 2.59% 2.98% 4.13% 3.35% 1.54% 1.01 0.161 
Pay%Cash 79.351 89.330 87.931 72.003 68.140 -21.190 -3.82*** 0.007 
Pay%Stock 20.649 16.087 18.256 22.841 25.412 9.325 2.44** 0.000 
PCAR[-1, 1] 0.15% 0.08% 0.13% 0.19% 0.23% -0.15% -8.21*** 0.001 
PCABR[-1, 1] -0.063% 0.071 0.068 0.062 0.051 0.020 5.12*** 0.000 
Price 42.35 39.50 42.80 45.00 42.10 2.60 1.52 0.072 
PriceVol 2.501 2.201 2.801 1.902 3.102 0.009 2.42** 0.020 
PriceVolB 0.662 0.632 0.636 0.659 0.721 -0.089 -2.34** 0.019 
Prop. cash M&A 70.1% 83.1% 69.0% 65.6% 62.3% -20.8% -6.11*** 0.002 
Prop. stock M&A 16.6% 13.5% 16.9% 17.8% 18.2% 4.7% 3.62** 0.003 
PUI 119.514 129.024 123.772 115.760 109.500 19.524 -1.12 0.103 
Qt-1 1.713 1.691 1.640 1.722 1.801 0.118 1.71* 0.064 
R&D/Assets 0.271 0.301 0.289 0.325 0.169 -0.132 -1.83* 0.019 
Relative size 24.4% 19.3% 26.3% 24.8% 27.2% 7.9% 2.20** 0.005 
ROAt-1 0.159 0.142 0.176 0.155 0.163 0.021 1.92* 0.067 
Salest-1($billions) 4.503 4.103 4.377 4.723 4.811 0.708 1.97** 0.023 
SAQ 0.519 0.472 0.513 0.530 0.561 -0.041 -10.89*** 0.004 
%ShortO 0.230 0.213 0.224 0.239 0.244 0.031 6.01*** 0.003 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 1] 0.783 0.731 0.748 0.792 0.861 0.130 3.95*** 0.002 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 3] 0.588 0.522 0.591 0.607 0.632 0.110 9.12*** 0.005 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 10] 0.475 0.441 0.469 0.487 0.503 0.062 2.20*** 0.007 
Size of Acquirer 21.57 22.910 23.830 20.110 19.430 -3.480 -1.81* 0.059 
TargetAR 20.0% 17.5% 16.3% 22.1% 24.1% 6.6% 1.66* 0.043 
TargetCAR 32.6% 36.1% 26.0% 35.0% 33.3% -2.8% -3.01*** 0.003 
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TargetCANIPR 33.30% 35.4% 31.7% 29.7% 36.4% 1.0% 1.21 0.101 
TargetPublic 52.6% 67.2% 49.5% 48.6% 45.1% 22.1% 5.33*** 0.001 
TargetSub 15.9% 14.8% 15.4% 16.2% 17.2% 2.4% 1.09 0.176 




Table 3.6. Probit analyses to identify the determinants for the choice of stock and of cash as the method of 
target payment  
This table reports marginal coefficients (multiplied by 1000) from Probit regressions predicting cash and predicting 
stock as the method of payment to targets. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix 3.A. The dependent 
variable in Panel A (B) is a cash (stock) dummy variable equal to 1 if cash (stock) accounts for 100% of the 
payment and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 7812 observations for 1556 M&A announcements from August 
2009 to December 2015. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The regressions include industry-fixed effects (IFE) based on the Fama-French 
(1997) 48 industries interacted with year-fixed effects (YFE). Standard errors are robust to industry clustering.  
 Panel A: Cash as Method of Payment  Panel B: Stock as Method of Payment 







































































































  -0.126*** 
(-5.91) 
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18.154 ***  
(-2.84) 



























































MIAwEQ -23.729*** -26.117**  -24.001*** -22.901***  4.202** 4.269***  5.341*** 5.821*** 
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  ×Q(IV) (-2.69) (-2.06) (-2.85) (-3.05) (1.97) (3.93) (3.24) (4.00) 






































































































































































































































IFE&YFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 3.7. Equity and bond price effects for M&A announcements sorted by method of payment 
This table reports mean price effects in basis points (bps) for the announcement window [-1, 1] and three post-
announcement windows after single sorted by method of payment for a sample of acquirers with M&A announcements 
between August 2009 and December 2015. Panels A and B report the means of the equity price effects not adjusted (CAR 
and Alpha) and adjusted (PCAR and PAlpha) for the equity issue effect, respectively, obtained using the Fama and French 
five-factor stock model (2015). Panels C and D report the means of the bond price effects not adjusted (CABR and 
BRALPHA) and adjusted (PCABR and PBRALPHA) for the equity issue effect, respectively, obtained using the Fama 
and French five-factor bond model (1993). Model coefficients estimated in a first step over the window [-200, -41] are 
used in calculating the announcement CAR or CABR for the window [-1, 1] in a second step (see related text, Table 3.8, 
Table 3.9, and Supplementary Appendices S2 and S3 for greater details). Post-announcement performances are the 
estimated intercepts of the appropriate five-factor model when estimated in sample for portfolios for windows of [2, 124], 
[2, 250] and [2, 498], which represent periods of about 6-, 12-, and 24-months, respectively. These portfolios are formed at 
each announcement month end provided that this month has a minimum of five such events as in Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000). The portfolios are then held unchanged until the ending day in the brackets in the column labeled “horizon”. The 
number of such post-announcement portfolios is 259 for stock, 208 for mixed and 1089 for cash. The t-values for tests of 




 Method of Payment 
All Stock Mixed Cash Stock-Cash 























































































































































































Table 3.8. (Post-) announcement equity price effects for samples double-sorted by M&A payment method and each of four determinants 
This table presents mean announcement window [-1, 1] PCAR and mean post-announcement window PAlpha for the shareholders of M&A acquirers double 
sorted by payment method and acquirer managerial interest alignments (MIAwEQ, MIAwDBT), abnormal insider trading by acquirer executives (CANIPR), or 
firm CSR ranking (CSRcom). The reported values in basis points (bps) are obtained using the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015) adjusted (PCAR and 
Palpha) for the equity issue effect (see related text, Table 3.7 and Supplementary Appendix S2 for greater details). N is the number of portfolios. *, ** and *** 
represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Eval. Period 
(days) 
  MIAwEQ  MIAwDBT 
All  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV 





























































































N 1089  295 292 289 213   345 239 244 261  





























































































N 259  44 71 87 57   73 65 62 59  





























































































N 1556  394 391 432 339   452 375 370 359  
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Table 3.8. Cont’d 
Eval. Period 
(days) 
  CANIPR  CSRcom 
All  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV 





























































































N 1089  359 277 212 241   313 234 247 295  





























































































N 259  69 72 57 61   71 62 77 49  





































































































Table 3.9. (Post-) announcement bond price effects for samples double-sorted by M&A payment method and managerial interest alignments 
This table presents mean bond price effects for the announcement window [-1, 1] and three post-announcement windows for M&A acquirers double sorted by 
payment method and acquirer managerial interest alignments (MIAwEQ, MIAwDBT). The reported values in basis points (bps) are obtained using the 5-factor 
bond model of Fama and French (1993) adjusted for the equity issue effects (see related text, Table 3.7 and Supplementary Appendix S3 for greater details). N is 
the number of portfolios. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Eval. Period 
(days) 
  MIAwEQ  MIAwDBT 
All  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV  I (lowest) II III IV (highest) I-IV 





























































































N 1089  289 290 293 217   295 292 289 213  





























































































N 259  47 69 83 60   44 71 87 57  

































































































Table 3.10. Determinants of the M&A Announcement Pure Price Effects for Shareholders of the Acquirers 
This table reports cross-sectional test results examining potential determinants of the PCARs for acquirers which are 
the announcement stock price effects for an acquirer from day -1 to day 0 (the M&A announcement day), 1, 3 or 10.  
All of the included independent variables are lagged one year, and a Wu-Hausman test rejects the presence of an 
endogeneity problem with their inclusion. CANIPR is cumulative abnormal insider purchase ratios for the executives 
of acquirers averaged over two quarters. ComLev is compensation leverage. ComTotl is total executive 
compensation. CSRcom is CSR composite.  Eq*LTL is the proportion of the acquirer’s equity held by its executives 
divided by the proportion of the acquirer’s long-term liabilities held by its executives. InsDbt is inside debt. 
Leverage is debt to equity ratio. MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) is managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(bondholders). Q(.) is a dummy variable representing quartiles II, III & IV. PReturn is the past stock return. 
PriceVol is share price volatility. Prop. Cash (Stock) M&A is the proportion of the M&As that are pure cash (stock).  
RelIncentR is the relative incentive ratio obtained as the product of debt & equity proportions held by the acquirer’s 
managers. ResCov is residual analyst coverage. RKRV-HP is the RKRV valuation model estimate obtained using the 
three-step regression procedure of Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010). %ShortO is the ratio of shorting volume to total 
trading volume. ⊿%ShortO is the change of %ShortO for the acquirer for the time period over which the dependent 
variable is measured minus the median %ShortO for the acquirer in the pre-event window [-22, -6]. Size of Acquirer 
is the acquirer’s market capitalization.  Turnover is share turnover on the M&A announcement day.  VolatR is 
acquirer’s stock return volatility. All the regressions include industry-fixed effects (IFE) based on the Fama-French 
(1997) 48 industries interacted with year-fixed effects (IFE). P-values are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 PCAR[-1,0]   PCAR[-1,1]  PCAR[-1,3]  PCAR[-1,10] 





































  1.60*** 
(0.002) 
  1.92** 
(0.024) 


















































































































  -0.08** 
(0.012) 
  -0.11*** 
(0.009) 





  -0.21*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.22*** 
(0.001) 





  -0.46*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.53*** 
(0.001) 





  -2.01*** 
(0.008) 
  -2.31** 
(0.012) 



















MIAwEQ×Q(II) 0.09*** 0.08***  0.11*** 0. 13***  0.14*** 0.15**  0.18*** 0.16*** 
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ResCov  0.008 
(0.151) 
  0.007 
(0.261) 
  0.004 
(0.318) 




  0.07* 
(0.092) 
  0.03** 
(0.022) 





  -0.04*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.05*** 
(0.001) 







  10.71 
(0.108) 
  8.03 
(0.350) 


































































IFE&YFE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1201 0.1314  0.1511 0.1108  0.0891 0.1533  0.0868 0.1501 




Table 3.11.  Covariance decompositions for the potential determinants of Acquirer PCAR 
This table examines the determinants of the mean and variability of the acquirer pure price effects (PCAR) for the 
announcement window [-1, 1].  Panels A and B implement the two-stage procedure of Mitchell, Pulvino and 
Stafford (2004) to determine how much of the mean PCAR for acquirers using stock as the method of payment is 
explained by arbitrage short selling.  Panel A presents the results of applying the first stage Probit model of Mitchell, 
Pulvino and Stafford (2004) where ⊿%ShortO is regressed on a constant and the dummy variables, Hostile and 
Relsize (as in Liu and Wu, 2014) to obtain fitted values of the daily relative short selling volume (Fit⊿ShortO) in the 
announcement period of [-1, 1] where 0 is the announcement date.  Panel B reports the results of regressions of 
PCAR[-1,1] against the dummy variables, Cash and Stock, with and without the inclusion of Fit⊿ShortO. The 
difference between the two coefficients for Stock represent the portion of the mean PCAR[-1,1] explained by 
arbitrage short selling. Panel C reports a covariance decompositions of the explained portion of the variability of 
PCAR[-1,1] to quantify the  relative contribution of the significant determinants in explaining the variability of 
acquirer pure stock price effects for the announcement window [-1, 1].  BHZ and LRZ refer to the covariance 
decomposition methodologies of Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2012), and Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), 
respectively. The reported values are for the regression that includes the independent variables and their interactions 
that are found to be significant in a previous regression including more variables as in Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang 
(2012). CANIPR is the cumulative abnormal net insider purchase ratio for acquirer executives. CANIPR_Diff is the 
difference in CANIPR for acquirers versus targets.  CSRcom_Diff is the difference in CSR rankings of the acquirer 
and its target. CSRcom*RKRV-HP is the interaction of CSRcom with the misvaluation estimate from the model of 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (RKRV, 2005) obtained using the three-step regression procedure of 
Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010).  MIAwEQ (MIAwDBT) is managerial interest alignment with shareholders 
(bondholders), and MIAwEQ_Diff (MIAwDBT_Diff) is the difference in managerial interest alignment with 
shareholders (bondholders) between acquirers and targets. MB ratio is the market-to-book ratio of acquirers as in 
DHRT (2006).  PAIT is abnormal insider trading (PAIT) measured as in Akbulut (2013). RKRV_FIRM, 
RKRV_TIME and RKRV_LONG are the three components of the decomposed MB ratio of RKRV. RKRV-HP_Diff is 
the difference in RKRV-HP between the acquirer and its target. ⊿%ShortO is the average relative short selling 
volume over the event window [-1, 1] minus the median for window [-22, -6]. Coefficients for Cash and Stock are in 
basis points. The number of observation is 1,348. P-values for t-tests of the means are reported in the parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regression subsequently used to obtain fitted values for ⊿%ShortO [-1,1] 
 Hostile Relsize Intercept R2 
Coeff -89.11* 31.92*** 211.60*** 
0.072 
t-Stat -1.78 3.12 2.84 
 
Panel B: Second-stage regression to explaining the mean PCAR [-1, 1] 
 Second-stage regression  Second-stage regression 
 Cash Stock  Cash Stock Fit⊿%ShortO 
Coeff 24.35*** -11.61**  29.04*** -5.21*** 59.31** 
t-Stat (2.76) (-1.96)  (3.01) (-4.32) (-2.38) 
R2 0.112  0.187 
 
Panel C: Second-stage regressions explaining the variability in PCAR [-1, 1] 
Variable Coeff. t-Stat. 
Cov Decomposition 
BHZ  LRZ  
CANIPR 116.14*** 7.02 0.095 0.081 
CANIPR_Diff -22.32*** -2.95 0.051 0.059 
CSRcom 10.19*** 3.01 0.025 0.021 
CSRcom_Diff -3.02** -2.41 0.027 0.031 
CSRcom*RKRV-HP 8.56** 1.90 0.029 0.036 
LGG 35.19*** 4.24 0.006 0.005 
MAQ -6.14*** -2.78 0.004 0.003 
MIAwEQ 1.73*** 3.95 0.091 0.079 
MIAwEQ_Diff -0.84*** -2.94 0.083 0.078 
MIAwDBT -2.391*** -5.01 0.055 0.047 
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MIAwDBT_Diff     
MB ratio     
PAIT 33.01* 1.70 0.012 0.022 
PUI 1.07** 2.33 0.003 0.002 
RKRV_FIRM     
RKRV_TIME     
RKRV_LONG     
RKRV-HP 19.22*** 7.23 0.041 0.048 
RKRV-HP_Diff -27.06** -2.24 0.029 0.023 
⊿%ShortO [-1, 1] -321.19*** -4.29 0.390 0.406 
Cash 33.71*** 3.03 0.027 0.031 
SAQ     
Stock -2.27* 1.69 0.042 0.038 
Constant 39.04* 1.71 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.213   
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 Table 3.12. Simultaneous 3SLS estimations for changes in managerial interest alignments and conservatism, 
abnormal net insider purchase ratios and CSR 
The results reported in this table are for a simultaneous system of five equations estimated using 3SLS for a sample 
of 1556 firms and 7812 firm-years. The five dependent variables in the system, MIAwEQ, MIAwDB, InsDbt, 
CANIPR, CSRcom, and all regressors are for differences between their mean values during window [2, 12] and 
window [-261, -251] (about one year prior to announcement date 0). 0-lag differences for annual (monthly) data for 
the dependent variables are computed as the difference between the year (month) of day [2] and the year (month) of 
day [-261], i.e., the year of the post- M&A announcement and about the year prior the M&A announcement window 
[-1, 1]. The 0-lag differences for the controls based on daily data are computed as the difference in the means during 
window [2, 12] and window [-261, -251] where the latter window is about one year prior to the M&A announcement; 
The 1-lag differences for the controls based on annual (monthly) data are computed as the difference between the 
year (month) of day [-261] and the year (month) of day [-509], i.e., one year and two years prior to the M&A 
announcement. The 1-lag differences for the controls based on daily data are computed as the difference in its means 
during window [-261, -251] and window [-509, -499] where the two windows are about one year and two years, 
respectively, prior to the M&A announcement window [-1, 1]. For ΔMAQ (ΔSAQ), we first obtain the mean value 
of MAQ (SAQ) for year t, t-1, and t-2 (if there is no MAQ (SAQ) bid in a given year, its mean value for that year is 
0). Next, we calculate 0- and 1-lags of ΔMAQ (ΔSAQ). For more details about the calculation of changes, see the 
description to Table S4.2 of the Online Appendix S4. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A. Year dummy 
variables are included in all specifications. The goodness of fit measure (GOF) is the square of the correlation 
coefficient between actual and fitted values (Haessel, 1978).  All models include year and industry dummy variables 
(YFE&IFE) where the latter use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications. The t-values reported in the 
parentheses are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Ind. Variable 
 [I]  [II]  [III]  [IV] [V] 
ΔMIAwEQ ΔMIAwDBT ΔInsDbt ΔCANIPR ΔCSRcom 
ΔCANIPR 
    0.109*** 
(3.015) 
ΔCANIPR t-1 














































  1.903*** 
(5.234) 
ΔInsDbt t-1 
























  -0.141*** 
(-7.251)    
ΔMAQ 















   
ΔMIAwDBT × 
   StockM&A 













    
ΔMIAwEQ × 
  StockM&A 










(-12.309)   











































































































GOF  0.721  0.809  0.667  0.955 0.901 




Table 4.1. Sample firm statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the paper for our final sample of 25,571 firm-year 














CSR 0.3913 0.4933 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CSRnet 0.2749 2.3024 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CSRcom 0.4517 0.0473 0.3987 0.4501 0.4764 
ComTotl 5.9841 2.9594 1.6801 3.9064 6.4992 
InsDbt 0.0512 4.0031 0.0000 0.0000 1.7241 
ComLev 0.0840 0.3014 0.0000 0.0000 0.3202 
FamilyFirm 0.1003 0.3016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Divers 0.5064 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Assets 6.6754 1.6741 6.1477 7.3652 8.8912 
Debt/Assets 0.2415 0.2349 0.0199 0.0284 0.3955 
R&D/Sales 0.0615 0.0650 0.0241 0.0421 0.0690 
IndexGIM 15.5862 3.0640 14.0000 16.0000 18.0000 
Duality 0.7702 0.4699 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CEOnom 0.2314 0.4231 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
%Director 0.0229 0.0721 0.0142 0.0203 0.0609 
%Board 0.5871 0.2147 0.3600 0.7000 0.8200 
%Insti 0.5201 0.3641 0.2354 0.4615 0.7412 
MPHP 0.0253 0.8123 -1.2070 -0.0134 1.3050 




Table 4.2. Correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables 
This table reports the correlation coefficients among the variables used herein for the 25,571 firm-year observations for 2803 firms over the period from 1992 to 2013. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix 4.B. a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
CSRcom (1) 1                         
CSRcom t-1 (2) .23a 1                        
ComTotl (3) -.09a -.05 1                       
ComTotl t-1 (4) -.01 -.01 .25a 1                      
InsDbt (5) -.08a -.02 .13a .03 1                     
ComLev (6) -.07a -.04 .16a .04 .47a 1                    
FamilyFirm (7) -.03 -.02 .07c .01 .02 .02 1                   
R&D/Sales (8) .09b .05 -.06a -.03 .08a .06c -.11a 1                  
Divers (9) .09a .06c -.05 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.09a 1                 
Duality (10) .15a .00 .10b .03 -.01 -.03 -.08a -.07a .03 1                
CEOnom (11) .21a .03 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.09a -.07b .06a .21a 1               
IndexGIM (12) -.22a -.02 -.09b -.03 -.05c -.07b .07 .03 .07a .11a .06 1              
IndexGIM t-1 (13) -.01 -.04 -0.5c -.06 -.03 -.04 .01 .03 .05 .02 .02 .32 a 1             
%Board (14) .18a .03 -.18a -.02 .03 .01 -.26a .09a -.09a .14a .25a .08a .05 1            
%Director (15) .15a -.05 -.02 -.03 -.08a -.10a .18a .05b -.02 -.01 -.11a -.05 -.01 -.21a 1           
%Insti (16) .21a .06 -.06a -.02 -.07a -.05b -.15a .14a -.05b .10a .08a .04 .03 .21a -.11a 1          
ResCov (17) .32a 0.4 -.02 -.05 .06b .04 -.08a .33a .02 .15a .11a -.36a -.03 .11a -.05c .09a 1         
Firmage (18) .26a .03 -.02 -.06 -.09a -.01 -.12a -.12a .09a .12a .17a -.05 -.02 .24a -.15a -.06a .13a 1        
Assets (19) .13a .03 .12a .04 .11b .11a .06c .23a .06c .03 .08a .05 .04 .16a -.06c .11a .07a .05c 1       
Debt/Assets (20) -.08a -.04 -.10b -.03 .08a .10a -.01 .09a .22a .02 .04 -.06 -.03 .07a -.12a .17a .13a .05 -.06a 1      
MPHP (21) .03 .02 -.11a -.01 -.07a .06a .02 -.13a -.08b -.12a .02 -.16a -.04 -.07b .11a -.14a .08a -.03 .12a .09a 1     
CSR (22) .36a .10a -.09a -.04 -.12a -.08a -.06a -.07b .11b .12a .18a -.16a -.04 .21b -.11a .20a .33a .27a .11a -.07a .11a 1    
CSRnet (23) .39a .11a -.15a -.02 -.14a -.21a -.07a -.06c .26a .16b .22a -.17a -.01 .31a -.17a .24b .32a .25a .06a -.04a .15a .31a 1   
Uvdum (24) .28a .05 -.05a -.03 .07b .12a .28a .07a .09a .05b .06a -.13a -.02 .08a .16a -.12a .19a .03 .08a -.11a .08a .28a .33a 1  




Table 4.3. Annual cross-sectional regressions with insider transaction type as the dependent variable 
This table reports the time-series averages of the estimated coefficients from the annual cross-sectional regressions 
(see equation C.1 in Appendix 4.C) of insider transactions (i.e., open-market purchases and sales and option-
exercise purchases) on the control variables over the period from 1992 to 2013. The variables for equation C.1 are as 
defined in Appendix 4.C. Each insider is matched to a peer by propensity score matching based on logistic 
regressions on five variables: Ownership, Assets (the nearest dollar value of shareholdings), %Insti, InConcen and if 
the firm of the peer insider is also a (no) CSR-firm from year t-1 to t. All transaction variables are expressed as a 
fraction of the trading volume in year t and winsorized at the 1% level. The prior-trading of the firm of interest and 
its peer are scaled by dividing its initial value by 1000. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) corrected 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Number of 




 Open Market Purchases  Open Market Sales  Option Exercise Purchases 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Intercept -0.2892** -1.99 49.0412*** 2.85 1.6340 1.22 
InTradingt-1 0.4732*** 6.58 0.2014*** 16.23 0.2307*** 21.62 
Ptrading 0.0055** 2.03 0.0311* 1.65 0.0059*** 4.99 
Assets -0.0254*** -11.65 -0.5908*** -7.23 -0.0167*** -5.77 
%ComTotl -0.0085*** -2.63 -0.2132*** -2.22 -0.5236*** -12.36 
Ownership 0.0311** 1.97 0.0006* 1.69 -0.0189*** -10.78 
%Insti -0.3309*** -2.81 3.4575*** 2.98 0.1164** 1.98 
InConcen 0.0002*** 24.36 -0.0031** -2.13 0.0001*** 3.69 
%InsDbt -0.0008*** -10.92 41.0157*** 3.41 -0.1503*** -5.24 
IndexGIM 0.2103*** 3.06 -3.4581*** -3.04 -0.5855** -2.54 
ComTotl 0.0496*** 3.04 0.6468*** 2.67 0.3010*** 7.19 
ResCov -0.0026*** -6.78 -0.0038*** -2.979 -0.0094*** -11.44 




Table 4.4. Summary distributional statistics for the AIB undervaluation estimates for positive, negative and 
no changes in the composite CSR rankings 
This table reports the distributional statistics for the total abnormal net buy ratios for insiders (AIB) in year t for firm 
i for various samples of the changes in the composite CSR rankings (△CSRcomi). AIB for a given year is computed 
as described in Appendix 4.C. Specifically, open market sales, open market purchases, and option-exercise 
purchases for each insider are the residuals from annual cross-sectional regressions, that are then aggregated to 
compute the abnormal net buy ratio for each firm for each year. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
AIB  All  △CSRcomi,t > 0  △CSRcomi,t = 0  △CSRcomi,t < 0 
Maximum 0.5681 0.5681 0.5125 0.4872 
25th percentile 0.0525 0.0593 0.8080 0.0456 
Mean 0.0044*** 0.0147*** 0.0045*** -0.0091*** 
Median 0.0046 0.0146 0.0046 -0.0044 
75th percentile -0.0467 -0.0426 -0.0456 -0.0565 
Minimum -0.5407 -0.4643 -0.4803 -0.5408 
Std. dev. 0.0211  0.0223 0.0209 0.0216 




Table 4.5. Average firm characteristics for three AIB terciles and tests of their differences 
Table 4.5 reports the mean values of various firm characteristics for three AIB terciles. A firm is placed in the High 
(Low) AIB tercile in year t if its AIB is in the top (bottom) 33% of the distribution of AIB for all firms in the year, 
and in the Medium AIB tercile otherwise. All the variables are as described in Appendix 4.B. Differences in the 
mean values between the firms in the High and Low AIB terciles for each variable are presented and tested using a 
two-sample t-test. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Obs. is the number 
of observations. 
Variable 
 High AIB 
(I) 
 Medium AIB 
(II) 
 Low AIB 
(III) 
 Difference 
(I) – (III) 
 
t-stat 
CSRcom 0.0348 0.0011 -0.0227 0.0575 6.512*** 
△CSRcom>0 0.0167 0.0149 0.0126 0.0041 2.984*** 
△CSRcom<0 0.0048 -0.0131 -0.0190 0.0238 7.397*** 
ComTotl 5.6993 6.0138 6.5284 -0.8291 -21.387*** 
IndexGIM 7.9251 9.4022 10.4390 -2.5139 -3.064*** 
MPHP 0.3104 0.0309 -0.2376 0.5480 3.911*** 
InsDbt 0.5736 1.3974 1.5942 -1.0206 -1.978** 
ComLev 0.0844 0.2241 0.2967 -0.2123 -2.883*** 
%Director 0.0992 0.0842 0.0592 0.0401 0.362 
%Board 0.6501 0.6013 0.5637 0.0864 11.093*** 
Duality 0.8639 0.7911 0.7693 0.0946 3.005*** 
CEOnom 0.5135 0.3498 0.2129 0.3007 1.669* 
CRISIS 0.8124 0.6917 0.5042 0.3082 6.960*** 
FamilyFirm 0.0922 0.0923 0.1069 0.0147 1.882* 
%Inst 63.0512 51.0490 47.9233 15.1289 3.692*** 
ResCov 0.9006 0.2770 -0.7826 1.6832 7.261*** 
Divers 0.7022 0.5529 0.4938 0.2084 3.021*** 
Firmage 34.8422 23.0285 13.8463 20.9960 1.701* 
Assets 8.7029 7.2023 5.9273 2.7756 9.035*** 
Debt/Assets 0.2394 0.2481 0.2492 -0.0098 -4.972*** 
R&D/Sales 0.0351 0.0345 0.0341 0.0010 36.498*** 
PAIT  0.0264 0.0039 -0.0153 0.0417 1.975** 
Tobin’s Q -0.1895 -0.2011 -0.2203 0.0308 2.470** 
PV_MB -1.5072 -1.7109 -1.9201 0.4129 1.679* 
DHRT -1.6032 -1.6401 -1.6938 0.0906 1.470 
RKRV_Long 0.0614 -0.1807 -0.3319 0.3933 1.721* 
RKRV_Sector -0.0632 -0.1753 -0.2105 0.1473 1.242 
RKRV_Firm -0.3029 -0.4714 -0.5570 0.2541 2.394** 










Table 4.6. Firm undervaluation regressions using Heckman and IV estimation approaches 
This table presents summary panel regression results using various model specifications and two estimation 
approaches for a sample of 2803 firms and 25,571 firm-years. Firm undervaluation (Uvdum) is the dependent 
variable in the second stage of both estimation approaches. All regressors are lagged one year and are defined in 
Appendix 4.B. For the Heckman two-stage treatment effect estimation approach, the inverse Mills’ ratio (gamma) 
obtained from a Probit model estimated in the first stage is included as a regressor in the second stage estimation. 
For the two-stage IV approach, firmage is chosen as our instrumental variable since firmage is highly correlated 
with CSRcom but only influences Uvdum through CSRcom (i.e., Cov(firmage, ε) = 0). Year dummies are included in 
all specifications. The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable / 
Statistic 
 Heckman two-stage treatment effect  Instrumental variable approach 







































































































































































































































     
F-F 48 industry Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Wald 𝝌2 6938.01 6304.21 5971.78 7204.11      
Adj. R2       0.071 0.076 0.133 0.140 
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Table 4.7. Panel regressions with time and industry fixed effects 
This table reports panel regression results for the marginal effects of the differences of CSR rankings for a sample of 25,571 firm-year observations for 2803 
firms. Dependent dummy variables are: D∆CSRcom for changes in the annual CSR-combined scores, D∆CSRstr for the changes in the annual combined 
strengths CSRstr, and D∆CSRcon for the changes in the annual combined concerns CSRcon. The regressions are run separately for positive and negative changes 
of the CSR used in constructing each dependent variable. All the dependent and independent variables are described in Appendix 4.B. All independent variables 
are lagged one year. Standard errors are robust to industry clustering based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification scheme. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Obs. is the number of observations. FE refers to fixed 
effects. 
Ind. variable 
D∆CSRcom  D∆CSRstr  D∆CSRcon 
If ∆CSRom > 0  If ∆CSRcom < 0 If ∆CSRstr > 0  If ∆CSRstr < 0 If ∆CSRcon > 0  If ∆CSRcon < 0 


























































































































































































































































































Table 4.7. Cont’d 
Variable / 
Statistic 
 D∆CSRcom  D∆CSRstr  D∆CSRcon 
If ∆CSRcom > 0  If ∆CSRcom < 0 If ∆CSRstr > 0  If ∆CSRstr < 0 If ∆CSRcon > 0  If ∆CSRcon < 0 







































































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 𝝌2 5225.94 6301.72 6933.41 5817.46 4926.31 5514.87 7106.44 6179.01 4599.51 5231.89 6725.63 6167.05 
Adj. R2  0.294 0.341 0.207 0.392 0.195 0.263 0.312 0.273 0.333 0.202 0.291 0.389 
Obs. 1311 1311 1145 1145 1311 1311 1145 1145 1311 1311 1145 1145 
 162 
 
Table 4.8. Simultaneous 3SLS estimations for four dependent variables: CSR, undervaluation, executive 
compensation, and governance 
The results reported in this table are for a simultaneous system of four equations estimated using 3SLS for a sample 
of 2803 firms and 25,571 firm-years. The dependent variables in the system are CSRcom, Uvdum, ComTotl and 
IndexGIM. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.B, and 1-lag of the dependent variable is included as a regressor 
in each equation. The goodness of fit measure (GOF) is the square of the correlation coefficient between actual and 
fitted values (Haessel, 1978). All models include year and industry dummy variables (YFE&IFE) where the latter 
use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications. The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are based on 
robust, firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Ind. Variable 
 [I]  [II]  [III]  [IV] 

































   
























































































































   
PReturn 









   0.028*** 
(4.396) 
Spreads 




















(YFE&IFE) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GOF 0.895 0.930 0.492 0.675 





Table 4.9. Summary results for representative level-level and change-change regressions between the controls 
as the dependent variables and the other variables 
This table presents summary results for representative level-level and change-change OLS regressions between four 
control variables and the other variables for a sample that includes 2803 firms and 25,571 firm-year observations. 
The four representative control variables are inside debt (InsDbt), board independence (%Board), institutional 
ownership (%Insti), and log Assets (Assets). The other variables include the dependent variables in the simultaneous 
system of equations: CSR composite changes (CSRcom), undervaluation (Uvdum), total compensation (ComTotl) 
and shareholder rights (IndexGIM). They also include inside compensation leverage (ComLev), CEO is chair or 
nomination committee member (CEOnom), debt/assets ratio (Debt/Assets), R&D expenditure ratio (R&D/Sales), 
and alternative undervaluation estimate (MPHP). In the level-level regression results reported in Panel A, the 
dependent variables are their levels for period t and the independent variables are their levels for period t-1. In the 
change-change regression results reported in Panel B, the dependent variables are their changes from period t-1 to t 
and the independent variables are their changes from period t-2 to t-1. The t-values reported in the parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors. All specifications include year dummies. ***, **, and * represents significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable / 
Statistic 
 Panel A: Level at t against level at t-1  Panel B: Change to t against change to t-1 



























































































































































































































































































R2 0.294 0.553 0.742 0.470 0.268 0.612 0.331 0.097 
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Table 4.10. The System-GMM estimates 
This table reports the summary statistics from the System-GMM estimations of the following model for a sample of 2803 firms 
and 25,571 firm-year observations between 1992 and 2013: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡;    t = 1994, …, 2013, 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of the four dependent variables (i.e., CSRcom, Uvdum, ComTotl, and IndexGIM); 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  is a vector of one or 
more lagged dependent variables other than 𝑌𝑡−1 included in the equation as regressors; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 includes the independent variables; 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 includes year dummies. The firm characteristics are obtained from Compustat and CRSP. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.B. The board structure variables are from RiskMetrics. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. All specifications 
include two lags of the dependent variable. AR(1) and AR(2) are estimations for the first- and second-order serial correlation, 
respectively, of  the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The over-identification Hansen 
test is under the null hypothesis of valid instruments, with p-values reported. The exogeneity tests of the Difference-in-Hansen is 
under the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments for the equations in levels, with p-values reported. The GMM estimation uses 
∆𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖−1, ∆𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, ∆𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, and ∆𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  as instruments for level equations [I] to [IV], respectively,  
and𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖−1, 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1  as instruments for differenced equations [I] to [IV], 
respectively. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 



































































































































































AR(1)/p-value 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 
AR(2)/p-value 0.231 0.190 0.337 0.412 
Hansen test 0.310 0.192 0.225 0.361 





Appendix 2.A. Definition of the Variables 
This appendix presents variable definitions used in this paper, where t represents the announcement year. The inside 
debt and compensation leverage metrics are similar to those used by Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and White (2015), and 
CEO and director compensation variables and firm characteristics variables are similar to those used by Brick, 
Palmon and Wald (2006), Akbulut (2013) and Blau, Fuller and Wade (2014). Descriptions are arranged 
alphabetically under the following categories: Price Effects; Compensation Variables; Firm/Issuer Characteristics; 
CEO and Firm Governance Characteristics; and Issue Characteristics. 
Moniker Name and Definition 
 Price Effects (computations are more fully discussed in Appendix 2.B) 
Alpha Alpha is the intercept from an estimation of either a four- or five-factor model using the 
observations for each of the three post-announcement windows. It provides an estimate of the 
average daily abnormal return over the window. 
BHAR The buy-and-hold abnormal return is equal to the compounded return relative for the firm of 
interest minus the compounded return relative for the benchmark firms where a return relative is 
equal to one plus the decimal return. 
CAR The cumulative abnormal returns for a three-day announcement window using a four- or five-
factor model and a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, the parameters of the model 
are estimated over the window [-200, -41] where 0 is the announcement day. In the second step, 
the AR for each day in the announcement window [-1, 1] is computed using the parameter 
estimates from the first step and the firm and factor realizations for that day in window [-1, 1]. 
P prefix PAlpha, PBHAR and PCAR refer to their pure values in the sense that any equity issue effect has 
been accounted for.  
 Compensation Variables 
CEO CComp CEO Cash Compensation. CEO salary plus bonus as described by Execucomp (in dollars). 
CEO TComp 
CEO Total Compensation. The sum of salary, bonus, total value of stock options granted using a 
Black-Scholes model, total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all 
other payments reported in Execucomp (in dollars). 
CompLev 
Compensation Leverage.  Our calculation method follows that in Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and White 
(2015, p. 265). We use the following equation for the CEO (and separately for typically the five 
top executives) in a firm: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑣 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 {∑ (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1 }⁄   
ΔCompLev 
Pre-to-post change in compensation leverage, which is defined as 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑣 =
 ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 {∑ (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1 }⁄  −
  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 {∑ (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1 }⁄  
CompLev-Rel 
Relative differences of compensation leverage for the CEO (and separately for typically the five 
top executives) between the acquirer and the target. 
Dir CComp 
Director Cash Compensation. The annual fee paid for each outside director plus per meeting fee 
times the number of director meetings (in dollars). 
Dir TComp 
Director Total Compensation. Base cash compensation plus the value of stock and options 
granted for external directors. Because Execucomp does not supply a value for the directors’ 
options and the proxy statements suggest that these options are often similar, we follow Brick, 
Palmon, and Wald (2006) and set each per-option value of director’s options equal to the per-
option value of the CEO’s options. Results (in dollars) are similar when director options are 
valued as Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) value CEO options; i.e., 0.25 times the exercise 
price. 
DQ(x) 
Dummy variable indicating whether the value of the interacting variable belongs to quartile x, 
where x = I, II, III, or IV. 
InsDebt 
Inside Debt. This variable is obtained as the present value of the pensions (PVB) for the CEO and 
for typically the five top executives divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
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ΔInsDebt1 Pre-to-post change in inside debt, which is defined as ΔInsDebt1 = [PVBpost /TApost] - [PVBpre 
/TApre]. 
ΔInsDebt2 Pre-to-post change in inside debt, which is defined as ΔInsDebt2 = [PVBpost /TApre] - [PVBpre 
/TApre] = [PVBpost - PVBpre] / TApre. 
ΔInsDebt3 Pre-to-post change in inside debt, which is defined as ΔInsDebt3 = [PVBpost /(TApost – TAacquired)] 
- [PVBpre /TApre]. 
InsDebt-Rel 
Relative inside debt differences for the CEO (and separately for typically the five top executives) 
between acquirer and target. 
PVB 
Present value of pension (PVB). Our calculation method follows that in Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and 




𝑛=max (0,𝑅−𝐴)  
where X is the amount of the annual pension for the executive, A is the current age of the 
executive, R is the minimum retirement age to achieve full benefits, τ is the final year that the 
executive draws a pension, and π(n) is the probability that the executive will continue to draw 
retirement benefits in future year n. The mortality probabilities for an executive of age A are 
based on the projected life expectancy from the Period Life Table that is available from the U.S. 
Social Security Administration. Since year 119 is the last year for which a period life expectancy 
at a given age is reported in this table, τ is set to 120 (also assumed in Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007). The annualized Moody’s Seasoned AAA-rated bond yield for a given year obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release is used as the rate of discount, d. This is similar to the 
rate used by firms that voluntarily disclosed PVB values prior to 2006, which was the yield on 
either 10-year Treasuries or AAA-rated corporates. We obtain the PVB for all executives of a 
firm by adding up the PVBs over the executives in a firm.   
Firm/Issuer Characteristics 
Adv/Assets  Advertising /Assets. Ratio of advertising expenditures to total assets. Zeros for missing values. 
Ann Return 
Announcement returns controlled for the equity issue effect. Computed as the cumulative market-
adjusted returns over the 3-day window [-1, +1] around the M&A announcement, minus equity 
issue effect (IssueCAR) if the method of payment is stock. 
AT(H) 
Dummy variable indicating whether an observation belongs to the top 33% of the distribution of 
managerial conservatism for the year prior to an acquisition for the entire sample. 
AT(L) 
Dummy variable indicating whether an observation belongs to the bottom 33% of the distribution 
of managerial conservatism for the year prior to an acquisition for the entire sample. 
BM Ratio Book value of equity divided by market value of equity before the M&A announcement. 
Cap Market Capitalization (in 000s of dollars). Number of shares outstanding times the stock price. 
Cashhold 
Cash plus cash equivalents divided by the book value of total assets before the M&A 
announcement. 
CF/EQ 
Income before extraordinary items + depreciation - dividends on common and preferred stock / 
market value of equity before the M&A announcement. 
CashFlowRisk Cash Flow Risk. The standard deviation of the first differences in ROA for the prior 8 years. 
Cash M&A Dummy variable indicating whether the method of payment for an M&A is 100% cash. 
Debt/Assets Debt /Assets. The ratio of total debt to total assets.  
Debt/Assets-
Rel 
Relative difference of Debt/Asset ratio between the acquirer and the target. 
DebtP 
The ratio of debt used to pay for the transaction. The net increase in firm debt 3 months after the 
announcement divided by the transaction value. 
Income ratio 
Operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets before the M&A 
announcement. 
Ins Ownership Institutional Ownership. Fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. 
IssueCAR 
Equity issue effect of stock-financed acquirer (see Appendix 2.B for more detailed procedure of 
the estimation). 
Inv/Assets Investments /Assets. The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
LGG 
Low GDP Growth dummy variable, which is based on the years when the normalized GDP 
growth rate based on constant 2015 US dollars obtained from World Bank is below the bottom 
20th percentile of the distribution of normalized GDP growth for 648 country-year observations 
(Erel, Jiang & Minton, 2017).  Because distributions of GDP growth are country specific, the 
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GDP growth is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of 
each country to identify abnormal levels of GDP growth rates. The mean and standard deviation 
used to normalize GDP growth for a specific country and year are estimated from a time-series of 
GDP growth rates over a prior 20-year period ending two years prior to the event (i.e. from t-23 
to year t-3). 
Mixed M&A Dummy variable indicating whether the method of payment for an M&A is cash and stock. 
MP-HP 
Mispricing measure. RKRV valuation model using three-step estimation approach of Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010) that uses an unbalanced, rolling ten-year panel with firm fixed effects for all the 
firms in each industrial sector. 
MAQ 
Multiple acquirer, an acquirer that made more than one successful acquisition during the previous 
two years (Ismail and Abdallah, 2013). 
Price Share price.  Measured in dollars. 
Public Target Dummy variable indicating whether the target is traded on the stock market. 
PUI 
Policy uncertainty index (PUI) obtained from the website of Baker, Bloom, and Davis. This 
index has four components (i) a comprehensive measure of uncertainty based on the number of 
articles about economic policy uncertainty in ten large newspapers; (ii) taxation uncertainty 
based on data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on expiring tax provisions, (iii) 
taxation uncertainty, and (iv) expenditure uncertainty, where the latter two components are based 
on the dispersions in professional analyst forecasts. Baker et al. (2016) report that the PUI 
captures periods of heightened policy uncertainty around such events as elections, policy debates, 
and government policy changes. PUI is used in various studies (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; 
Gulen and Ion, 2016; and Francis et al., 2014). 
Q 
Q-ratio. The market value of common stock plus the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total assets in the year prior to the M&A announcement. 
R&D/Assets 
R&D/Assets. The ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures to total assets. 
Missing values are replaced by zeros. 
Return 
Stock Return. The holding period stock return for the past three years, equal to the ratio of the 
price at the end of year t - 4 to the end of year t - 1, adjusted for dividends and splits, minus 1. 
ROA  
Return on Assets. The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), 
divided by the firm’s total assets. 
Sales ($) Sales. Logarithm of the dollar value of sales in the year prior to the M&A announcement. 
SAQ 
Single acquirer, which is defined as an acquirer that made no successful acquisition during the 
previous two year (Ismail and Abdallah, 2013). 
Stock M&A Dummy variable indicating whether the method of payment for an M&A is 100% stock. 
TA Total assets. 
Turnover 
Turnover. The annual split-adjusted trading volume divided by the average number of split-
adjusted shares outstanding over the year before the M&A announcement date. 
TranValue Transaction Value. In millions of dollars. 
TranSize Transaction size. Transaction value scaled by the acquirer’s market capitalization. 
Volatility Volatility. The Black–Scholes volatility measure given by Execucomp. 
Withdrawn Dummy variable indicating whether an M&A was withdrawn. 
CEO and Firm Governance Characteristics 
CEO Age The natural logarithm of the age of current CEO. 
CEO Chair 
CEO Is Board Chair. A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the Board 
and zero otherwise. 
CEO Gender 
A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is female. The gender results reflect a relatively 
small number of observations. 
CEO Tenure The number of years that the CEO has served as CEO at the firm. 
ExpTenure 
CEO expected tenure is based on the assumption that CEO decision horizon can be adequately 
approximated by the CEO’s expected tenure with the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1979) and that 
CEOs estimate their tenure by comparing themselves with the length of current tenure and age of 
other CEOs in their industry (Antia, Pantzalis and Park, 2010). Given by: ExpTenure = TenuInd 
– Tenu + AgeInd – Age, where tenu is the number of years the CEO has been in that position, 
Age is the age of that CEO for the firm in year t, and TenuInd and AgeInd are the industry 
median of tenure and age based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification scheme. A positive 
 169 
 
(negative) value suggests that the CEO’s expected tenure is longer (shorter) than the industry 
median. 
%Equity % of Equity Owned by the CEO. The percentage of the firm’s equity owned by the CEO. 
Hubris 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds stock options that are more than 67% in the money, 
0 otherwise (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011). 
%Internal 
% of Internal Directors. The percentage of board members that are managers of the firm, which is 
used to check for robustness in a sub-sample, if applicable. 
Internal CEO 
A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO joined the company more than a year before taking 
the position of CEO. 
MGR Rep 
Republican party orientation of managers. As in Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2014), we focus on 
the CEO and on typically the five top executives according to their reported annual Execucomp 
salary, which provides the title and full name of top managers for every fiscal year and allows for 
a determination of their individual political contributions on the FEC file. A manager-specific 
Republican dummy variable (MGR RepCycle) takes the value of 1 if all political contributions 
are directed towards the Republican Party in a given election cycle, 0 otherwise. A manager-
specific political orientation index MGR Rep is equal to the mean value of MGR RepCycle 
across all election cycles that the manager contributes or zero if the manager never contributes 
(Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012). MGR Rec represents the percentage of election cycles a manager 
actively and strongly financially supports the Republican party. 
Issue Characteristics 
Combined Dummy variable equal to 1 if the equity offer includes secondary shares (identified by Thomson 
Financial SDC), 0 otherwise. 
Diversific Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is cross-industry, 0 for same industry. Industries are 
defined using Fama-French 48 industries classification. 
Hostile Dummy variable equal to 1 for a deal labeled as “hostile” or “unsolicited” (identified by 
Thomson Financial SDC), 0 otherwise. 
Multibid Dummy variable equal to 1 if it is a deal involving multiple bidders (identified by Thomson 
Financial SDC), 0 otherwise. 
Pure Primary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the equity offer consists of only newly issued shares (identified by 
Thomson Financial SDC), 0 otherwise. 





Appendix 2.B. Methods used to estimate M&A price effects on acquirers and to control for the 
equity issue effect when the stock method of payment is used 
B.1 Adjusting for factor-model equity price effects for the announcement window for acquirers 
using the stock method of payment  
 Our method is similar to Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) with the exception that they use the 
single-factor model while we use multi-factor models. 
B.1.1 Not accounting for equity issue effects 
 The CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) for the [-1, +1] window are obtained for a sample of 7372 
SEO announcements between 1992 and 2014 which were obtained from the SDC. In the first step, we 
estimate the coefficients for each of two factor models over the window [-200, -41] relative to the day of 
the first bid announcement (day 0). The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and the five-factor model of 
Fama and French (2015) for acquirer j are given by: 
 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑟𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵t + 𝛽3𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿t + 𝛽4𝑗𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,t  (B.1) 
 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝛾1𝑗(𝑟𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛾2𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵t + 𝛾3𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿t + 𝛾4𝑗𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑗𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗,t (B.2) 
In these equations, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡is the return of acquirer j on day t; 𝑟𝑓,𝑡is the return on the risk-free asset on day t;  
𝑟𝑀,t is the return of the market on day t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿t and 𝑊𝑀𝐿t are the size, book-to-market and 
momentum factor returns on day t;  𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the difference in returns between diversified portfolios of 
stocks with robust and weak profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the difference in returns between diversified portfolios 
of stocks with low (conservative) and high (aggressive) investments; and 𝜀𝑗,t and 𝜖𝑗,t are the error terms. 
 In the second step, we calculate the abnormal return (AR) for each day in the announcement window 
[-1, 1] for each acquirer j. To illustrate for day  𝜏 = −1 (i.e., the day immediately before the 
announcement day) and the five-factor model (B.2), this is obtained as follows for each acquirer j: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑟𝑗,𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓,𝜏) − [𝛾1𝑖(𝑟𝑀,𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓,𝜏) + 𝛾2𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝜏 + 𝛾3𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿𝜏 + 𝛾4𝑗𝑅𝑀𝑊𝜏 + 𝛾5𝑗𝐶𝑀𝐴𝜏] (B.3) 
In eq. (B.3), the five 𝛾 are the estimates from equation (B.2) obtained in the previous step, and 𝑟𝑗,𝜏, 𝑟𝑓,𝜏, 
𝑟𝑀,𝜏, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝜏, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝜏, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝜏 and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝜏  are the returns for these variables for day 𝜏 = −1 (i.e., the day 
immediately before the announcement day). A similar procedure is used to compute the AR for each 
acquirer j for 𝜏 = 0 and for 𝜏 = +1. By cumulating the AR over the three days in the announcement 
window of [-1, 1] for each acquirer j, we obtain its 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗,[−1,1]. 
B.1.2 Removal of the equity issue effects 
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 We use the two methods used by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) to estimate the required 
adjustment for the equity issue effect for each acquirer j only for acquirers using the stock method of 
payment. This is designed to isolate the price effects of the investment (M&A) decision when it is 
combined with the implicit financing decision when the method of payment is stock. We refer to the 
isolated price effects of the investment decision as being pure indicated by adding the suffix P to our 
labels for the price effect measures.  
 The first method is a linear prediction method where we predict the equity issue effect for each 
acquirer j based on its CAR for window [-1, 1] as if it had undertaken an SEO. To do so, we estimate the 
CAR for each SEO s in a sample of SEOs using the procedure detailed for acquirers in section B.1.1. We 
then run the following cross-sectional regression of the CARs for the announcement window [-1, 1] for 
the sample of SEOs: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝑋𝑠𝛿 + 𝜗 (B.4) 
where 𝑋𝑠 is a matrix of issue and pre-announcement issuer characteristics used by Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2016); specifically TranSize, TranValue, BM ratio, Cap, Cashhold, CF/EQ, Debt-to-Assets, 
Income Ratio Return, and Volatility; 𝛿 is a vector of parameters; and 𝜗 is a vector of error terms. 
 The equity price effect for M&A acquirer j is then obtained using the realizations for the issue and 
issuer characteristics of this acquirer and the estimated δ coefficients from eq. (B.4). We use PCAR to 
represent the pure CAR for each acquirer after the removal of the equity issue effect for the stock method 
of payment. It is obtained by adding the CARs obtained in sections B.1.1 and B.1.2. 
 Unlike the first method, the second method for removing the equity issue effect associated with each 
M&A acquirer is obtained for each M&A acquirer j using m-nearest-neighbor propensity score matching 
where the propensity scores are obtained using a Probit regression where the dependent variable is one for 
an SEO and zero for an M&A using stock as the method of payment.109 To ensure that the findings are 
robust to the choice of m we use values of m of 1, 20 and 40. Specific details on the results of the 
propensity matching are presented in Online Table O.1 and O.2 for the five- and four-factor models. The 
results reported in the paper are based on an m of 20 matches. 110 Based on the results summarized in 
Table B.1, both the mean (median) CAR for our SEO sample of -2.97% (-3.19%) for the five-factor 
model and -3.03% (-3.22%) for the four-factor model are quite similar to the -3.16% (-3.05%) found by 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) for a smaller sample of 3212 SEOs over the 1985-2009 period. 
                                                          
109 See Li and Zhao (2006) for the use of propensity score matching to examine SEO performance. 
110 Alderson and Betker (2006) conclude that it is very important to match each sample firm to a control group rather 
than a single control firm that shares similar pre-event characteristics. 
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 We then estimate the CAR for window [-1, 1] for each SEO s in the SEO sample matched with 
acquirer j using the procedure detailed for acquirers in section B.1.1. The average of these CARs is used 
as the estimate of the equity issue price effect that needs to be added to CAR for acquirer j to obtain its 
PCAR. In the tables, we report the cross-sectional mean PCAR for various categories of acquirers. 
B.2 Determination of factor-model performance for acquirers for three post-announcement 
windows 
 We use an approach for measuring performance that is commonly used in tests of fund performance. 
We evaluate such performance for post-announcement windows of [2, 64], [2, 124] and [2, 250] days, 
which are approximate windows of 3, 6 and 12 months of trading days. We measure the performance of 
portfolios formed at the end of each announcement month that have a minimum of five such events as in 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and are held unchanged until the final relative day specified in each window. 
This involves the estimation of equations (B.1) and (B.2) for each acquirer j and each of the 20 SEOs that 
have been matched to acquirer j that are in portfolio p. The intercept or alpha (Alpha) from each of these 
estimations measures the average performance of each firm over an estimation window. We obtain the 
pure alpha (PAlpha) for each portfolio p as the average Alpha for the acquirers in that portfolio plus the 
average of all the Alphas for all the SEOs in the matched samples for all the acquirers in portfolio p. In 
the tables, we report the cross-sectional mean PAlpha for various categories of acquirers. 
B.3 Determination of BHAR and PBHAR performance for acquirers for the pre- and post-
announcement windows 
 As an extension to Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2016) and as a further test of robustness, we 
compute pure Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (PBHAR) for each acquirer j for each of the four 
windows. This computation is slightly more complicated because each BHAR and any adjustment for  an 
equity issue effect involve the differences in two sets of compounded return relatives (i.e., one plus the 
total return). 
 To get the BHAR for the M&A acquirers regardless of their method of payment, we first match each 
M&A acquirer j with a sample of nonacquirers k (k = 1, …, K) using propensity score matching. For 
consistency, we use the same covariates that we used to determine the equity issue effect to obtain the 
PCAR and the same matching K of 20. We then calculate the BHAR for each acquirer j in portfolio p 
formed in calendar time as previous discussed for each window. To illustrate using the [-1, 1] window, 
this is given by: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,[−1,1] = ∏  (
1
𝜏=−1 1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝜏) +
1
𝐾
∑ (∏  (1𝜏=−1 1 + 𝑅𝑘,𝜏))
𝐾
𝑘=1  (B.5) 
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Where j is an index for the acquirer, k is an index for each non-acquirer in the sample matched to M&A 
acquirer j, τ is an index for time relative to the M&A announcement day 0, K is the number of matches 
taken for each acquirer j, R is a total daily return, and 1+R is a total daily return relative. 
 To get the equity price effect required to adjust the BHAR that is required for only the M&A acquirers 
using the stock method of payment, we first match each M&A acquirer j with a sample of nonSEO issuers 
q (q = 1, …, Q) using the propensity score matching procedure described earlier. The equity price effect 
adjustment for each acquirer j in portfolio p for each window is found as the difference between two 
sample averages where each sample has been propensity score matched to each acquirer j using the same 









∑ (∏  (1𝜏=−1 1 + 𝑅𝑞,𝜏))
𝑄
𝑞=1  (B.6) 
 The pure BHAR or PBHAR for each portfolio p is equal to the sum of the mean of the BHAR for the 
acquirers included in portfolio p obtained using eq. (B.5) and the mean of the AdjBHAR for the acquirers 
in portfolio p obtained using equation (B.6). In the tables, we report the cross-sectional mean PBHAR for 
the various categories of acquirers. 
Table B.1. CAR[-1,1] for the SEO sample 
This table reports the CAR in % over the three-day announcement window [-1, 1] for a sample of 7372 SEO 
announcements between 1992 and 2014 which is drawn from the SDC. The abnormal return (AR) for each day in 
the [-1, 1] window for each SEO is computed using the parameters of both the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and 
the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model using daily returns over the window [-200, -41] and the returns for the 
issuer and each model’s factors for each day in the [-1, 1] window. The cross-sectional mean and median three-day 
CAR are tested for significance using t- and Wilcoxon tests, respectively, whose p-values are reported in the last two 
columns of the table.  
 
Model Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max Wilcoxon T-test 
5-factor Fama-French -2.97 10.46 -25.13 -6.43 -3.19 -0.15 22.14 0.00 0.12 
4-factor Carhart -3.03 9.17 -24.97 -6.38 -3.22 -0.15 21.98 0.01 0.03 





Appendix 3.A. Definition of the Variables 
This appendix defines the variables used in this paper, generally after presenting the equation to which they apply. 
RKRV (2005) refers to Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005). 
Symbol Name Definition 
Age Age Number of days since an insider first reported for any firm in a quarter. 
AIS Open market sale  
The abnormal number of shares sold/bought on the open market or option 












Equal to AIB + AIBO - AIS for an acquirer expressed as a fraction of the 
trading volume for that firm during a quarter. 
#Analyst Analyst coverage The number of analysts following the firm (IBES database). 
AT(H)  
Dummy variable indicating whether an observation belongs to the top 33% 
of the distribution of managerial interest alignment for the year prior to an 
acquisition for the entire sample. 
AT(L)  
Dummy variable indicating whether an observation belongs to the bottom 
33% of the distribution of managerial interest alignment for the year prior to 
an acquisition for the entire sample. 
CAINPR 
abnormal trading 
of firm insiders 
Sum of the AINPR for the two quarters prior to the M&A announcement 
quarter. 
#Bidders Number of bidders Number of bidders during the M&A process 
Bid Prm Bid Premium 
As in Officer (2003), the bid premium for public targets only is given by 
[bidder’s offer divided by target’s pre-bid market value of equity − 1], 
where value of the bidder’s offer is in the order of availability in the SDC 
by the sum of the value of all consideration offered, or the initial offer price, 
or the final offer price. 
BM Ratio Firm BM Ratio 
Book value of equity divided by its market value before the SEO or M&A 
announcement. 
%Board % of independent 
directors 





A two-step estimation procedure is used. First, the parameters of a five-
factor model are estimated for the window [-200, -41] where 0 is the M&A 
announcement day. Second, the resulting parameter estimates and the firm 
and factor realizations for a day in a specific announcement window are 




A two-step estimation procedure as CAR. 
%Cash Cash payment % Percent of target payment that is cash. 
CashFlow Free cash flow Operating cash flows minus capital expenditures (Source: Compustat). 
CashHld Cash holding 
Ratio of cash plus cash equivalents to the value of the firm’s total assets 
before the M&A announcement. 
CashM&A Dummy variable Indicates whether the method of payment is 100% cash. 
CEOnom CEO nomination 
committee 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO is a chair or a member of nomination 
committee (source: RiskMetrics). 
CF/EQ 
SEO firm income 
return on equity 
Income before extraordinary items + depreciation - dividends on common 





Indicator that takes the value of one for a firm with CG that is above the 
sample industry median CG calculated in each year and zero otherwise. CG 
is the first principal component of board independence, compensation 
committee independence, institutional ownership, and independent & long-
term institutional ownership as described in Dai et al. (2016). 





committee independence, institutional ownership, independent & long-term 
institutional ownership, and seven other governance attributes described in 
Dai, et al. (2016). 
CombCAR Combined CARs 
Involving public targets only. Value-weighted average of acquirer and 




Present value of all executive pensions divided by the sum of this value and 
the values of all stocks and stock options owned by the top five managers, 
i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑣 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 {∑ (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1 }⁄  




From ExecuComp item “TDC1”, which is the sum of salary, bonus, other 
annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, Black-
Scholes value of stock options granted that year, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other compensation (in thousands) for top five executives. 
Congl Dummy variable 






Herfindahl index calculated over the distribution of the fraction of company 
stock owned by institutional investors at beginning of the current quarter.  
CSRcom CSR composite 
Arithmetic average of combined scores of KLD strengths minus concerns 
for the dimensions of community, environment, diversity, employee, and 
product. Annually for each firm equal to (Sum of all strength scores plus 
total maximum possible number of community concern scores minus sum 
of all concern scores) divided by (total maximum possible number of 
strength scores plus total maximum possible number of concern scores).  
DealSize Transaction value 
In millions of dollars for the M&A or SEO used in computing pure price 
effects. 




Portion of an employee's income paid out at a later date, excluding pensions 
and stock options. 
%Director % of director’s 
shares 
Percentage of shares owned by directors (source: RiskMetrics). 






Equal to 1 if the acquirer’s CANIPR in a quarter is in the top 33% of the 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has more CSR strengths than 




Equal to 1 if the MRC for the acquirer in a quarter is in the top 33% of the 




Equal to 1 if the MRC for the acquirer in a quarter is in the top 33% of the 




Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. (source: RiskMetrics) 
%Eq Equity percentage 
Proportion of equity held by the mangers given by (Stock + Options) / 
Equity. 
%Eq/%Ltl 
Ratio of equity to 
LT liabilities  
Proportion of equity holdings divided by proportion of long-term liabilities 
held by the executives of an acquirer. 
%Equity 
Ratio of equity to 
total compensation 
Given by: 1 – (Salary + Bonus)/TDC1, where TDC1 is from the 
ExecuComp database. 
FamilyFirm Family firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a family owned firm; otherwise 
equal to 0. 
Firmage Firm age Firm age is calculated from the beginning of the year from the CRSP 
database (source: CRSP). 
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GIndex GIM index The index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003; 2010) based on the 
incidence of 24 different corporate-governance provisions. (source: 
RiskMetrics) 




Operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of total 
assets for the matching SEO issuer before the M&A announcement date. 
InsDbt Inside debt 
Present value of all top five executives’ pensions (×1000) divided by the 





Ratio of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors relative to total shares 
outstanding, measured at the beginning of the current quarter.  
InsPTrd Peer trading The number of shares bought (or sold) through open market purchases (or 
sales or exercises of stock options) by an insider of the acquirer or a peer at 
another firms, expressed as a fraction of trading volume in the quarter for 
their firm. 




Proportion of capital expenditure to total assets. 




Long-term liabilities of the firm. 
LGG  
Low GDP Growth dummy variable, which is based on the years when the 
normalized GDP growth rate based on constant 2015 US dollars obtained 
from World Bank is below the bottom 20th percentile of the distribution of 
normalized GDP growth for 648 country-year observations (Erel, Jiang & 
Minton, 2017).  Because distributions of GDP growth are country specific, 
the GDP growth is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation of each country to identify abnormal levels of GDP 
growth rates. The mean and standard deviation used to normalize GDP 
growth for a specific country and year are estimated from a time-series of 
GDP growth rates over a prior 20-year period ending two years prior to the 
event (i.e. from t-23 to year t-3). 
MAQ  
Multiple acquirer, an acquirer that made more than one successful 




Managerial interest alignment with debtholders, which is given by the 
proportion of LTL held by the managers. 
ΔMIAwDBT1 
Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 
𝛥𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐷𝐵𝑇1𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/
𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝑡－(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 
ΔMIAwDBT2 
Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 
𝛥𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐷𝐵𝑇2𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = [(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)－
(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)]/𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 
ΔMIAwDBT3 
Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 
𝛥𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐷𝐵𝑇3𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/





Managerial interest alignment with equity holders, which is the proportion 
of a firm’s equity (Eq) held by its mangers. 
ΔMIAwEQ1 
Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 
𝛥𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐸𝑄1𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝑡－
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 
ΔMIAwEQ2 
Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 





Changes in interest 
alignment measure 
Pre-to-post change in interest alignment measure, which is defined as 
𝛥𝑀𝐼𝐴𝑤𝐸𝑄3𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 = (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/(𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑖,𝑡－
𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡)－(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝐽,𝑡)/𝐸𝑞𝐵𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 










Combined managerial interest alignment to stockholders and bondholders 
given by: (Stock + Options + Debt + PVP) / (Eq + LTL) where the 




Ownership is percentage of shares held by insiders, excluding shares held in 
a fiduciary capacity, divided by outstanding shares at the beginning of a 
quarter (Iliev et al., 2015). Ownership is defined as percentage of closely 
held shares in Worldscope, and as the sum of the holdings of all institutions 




Misvaluation measure of Akbulut (2013). 




Difference between daily high and low price, divided by daily high price 




Difference between daily high and low price, divided by daily high price. 
PReturn Past return Stock return over the previous 4 quarters. 
Public Target Dummy variable Equal to one if target is listed on the stock market; 0 otherwise. 
PUI  
Policy uncertainty index (PUI) obtained from the website of Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis. This index has four components (i) a comprehensive measure of 
uncertainty based on the number of articles about economic policy 
uncertainty in ten large newspapers; (ii) taxation uncertainty based on data 
from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on expiring tax provisions, 
(iii) taxation uncertainty, and (iv) expenditure uncertainty, where the latter 
two components are based on the dispersions in professional analyst 
forecasts. Baker et al. (2016) report that the PUI captures periods of 
heightened policy uncertainty around such events as elections, policy 
debates, and government policy changes. PUI is used in various studies 
(e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; Gulen and Ion, 2016; and Francis et al., 
2014). 
PVP 
Present value of 
pensions 
Calculation method closely follows Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and White (2015, 
p. 262).  It is the sum of the following for each executive in a firm: 




X is the executive’s annual pension, A is the executive’s current age, R is the 
minimum retirement age to achieve full benefits, τ is the final year that the 
executive could draw a pension (set to 120 as in Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007), and π(n) is the probability that the executive will continue to draw 
retirement benefits in future year n. The projected life expectancy from the 
Period Life Table that is available from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration up to and including year 119 is used for the mortality 
probabilities for an age of A. Rate to discount, d, is the annualized Moody’s 
Seasoned AAA-rated bond yield for a given year obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s H.15 release. Firms that voluntarily disclosed PVP values 
prior to 2006 used a similar rate; namely, the yield on 10-year Treasuries or 








Market value of common stock plus book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total assets in the year prior to the M&A announcement. 
Q(i) Dummy variable 
Dummy variable indicating whether the value of the interacting variable 









Given by (△DebtCEO/△DebtFIRM) ÷ (△DquityCEO/△EquityFIRM), as in Wei 
and Yermack (2011). 
Relsize Exchange ratio 
Actual fixed exchange ratio for all announced deals to capture the extent of 
aribtrage driven short selling, as in Liu and Wu (2014). 
Return Stock Return 
Holding period stock return for the past three years, obtained as the ratios of 
the price at the end of years t - 4 and year t - 1, adjusted for dividends and 




RKRV (2005) Firm-specific short-run pricing error. 
RKRV_TIME RKRV (2005) Time-series sector short-run error. 




Obtained using the RKRV valuation model and the three-step regression 
procedure of Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010) on an unbalanced, rolling 
ten-year panel with firm fixed effects for all firms in each industrial sector. 
R&D R&D expenses Research and develop expenses. 
ROA t-1 Return on Assets 
Ratio of earnings before taxes, interest, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to the firm’s total assets. 
R&D/Assets R&D to assets 
Firm’s research and development expenditures divided by its total assets. 
Zeros replace missing values as in Brick et al. (2006). 
ResCov Residual coverage Residual coverage using the Yu (2008) calculation method. 
SAQ  
Single acquirer, which is defined as an acquirer that made no successful 
acquisition during the previous two year (Ismail and Abdallah, 2013). 
%Short Short interest ratio 
Ratio of short sales volume to total trade volume (e.g., Diether, Lee and 
Werner, 2009; Christophe, Ferri and Angel, 2004; Christophe, Ferri and 
Hseih, 2010). 
⊿%ShortO 
Change in short 
interest ratio 
Difference between the %Short for a specific day and the median %Short 
for window [-22, -6] as in Liu and Wu (2014) which represents normal 
stock short selling activity. 




The number of anti-take-over laws a firm incorporated in states. (Source: 
RiskMetrics, GIM index) 
%Stock 
% of stock in 
M&A payment 




Market value (i.e., number of shares outstanding times the share price) at 
day −64 relative to the M&A announcement day (day 0). 
Sales Sales Natural log of dollar sales in the year before the M&A announcement. 
StockM&A Dummy variable Equal to one if the method of payment is 100% stock; 0 otherwise. 
TA  Total assets. 
TargetSub Subsidiary target Percentage of targets that are subsidiaries. 
TargetCANIPR Target CANIPR 





 For public targets only. Target’s CAR for the window [−63, 126] relative to 





 Measured for the 3-day window around the announcement date using the 
Fama-French (2015) 5-factor model estimated using return data for the 1-
year period ending at day −64 relative to the announcement date. 
Tenure Tenure 
Number of days as of that quarter since the insider first reported in the 
insider data file under his current firm. 
Turnover Share turnover Trading volume in a quarter divided by shares outstanding at the beginning 
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of that quarter. 
△Turnover 
Change in share 
turnover 
Difference between share turnover measured over a subsequent number of 
days and share turnover measured over the prior two quarters. 
Volatility Firm volatility Black–Scholes volatility measure available from Execucomp. 
VolatR Return volatility 
Standard deviation of daily returns over window [-11, -2], where day 0 is 
the M&A announcement date. 
⊿VolatR 
Change in equity 
return volatility 
The volatility computed over quarter t-2 through t-1 minus the volatility 
computed over quarter t-4 through t-3. 
⊿VolatRB 
Change in bond 
return volatility 
The volatility computed over quarter t-2 through t-1 minus the volatility 
computed over quarter t-4 through t-3. 
Withdrawn Dummy variable Equal to one if M&A was withdrawn according to SDC; 0 otherwise. 
 180 
 
Appendix 4.A. Selective Literature Review of the Relationship between Firm Value and CSR 
 The theoretical models examining the relationship between CSR and expected returns assume capital 
market segmentation based on the different investor preferences for firm CSR activities (e.g., Heinkel, 
Kraus and Zechner, 2001; Fama and French, 2007; Mackey, Mackey and Barney, 2007). While socially 
responsible investors use both financial and nonfinancial criteria when making their investment decisions, 
investors with no CSR preferences exclusively use financial criteria. According to these models, socially 
responsible investors obtain increased value from holding firms with CSR activities where the 
incremental value of such holdings is viewed as consumption goods that are unrelated to expected returns 
(Fama and French, 2007). A prediction derived from these theoretical models is that a firm’s expected 
returns (risks) are positively (negatively) related to the size of its investor base based on the incomplete 
information model of Merton (1987) and the related shunned-stock hypothesis (Derwall, Koedijk and 
Horst, 2011).111 Lee and Faff (2009) demonstrate that the Merton (1987) model supports findings that the 
transparency and the risk management practices associated with CSR are priced by investors. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin firms (tobacco, gaming and alcohol) that are ignored by institutional 
investors such as pension funds who uphold social norms, have less analyst coverage, and require higher 
expected returns than otherwise comparable but non-sin firms. 
 Although the balance of empirical studies supports the finding that CSR and firm value are positively 
related, many studies find a negative or no significant relation (e.g., see the review by Margolis, Elfenbein 
and Walsh, 2009). The differences at least partly are attributable to model misspecification (e.g., Margolis 
and Walsh, 2001). Among the more recent papers that account for various potential model 
misspecifications and find that CSR can add value,112 Servaes and Tamayo (2013) find that CSR and firm 
value are positively (negatively or insignificantly) related for firms with high (low) customer awareness, 
and that the directional effect of awareness on this relation depends upon the prior reputation of the firm 
as a good corporate citizen. 
 With regard to the many channels though which CSR may be related to firm value, the risk mitigation 
channel which is grounded in the stakeholder-based theory supports the notion that CSR is positively 
related to a firm’s value since the risk reduction is value enhancing. The underlying argument is that CSR 
                                                          
111 Other market imperfection models for stock returns are developed by Levy (1978), Kryzanowksi and To (1982), 
and Mao (1971).  
112 Other papers in this category include Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2016) who find that CSR pays off when markets 
and the aggregate level of corporate trust suffer a negative shock, Deng, Kang and Low (2013) who find that CSR 
creates value for acquiring firms' shareholders, and Edmans (2012) who finds that CSR that increases job 
satisfaction creates firm value. 
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activities can produce goodwill or moral capital among shareholders,113 which preserves financial 
performance by providing an insurance-like reduction in a firm’s risk exposure (Godfrey, 2005: Godfrey, 
Merrill and Hansen, 2009). Furthermore, CSR engagement may increase firm value by decreasing the 
operating and financial risks associated with social issues (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra, 2011; Feldman, Soyka and Ameer, 1997). For example, CSR activities 
such as the reduction of pollution and emissions decrease a firm’s expected cash outflows due to possible 
compensation, compliance costs, fines, clean-up costs and settlements in case of an environmental 
disaster (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008).  
 In contrast, the overinvestment channel which is grounded in agency-based theory argues that CSR 
activities based on managerial opportunism and entrenchment decrease firm value. To illustrate, managers 
may over-invest in CSR activities to improve their firm’s CSR score in order to build their personal 
reputations as socially responsible citizens (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) or to lower their replacement risk by 
gaining the support of social and/or environmental groups (Cespa and Cestone, 2007). According to 
Surroca and Tribo (2008), a firm’s financial performance is adversely affected by higher CSR when 
combined with managerial entrenchment strategies.  
                                                          
113 Benefits identified by Godfrey (2005) include greater legitimacy among regulators and communities, more 
effective commitment by employees, greater trust by suppliers, and enhanced brand and credibility with customers. 
Other identified benefits include less severely affected by a crisis (Bouslah, Kryzanowski and M’Zali, 2016), less 
intense scrutiny (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009) and a greater decoupling of the effects of negative events from the 
rest of the firm (Bansal and Clelland, 2004). 
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Appendix 4.B. Definition of the Variables used in this Paper 
Variable Name Definition 
AIBi,t Lagged abnormal 
insider buys 
AIBi,t = Bi,t + BOi,t – Si,t,  expressed as a fraction of the trading volume of the 
year t for firm i. 
Assets Assets Total assets (source: COMPUSTAT). Its natural log is used. 
BlockH Blockholdings Log of sum of total blockholdings of no less than 5%. 
Bi,t Open market buys Abnormal number of shares of firm i bought through open market trades or 
through option exercises during year t, expressed as a fraction of the trading 
volume of the year. 
BOi,t Purchases through 
option exercise 
%Board % of independent 
directors 
Number of independent directors/Total number of board members (source: 
RiskMetrics). 
CBO Corporate board 
ownership 
Median Dollar Value of Director Ownership. As in Bhagat and Bolton 
(2006), the median of the holdings of all directors is our governance 
measure as this individual can have the 'swing' vote in governance related 
matters. This variable is calculated from data provided by IRRC and TCL. 
CEOnom CEO nomination 
committee 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO is a chair or a member of nomination 
committee (source: RiskMetrics). 
ComCash Cash compensation Executive Cash Compensation. Executive salary plus bonus as described by 
Execucomp (in dollars). 
ComTotl Total CEO 
compensation 
ExecuComp item “TDC1”, which is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, 
other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, the 
Black-Scholes value of stock options granted that year, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other compensation (in thousands) for the CEO. 
ComLev Compensation 
leverage 
The present value of the pensions of all executives divided by the sum of 
this value and the values of all stocks and stock-options held by the 
executives. 
%ComTotl Ratio of equity to total 
compensation  
Ratio of equity to total compensation for the CEO which is defined as: 1 – 
(Salary + Bonus)/TDC1, where TDC1 or Total Compensation is from the 
ExecuComp database. 
CRISIS Financial crisis 
dummy 
Dummy variable indicates whether the observation lies in the financial crisis 
of 2008-2009 as in Bouslah, Kryzanowski and M'Zali (2016). 
CSRcc Combined component 
scores 
(Sum of all j strength scores for firm i for year t plus total maximum 
possible number of community concern scores for year t minus sum of all j 
concern scores for firm i at year t) divided by (total maximum possible 
number of j strength scores for year t plus total maximum possible number 
of j concern scores for year t), where j = 1 (Community), 2 (Environment), 3 
(Diversity), 4 (Employee Relations) and 5 (Product). 
CSRs Component strength 
scores 
Sum of the strength scores for each component j for firm i for year t divided 
by total maximum possible number of such scores during year t, where j = 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5. See CSRcc for a description of the five j components. 
CSRc Component concern 
scores 
Sum of the concern scores for each component j for firm i for year t divided 
by total maximum possible number of such scores during year t. where j = 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5. See CSRcc for a description of the five j components. 
CSRstr CSR strength 1/5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑠5𝑗=1 j 
CSRcon CSR concern 1/5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑐5𝑗=1 j 
CSRcom CSR composite Arithmetic average of the combined scores of KLD strengths minus 
concerns of all five dimensions with the exception of the exclusionary items, 
i.e., community, environment, diversity, employee, and product dimensions, 
for firm i for year t, given by: 1/5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑐𝑐5𝑗=1 j. 
DCSR DCSR(0, 1) Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has CSR status (having more strengths 
than concerns) in t, 0 otherwise. 
D∆CSRnet D∆CSRnet(0, 1) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gain during t – 1 to t of CSRnet has 
changed. CSRnet is the differences between the number of all strengths a 





Dummy variable equal to 1 if the net gain during t – 1 to t is not zero for 
each of the three metrics. 
D∆CSRcon 
D∆CSRcom 
DHRT DHRT ratio Mispricing ratio of Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson & Teoh (2006).114 
Debt/Assets Debt to assets ratio Long-term debt divided by total assets (source: COMPUSTAT). 
%Director % of director’s share Percentage of shares owned by directors (source: RiskMetrics). 
Divers Diversification Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has more than one business segment 
(source: COMPUSTAT). 
Duality Duality as a measure 
of board leadership 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO is also chair of the board; otherwise 
equal to 0 (source: RiskMetrics). 
EntIndex Entrenchment index Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. (source: RiskMetrics) 
FamilyFirm Family firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a family owned firm; otherwise equal 
to 0. 
Firmage Firm age Firm age is calculated from the beginning of the year from the CRSP 
database (source: CRSP). 
Gamma  Inverse of Mills’ ratio. 
InConcen Concentration of 
institutional investors 
Measured at the beginning of the current year, set to 10,000 if it is greater 
than 10,000, the maximum of the Herfindahl index. 
InsDbt Inside debt Given by the present value of all executives’ pensions (×1000) divided by 
the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
IndexGIM Measure of 
shareholder rights 
Measure of shareholder rights equal to 25 – GIM Index, where GIM Index is 
the index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003; 2010) based on the 
incidence of 24 different corporate-governance provisions. A higher 
measure indicates greater shareholder rights. 
InTrading Insider trading For insider (self-trader) j, the number of shares bought (or sold) through 
open market purchases (or sales or exercises of stock options), expressed as 
a fraction of trading volume in the year for firm i in Eq (2). 
%Insti % of institutional 
ownership 
Percentage of institutional share ownership (source: CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) 
filings). 
MPHP Alternate mispricing 
estimate 
RKRV valuation model using three-step regression approach of Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010) which uses an unbalanced, rolling ten-year panel with firm 
fixed effects for all the firms in each industrial sector. 
Ownership Ownership Shares held by the insider divided by shares outstanding at the beginning of 
the year (winsorized at 1% level to remove the effects of outliers). 
ResCov Residual coverage Residual coverage (Yu, 2008). 
RKRV_Firm 
RKRV measures 
RKRV (2005) firm specific short-run pricing error. 
RKRV_Sector RKRV (2005) time-series sector short-run error. 
RKRV_Long RKRV (2005) long-run pricing to book. 
PAIT Akbulut measure Akbulut (2013) mispricing measure PAIT. 
PReturn Past return Stock return over the previous 4 quarters. 
Ptrading Peer trading For peer insider (self-trader) j, the number of shares bought (or sold) through 
open market purchases (or sales or exercises of stock options), expressed as 
a fraction of trading volume in year t for firm i. 
PV_MB Mispricing MB ratio Mispricing measure developed by Pastor and Veronesi (2003). 
R&D/Sales R&D expenditure ratio Research and development expense divided by total sales (source: 
COMPUSTAT). 
S Open market sales For firm i, the abnormal number of shares sold through open market sales 
during year t, expressed as a fraction of the trading volume of the year t. 
SOXpost Dummy variable Dummy variable is equal to 1 if a firm appointed expert directors to the 
audit committee in a year of the post-SOX period, i.e., between 2003 to 
2013. Similar to Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004), our expert directors include 
accounting experts (i.e., directors who are audit committee financial experts 
                                                          
114 Since higher values of Uvdum indicate greater undervaluation, all the other mispricing measures are multiplied 
by minus one so that their higher values also indicate greater undervaluation. The measures are PAIT, DHRT, MPHP, 
RKRV_Firm, RKRV_Sector, RKRV_Long, PV_MB and TobinQ.  
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and have work experience in accounting or finance (such as a CFO, CAO, 
and VP-Finance), or have experience in auditing) and other experts (i.e, 
directors who are designated as ‘‘audit committee financial experts’’ by the 
company who cannot be classified as accounting experts). 
Spreads Bond yield spreads The difference between the weighted average yield on the firm's outstanding 
debt and the yield on a Treasury security with a similar duration. 
StateLaw 
Anti-take-over laws 
The number of anti-take-over laws a firm incorporated in states. (Source: 
RiskMetrics, GIM index) 




Trading volume in a quarter divided by shares outstanding at the beginning 
of that quarter. 
Uvdum Undervalued dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 (undervalued) if the AIB of the firm in year t is 
in the top 33% of the distribution of the AIB of all firms in year t, -1 
(overvalued) if in the bottom 33% of the distribution, otherwise 0. 
VolatR 
Return volatility 
Standard deviation of daily returns over window [-11, -2], where day 0 is the 




Appendix 4.C. The Aggregated Abnormal Net Buy Ratio (AIB) as a Measure of Firm 
Undervaluation 
 Since the required raw data for estimating our AIB measure are reliable open-market sales, open-
market purchases and option-exercise purchases (codes “P”, “S” and “M”, respectively) by managers,115 it 
does not include amended or inconsistent insider trades (i.e., those with codes “S” and “A” as in Blau, 
Fuller and Wade, 2014), and insider trades by non-manager directors, large individual shareholders, 
institutional shareholders and trusts. The resulting sample consists of 23,309 insiders for 25,571 firm 
years and 2803 firms. The average and median time between the transaction and report dates for this 
sample is 23 and 9 days.  
 We obtain the AIB misvaluation estimates following the two-step procedure used by Akbulut 
(2013).116 In the first step, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression to obtain the abnormal 
ratios for each of three dependent variables:117 
 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏0𝐼𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘 + 𝑏1𝑃𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑏3𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 +𝑏4%𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏5𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6%𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (C.1) 
  +𝑏8𝐼𝑛𝑠𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝐼𝑀𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏11#𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘   
 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is the natural log of the trading ratio for insider j who is a member of firm i during 
time t for trade type k, where k is the ratio of open market sales (S) or open market purchases (B) or 
option exercises (BO) to annual trading volume. 118  Prior studies (e.g., Akbulut, 2013) find that an 
insider’s prior-trading is positively related to her current trading.  
 𝑃𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is the natural log of the trading ratio for the chosen peer to insider j using propensity 
score matching (PSM) where insider j is a member of firm i during time t for trade type k. 119 The use of 
                                                          
115 Managerial position codes include: VP, VC, OB, OD, OE, OT, OX, P. SVP, TR, COO. CT, EVP GC, GM, GP, 
H, O, AV, C, CB, CEO, CFO, CI and VP. 
116 Similar measures are used by Beneish and Vargus (2002), Core, Guay, Richardson and Verdi (2006), and Billett 
and Qian (2008). 
117 Past return, age, tenure, turnover and past volatility are not included since our regression results are not 
qualitatively affected by including these variables, and excluding these variables also helps to avoid a 
multicollinearity problem. In one of our specifications using all the variables, we find variance inflation factors (VIF) 
as high as 10.175. 
118 As argued by Billett and Qian (2008) and Akbulut (2013), we focus on sales that reflect managerial opinions 
about firm value and not on the sales immediately following option exercises that are more likely to be 
noninformation motivated.   




peer trading with similar ownership in a firm with similar firm size helps to account for normal trading 
across years and different insider trading periods.  
Ln 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is included since Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders at large (small) firms tend to be net sellers 
(purchasers). 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑙  and 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  are included since Beneish and Vargus (2002) report that insider 
compensation level and ownership form have an impact on the insider’s liquidity, portfolio rebalancing 
and diversification motivated trading. Furthermore, previous studies find that managerial stock ownership 
is positively (negatively) related with open market trading (purchases through options exercise).120  
 Institutional ownership fraction (%𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖), Concentration (𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛) of institutional ownership and 
residual coverage (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑣) are included to proxy for firm governance. Prior studies find that the levels of 
corporate governance negatively impact the open market purchases of managers.  
 Inside debt (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝐷𝑏𝑡) and the shareholder rights index (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝐼𝑀) are also included since unreported 
panel regressions indicate that these two variables capture unique information about the trading 
propensity of managers.  
 %𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑙 is included since studies (e.g., Akbulut 2013) find that executives with a higher ratio of 
equity to total compensation purchase less through open market and option exercises.  
 𝜀𝑗𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  represents abnormal insider trading for trade type k (buy, sell or option exercise) of manager j in 
firm i in year t.121 Abnormal changes in insider trading are captured well since our model allows the 
coefficients to change. A significantly positive and large value indicates that managers believe that their 
firms are undervalued, so that they buy more and sell less.  
 In the second step, we obtain a value for aggregated managerial beliefs about the extent of firm 
undervaluation for firm i in year t as AIBi,t (aggregated abnormal net buy ratio) :  
AIBi,t = Bi,t + BOi,t – Si,t (C.2) 
where 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 , BOi,t, and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  are the abnormal insider trading buy, stock-option exercise and sell ratios, 
respectively, estimated in the first step, where each is aggregated over all the managers J in firm i in year t. 
                                                          
120 See, e.g., Beneish and Vargus (2002), and Akbulut (2013). 
121 In order to control for cross-sectional changes of trading volume in a year, we divide each abnormal insider 
trading variable by the total trading volume for that year to normalize these variables. This accounts for seasonal 
changes in market trading volume. 
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Appendix 4.D. List of the Strength and Concern Items for Five Categories in the KLD Database 
This appendix provides a list of the strength and concern items for five KLD categories that are bolded. Two not 
listed categories: Corporate governance; & human rights. KLD exclusionary items (controversial business items): 
Alcohol; Gambling; Tobacco; Firearms; Military; & Nuclear. Strengths and concerns included in data set from 1992 
to 2014, unless otherwise indicated. Items added or removed (i.e. ended) or moved between categories in 




Strengths: Charitable giving; Innovative giving; Support for housing; Support for education (added 1994); 
Indigenous peoples relations (added 2000 moved to human rights 2002); Non-U.S. charitable giving; Volunteer 
programs (added 2005); Other strength. 
Concerns: Investment controversies; Negative economic impact; Indigenous peoples relations (’00, moved ’02 to 
human rights); Tax disputes (moved here 2005); & Other concern. 
Environment  
Strengths: Beneficial products & services; Pollution prevention; Recycling; Clean energy (renamed from alternative 
fuels); Communications (added 1996); Property, plant, and equipment (no assignments since 1996); Management 
systems (from 2006); & Other strength.  
Concerns: Hazardous waste; Regulator problems; Ozone depleting chemicals; Substantial emissions; Agricultural 
chemicals; Climate change (added 1999); & Other concern. 
Diversity 
Strengths: CEO; Promotion; Board of directors; Work/life benefits (renamed 2005 from family benefits); 
Women/minority contracting; Employment of the disabled; Gay & lesbian policies; & Other strength.  
Concerns: Controversies; Non-representation; & Other concern. 
Employee Relations 
Strengths: Union relations; No layoff policy (ended 1994); Cash profit sharing; Employee involvement; Retirement 
benefit strength; Health and safety strength (added ‘03); Other strength. 
Concerns: Union relations; Health & safety concern; Workforce reductions; Retirement benefits concern (renamed 
2004 from pension/benefit concern); Other concern. 
Product Quality 
Strengths: R&D/innovation; Benefits to economically disadvantaged; & Other strength 
Concerns: Product safety; Marketing/contracting concern; Antitrust; & Other concern. 
 
